

# Chinese Representation in the United Nations

## 272. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>

New York, January 10, 1969, 2149Z.

50. Chirep in SC—Wrap-up Jan 10. Ref: USUN 8669<sup>2</sup> and 08.<sup>3</sup>

1. Changed composition of SC in 1969 is unfavorable from US viewpoint on a wide range of issues including Chirep, ME, and African problems. If challenge on Chirep issue is to be raised, it should logically be done at first meeting of Council in 1969 to avoid adverse precedent of continuation of past practice. Therefore, we have initiated consultations with new SC members and will touch base again with old members on strategy and tactics designed to avoid a confrontation on this issue.

2. In addition to five perm members (China, France, USSR, UK, US), there are 10 non-perm seats held in 1969 by following (new members indicated by country replaced in parenthesis): Algeria, Colombia (Brazil); Finland (Denmark); Hungary; Nepal (India); Pakistan; Paraguay; Senegal; Spain (Canada); Zambia (Ethiopia). At 23rd UNGA, only 5 of above countries voted against so-called Albanian res which would have expelled GRC and seated PRC (China, Colombia, Paraguay, Spain, US). Senegal abstained and other 9 voted in favor.

3. Our policy premise is that GA, as plenary body of UN in which all members are represented, should be venue for discussions involving change of representation of a member state. Thus, a 15-nation body not representative of full membership, SC, should not take a decision on such a far-reaching matter affecting representation in UN of a founding member. This is particularly true when subject has regularly been debated extensively in GA. In our view, such an important issue as Chirep should not be approached through technical subterfuge of seeking to reject credentials of a member of SC.

4. Since 1948, SC has followed a procedure whereby SYG, when a rep on Council is replaced, simply circulates a report stating that credentials have been issued by proper authorities and are in order. Tradi-

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, UN 6 CHICOM. Secret. Repeated to Taipei, Paris, Moscow, London, Algiers, Bogota, Helsinki, Budapest, Kathmandu, Rawalpindi, Dakar, Madrid, Lusaka, and Asuncion.

<sup>2</sup> Dated December 31, 1968. (Ibid.)

<sup>3</sup> Dated January 2, 1969. (Ibid.)

tionally, there has been no formal action by Council and credentials are thus tacitly approved. (Present GRC Rep has sat in SC since 1962.) In Jan 1968 Algerian Rep raised question of whether approval of credentials reports was tacit or explicit and stated that his del believed approval should be explicit in event objections were raised. At suggestion of Pres, SC went on to consider its agenda but requested SYG to prepare a report on how credentials were handled. Above practice was described by SYG in doc S/8365 and Algeria did not raise matter again in 1968.

5. If Algeria or some other member raises Chirep in SC, our first line of defense will be to argue that there should be no change in Council's long established practice on credentials and we would hope that Pres would rule any attempt to take up matter of handling credentials out of order. Obviously, we would not be able to count on such a ruling when France, Hungary and USSR are Pres in Feb, Mar and Sept respectively.

6. In order to give effect to our position in para 3 above, we have developed fol res which can be supported widely in SC without doing violence to position of friendly states (such as UK) which recognize Peking:

"The Security Council,

"Noting with approval the report by the Secretary General on 'practice of the Security Council regarding the credentials of its members' of 26 January 1968 (S/8365),

"Decides to take no further action at this time to consider the credentials of any of its members."

7. Such a res is not vetoable and would require 9 affirmative votes. Based on our consultations during 1968 and on past votes, we are reasonably confident that we can count on 8 firm votes: China, Colombia, Finland, Paraguay, Senegal, Spain, UK, US. Thus we will need either Nepal or Zambia if we are to be successful. Our initial approaches to these two members are reported USUN 8669 and 08 and we will be following up here early next week. A summary of our consultation follows:

8. UK. UK, in consultations last year, approved text of above res. Support of UK essential but, since it recognizes PRC, cannot support us on some alternative ways of dealing with problem. Therefore, above text was worked out in consultation with UK and Danes.

9. Finland. During 23rd GA, Amb Jakobson told Pedersen that GOF supported basic US approach. We intend to check with him exact wording of text of our procedural res as well as to discuss various tactical contingencies which might arise while he is Pres. (Denmark, in agreeing to text last year, showed it to Nordic countries including Finland, but we still have to get formal Finnish approval.)

10. Nepal. See USUN 8669. (We still awaiting reply to State's 294243.<sup>4</sup> Hope Emb can provide answer soon since Nepal vote critical.)

11. Zambia. See USUN 08.

12. Colombia. Based on Colombia's past votes on Chirep, we do not anticipate difficulty but we will discuss matter with Amb Turbay soon.

13. Paraguay. Based on our discussions with Amb Lopez in 1968, we believe Paraguay supports our position.

14. Spain. De Pinies told Buffum he expected GOS would support US position.

15. Senegal. GOS supports basic US position matter should be handled by GA. We will discuss text of res with Amb Boye in near future.

16. Pakistan. Although our discussions with Shahi on this matter were not very encouraging last year, we believe it would be worthwhile to have another round with him possibly followed by an approach in Rawalpindi.

17. France. Berard told Buffum Jan 9 that he would be bound by firm instructions and that he "would not be able to be helpful". Berard also said on personal basis that he would prefer not to face this issue when he is Pres (Feb). Buffum said best insurance would be for France to use its influence to discourage Algeria from raising it. Berard said he would also consult on this matter while he is back in Paris next week.

18. China. We have been in touch with Amb Liu and we will compare notes with Chinese in near future.

19. It is not yet clear what further approaches if any will be necessary in capitals but we thought it advisable to send foregoings as background against possibility approaches might eventually be required.

**Buffum**

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<sup>4</sup> Dated January 4. (Ibid.)

**273. National Security Study Memorandum 14<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, February 5, 1969.

TO

The Secretary of State  
The Secretary of Defense  
The Director for Central Intelligence

SUBJECT

U.S. China Policy

The President has directed that a study be prepared on U.S. Policy Towards China, on U.S. objectives and interests involved and the broad lines of appropriate U.S. policies. The study should incorporate alternative views and interpretations of the issues involved. It should include summary statements of the conceptions and policy lines of the previous administration.

The Study should include the following:

1. The current status of U.S. relations with Communist China and the Republic of China;
2. The nature of the Chinese Communist threat and intentions in Asia;
3. The interaction between U.S. policy and the policies of other major interested countries toward China;
4. Alternative U.S. approaches on China and their costs and risks.

The President has directed that the NSC Interdepartmental Group for East Asia perform this study.

The paper should be forwarded to the NSC Review Group by March 10.

**Henry A. Kissinger**

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 365, Subject Files, NSSMs 1-42. Secret.

**274. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

New York, March 7, 1969, 2219Z.

679. Subject: Chirep. Ref: State 028278.<sup>2</sup>

1. We would appreciate Dept's analysis of possible implications of third of "three constant principles" which ChiComs gave Canadians per reftel.

2. Under third principle Canada, and any other country wishing diplomatic relations with CPR, "must give support to restoration of rightful place and legitimate rights of CPR in UN and no longer give any backing to retention of so-called representatives of Chiang Kai-shek in any organization of this international body."

3. Three aspects appear noteworthy in comparison previous stands taken by Peking re UN:

A. Question of their representation in UN is given prominence by its injection as one of only three conditions related to bilateral relations. Peking has not often shown this much interest in UN.

B. Similarly, surprisingly positive interest is indicated by formulation which puts clause re Peking representation in UN ahead of that re GRC representation.

C. Perhaps most surprising is "soft" formulation re GRC; instead of demanding active support for expulsion, Peking asks that Canada merely cease their support.

4. We recognize Peking may have selected language calculated avoid jeopardizing relations with Canada. Nonetheless we would have expected Peking require active Canadian support for "expulsion of illegal reps so that PRC could take its rightful place."

5. We also recognize present hard line being taken by Peking makes it doubtful Peking is moderating its view of outside world.

6. Nonetheless we would appreciate comments on possibility Peking may be becoming more interested in entering UN. (Indian source here in late Jan speculated that then-current moderation out of Peking Foreign Ministry suggested Chinese realize how dangerous their isolation is under conditions of mounting hostility with Moscow. He speculated Peking may have realized importance to Czechoslovakia of having a voice at the UN last August, and this may have contributed to policy shift to seek improved relations with outside world and press energetically for seat in UN.)

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 295, Agency Files, USUN, Vol. I. Secret; Exdis.

<sup>2</sup> Dated February 24. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 16 CHICOM)

7. Whether or not formulation of third principle represents policy shift by Peking, we are concerned that as knowledge of it spreads its effect may be to increase difficulty in holding line here at next GA in terms of defending GRC right to continued representation. This is because strength of US position against any proposal to throw GRC out of UN has rested in part on idea that Peking is disinterested in entering UN, as evidenced by their rigid insistence on explicit conditions whereby GRC will first be expelled.

Yost

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**275. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, March 18, 1969, 1053Z.

41509. Subject: Chirep. Ref: USUN 679.<sup>2</sup>

1. We do not believe that Chicom's presentation of "three constant principles" or their formulation of third principle to Canadians represents shift in Peking basic policy re recognition or UN. We do not however rule out possibility that Peking might wish to appear to be more interested than heretofore in UN membership. As Canadian/Chicom negotiations develop we will presumably get a clearer picture of Peking's intentions.

2. "Principles" outlined to Canadians are consistent with position taken by Peking for past several years in private discussions with US and in negotiations on recognition of which we aware with other non-communist countries. This was true even during period, i.e. 1965-66, when Peking publicly most strongly denounced UN and formulated its most extreme conditions for accepting membership. For example, Chicoms raised issue with us at Warsaw early 1966, charging US opposed restoration of their "legitimate" seat in UN. There are indications that these "principles" were put forward in negotiations leading to French recognition in 1964. We know that they were enunciated thereafter during attempts to get Japanese to follow French example.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, UN 6 CHICOM. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Jay H. Long; cleared by Richard H. Donald, Harry E. T. Thayer, Thomas P. Shoemith, William H. Gleysteen, Nicholas Platt, and William S. Shepard; and approved by Assistant Secretary De Palma. Repeated to Taipei and Hong Kong.

<sup>2</sup> Document 274.

3. With respect to para 3B reftel, it is uncertain whether clauses were in fact arranged or phrased precisely in the form passed to us by Canadians. Moreover, analysis is made difficult by lack of information concerning the precise manner in which the conditions were formulated to others previously. In any case, particularly if read, as clearly intended, in context of other two “principles”, we are inclined not to regard Chicom demand for support of its “rightful place” and for cessation of backing for GRC as a softening of traditional position. Whatever the order, it seems clear that Peking is not suggesting that continued presence of GRC in UN is any more acceptable.

4. Chicom formulation is consistent with proposition that Peking all along has wanted UN membership (on its terms of course) despite variations in the priority which it has given to achieving that objective. It should be noted that Peking has never explicitly ruled out UN membership and has never departed from attitude that it deserves to be member. It has simply made acceptance of membership conditional, with expulsion of the GRC as the minimum condition. Peking public denunciation of UN can be ascribed to “sour-grapes” recognition or belief that membership under its minimum condition has not been possible.

5. Despite the above, we agree with USUN (para 7 reftel) that any positive indication or impression of greater Peking interest in entering UN may make it more difficult to hold the line in the next GA as a result of our past use of the opposite argument. We will therefore have to watch developments very closely and in meantime recognize that such arguments could boomerang.

6. Hong Kong may wish to comment.

**Rogers**

**276. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, May 19, 1969, 2243Z.

79607. Subject: Soviets and Chirep.

1. Recent conversations reported reftel, USUN 1292<sup>2</sup> and elsewhere reflect Soviet preference, as result Sino-Soviet conflict to see continued exclusion of Chicoms from UN. Gradual Soviet shift away from full support of Peking on Chirep issue has been evident, though not always manifest, for past several years. Despite formalistic support in official statements and in voting Soviets on several occasions have made private statements or taken behind the scenes actions designed—sometimes grossly apparent—to give impression its support is not wholehearted. Fact that we have not faced serious challenge on Chirep in Security Council despite unfavorable composition of Council during 1968 and 1969 is due in part, we believe, to conscious Soviet disinclination to press issue when opportunity to do so has arisen.

2. Our preliminary judgment is that formal Soviet position in UN is likely to remain unchanged despite “unofficial” comments suggesting shift in attitude toward GRC and Chirep. We rule out possible change this year in traditional Soviet vote on Albanian Res and Important Question<sup>3</sup> and expect statements in UN, although perhaps somewhat more muted, essentially to repeat past position.

3. Private comments reflect probably genuine Soviet preference that status quo in UN not be upset. But Soviets probably assume that Chirep position of GRC, US and its allies commands sufficient support in UN to assure continued Chicom exclusion without Soviets having to do embarrassing about-face. This is related to Soviet concern and probing about possible shift in US-China policy.

4. Most likely impact, if any, of these Soviet hints of changed position might be upon those countries whose position on Chirep is influenced more by Moscow than by Peking. Whatever position Soviets

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, UN 6 CHICOM. Secret. Drafted by Jay H. Long; cleared by Louise McNutt, Nicholas Platt, Adolph Dubs, Paul H. Kreisberg, and John P. Sontag; and approved by William H. Gleysteen. Also sent to Taipei and repeated to Moscow, Ottawa, Tokyo, and Hong Kong.

<sup>2</sup> In telegram 1292, May 1, Yost reported that an unnamed First Secretary at the Soviet Mission to the UN said that he hoped that the United States would not change its attitude toward “Nationalist” China whether or not it sought improved relations with Communist China, adding that “Nationalist” China’s 13 million people could not be discarded. (Ibid.)

<sup>3</sup> See Document 278.

take formally, cumulative effect of Soviet private expressions of concern might be to prompt shifts by these others.

5. On other hand, private, low-level Soviet assertions of need to preserve representation of Taiwan in UNGA might encourage consideration by others of proposal calling for admission of Chicoms without at same time calling for expulsion of GRC. Such a proposal would possibly receive considerably greater support than the Albanian resolution and in case of adoption would seriously risk GRC withdrawal, result which neither we nor presumably Soviets would like.

6. Outside UN, Soviet private statements might serve to discourage additional moves toward bilateral recognition of Peking.

7. *For USUN*: Your comments solicited. We would appreciate particularly reporting on any sentiment on this issue which you may hear expressed by other missions or any indications Soviets are discussing Chirep along lines reported reftel.

Richardson

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## 277. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Netherlands<sup>1</sup>

Washington, August 18, 1969, 2335Z.

139182. Subject: Chirep and Korea at 24th UNGA. Ref: A. The Hague 3107;<sup>2</sup> B. CA-10681, 9/6/68.<sup>3</sup>

1. Chirep: At moment we assume Chirep issue will follow traditional pattern, i.e. Important Question and Albanian-type resolutions (with or without Study Committee proposal). While we do not rule out possible new initiatives or some shifts in attitudes as result developments since last year—such as Canadian and Italian moves toward recognition of Peking and intensification Sino-Soviet conflict—we have no evidence anyone planning anything new. Since Netherlands was once co-sponsor (1967) of unsuccessful study committee proposal, you

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, UN 3 GA. Confidential. Drafted by Long; cleared by McNutt, Thomas E. McNamara, Shoesmith, and Brynhild C. Rowberg; and approved by Gleysteen. Repeated to USUN, Seoul, and Taipei.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed. (Ibid.)

<sup>3</sup> This airgram described issues expected to be considered by the 23rd regular session of the UN General Assembly. (Ibid., UN 22–2 GA)

might discreetly sound out intentions this year as well as any word they may have received from Belgians or Italians. We would of course appreciate continuing Netherlands support for IQ Res and at minimum another abstention on Albanian Res. US position on all three reses remains unchanged. (See Ref B.)

2. Korea: Since supporters of North Korea have inscribed usual item calling for withdrawal of UN forces from Korea, we will wish UNCURK to submit its report early Sept to UNGA, rather than SYG, so that it will be inscribed on agenda. Although our preference was to avoid debate (and 1968 UNCURK Res was designed to make it possible) inscription of hostile item has made usual debate inevitable. Our position on this issue also remains unchanged. We expect debate and outcome similar to last year.

3. You will receive shortly annual circular airgram outlining US position on issues likely to arise in GA, including Chirep and Korea.

**Rogers**

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## 278. Editorial Note

During the 1961 UN General Assembly, a resolution sponsored by the United States, Australia, Colombia, Italy, and Japan was approved, making the issue of Chinese representation in the United Nations an "Important Question." (UN document A/L.372; Resolution 1668 (XVI), adopted December 15, 1961) Items placed before the UN General Assembly that were "Important Questions" (IQs) required a two-thirds majority to pass. A 1962 draft resolution sponsored by the Soviet Union sought to replace the Republic of China in the General Assembly and the Security Council by the People's Republic of China. This resolution was defeated in the General Assembly on October 30, 1962. A similar resolution, sponsored by Albania, the so-called Albanian Resolution, was rejected in October 1963. See *Foreign Relations, 1961-1963*, volume XXV, Documents 230 and 274.

On September 17, 1969, the General Assembly agreed to consider another resolution sponsored by Albania and 13 other nations entitled "Restoration of the lawful rights of the People's Republic of China." See *U.S. Participation in the UN, 1969*, pages 59-62.

**279. Telegram From Secretary of State Rogers to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

New York, October 11, 1969, 0037Z.

Secto 119/3544. Subj: Bilateral Talks Between Secretary and Foreign Minister Wei.

1. Following summary based on uncleared memcon, Noforn and FYI only subject to revision upon review:

2. Secretary opened discussion saying most important current problem Chirep. Foreign Minister Wei agreed and said when Secretary in Taiwan they hoped no complications would arise on this issue. Now there are difficulties with co-sponsors for IQ. Ambassador Yost said Latin Americans presenting some problems. This does not affect vote, only co-sponsors. Ambassador Liu said of last year's co-sponsors Colombia will not co-sponsor, Bolivian Mission uncertain of position of new government, and Brazil feels there should be more LA co-sponsors than just Brazil and Nicaragua. Nicaragua willing co-sponsor but thinks position awkward if Brazil doesn't come in. Liu thought it might be possible to add new LA co-sponsor, possibly Costa Rica, and ask for US assistance. Ambassador Yost said we will support Chinese moves that direction. Ambassador Pedersen said preliminary vote estimate is all right, but LA's must be firmed up. Ambassador Liu agreed and said Colombia and Ecuador required prodding. Ambassador Yost agreed, but noted statement by President of Colombia and Colombian Foreign Minister's plea for universality in GA. Ambassador Pedersen said a recent cable from Bogota indicated we might have some room for maneuver.<sup>2</sup> Secretary said he did not know reason for Colombian switch. Ambassador Liu said a Japanese colleague told him Colombian Perm Rep visited Communist China before coming to New York and Colombian Foreign Minister also visited mainland.

3. Conversation turned to Italy which was a co-sponsor last year and voted against Albanian Resolution. Liu said if Italy does not co-sponsor another European, possibly Spain, would be helpful. ROC Ambassador Madrid said GOS sympathized, however, wished to have judge elected to ICJ and also has problem of Gibraltar. Spanish reluctant move to forward position before ICJ candidates decided. We should have IQ Res circulated ASAP. If Spain agrees join later it would be acceptable. Liu asked if we would talk to Spanish. Yost agreed to

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 1 CHINAT–US. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Repeated to Taipei.

<sup>2</sup> Not found.

do so. Foreign Minister asked if we could convince the Italians to continue as co-sponsor. They have not changed their relations with Taipei. Secretary said Italians have domestic problems this issue, a large Communist bloc and an active group of intellectuals who favor recognition. They must look at real world of internal politics. Foreign Minister Moro was understanding in talk with Secretary but stressed domestic aspects.

4. Ambassador Wei said efforts required not only for co-sponsors but also for votes against AR. Liu added AR had three additional co-sponsors this year. Secretary asked that he and Ambassador Pedersen be kept informed and said he would send Amb. Pedersen back to New York if needed. Liu said there was concern US might shift policy toward Peking. Secretary pointed out we had not given any indication of shift; in fact we convinced Malaysian Prime Minister to alter his position of abstention on both items. Malaysia would now abstain on IQ and vote no on AR. Ambassador Liu said articles such as one in *New York Times* of October 9 regarding US moves to meet moderates in Peking are interpreted broadly by certain delegations.<sup>3</sup> Secretary said we would not change our position and, if necessary, he would make another statement.

5. Ambassador Wei asked President Nixon's view of talks between Secretary Rogers and President Chiang in Taiwan.<sup>4</sup> Secretary replied President had read report with interest and approved of what was said. We will not change our policy toward Taiwan and intend to honor our treaty commitments. [Omitted here is discussion of U.S. assistance to the Republic of China.]

**Rogers**

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<sup>3</sup> Peter Grose, "U.S. Aides Discern Signs That Peking Is Easing Enmity," *The New York Times*, October 9, 1969, p. A-1.

<sup>4</sup> A memorandum of conversation of the August 8 meeting between Rogers and Chiang is printed in *Foreign Relations, 1969-1976*, volume XVII, China, 1969-1972.

**280. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, October 22, 1969, 2330Z.

179395. Subject: Chirep Voting Estimates.

1. On basis responses to CA-4850,<sup>2</sup> UNGA General Debate statements and other reports, we have compiled following preliminary vote estimate on Chirep resolutions: Important Question: Yes-70, No-48, Abstain-7, Absent-1; "Albanian" resolution: Yes-45, No-56, Abstain-24, Absent-1.

2. While estimate reflects decrease in favorable margin on both reses, margin on IQ is still substantial (22 compared with 26 last year). On more critical Albanian res, margin between yes and no votes estimated decrease from 14 to 11.

3. Following are estimated changes from last year on Albanian res: No to Abstain: Chile and Italy; Abstain to Yes: Ghana and Nigeria; Yes to Abstain: Kenya. On IQ: No to Abstain: Kenya; Yes to Abstain: Malaysia and Maldives; Yes to No: Libya; Abstain to No: Morocco.

4. Firm information is lacking however from following (on Albanian res): Botswana, Cameroon, CAR, Equatorial Guinea, Gambia, Honduras, Iceland, Ivory Coast, Jordan, Kenya, Liberia, Malawi, Maldives, Malta, Mauritius, Niger, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Swaziland, Trinidad and Uruguay.

5. Request USUN review and compare estimates with our co-sponsors to determine where additional information or effort required. Following review and further canvass of dels, you may wish recommend to Dept capitals where approach has some prospect of success, where further effort with UNDel not likely to be productive (e.g. Chile), or where special circumstances apply.

**Rogers**

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, UN 6 CHICOM. Confidential. Drafted by Jay H. Long, cleared in draft by Louise McNutt, and approved by Arthur R. Day. Repeated to Taipei, Tokyo, and Hong Kong.

<sup>2</sup> See footnote 1, Document 83.

**281. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

New York, October 29, 1969, 0034Z.

3825. Subj: Chirep—Co-sponsors Meeting. Ref: State 179395.<sup>2</sup>

1. USUN chaired meeting IQ co-sponsors Oct. 28 to review voting estimates and general tactics for Chirep debate still tentatively scheduled open in plenary Nov. 3. Following co-sponsors attended: Australia, Costa Rica, Japan, Lesotho, Madagascar, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Paraguay, and Philippines. (Brazil, Gabon, Thailand and Togo not represented.)

2. Consensus was that debate and outcome Important Question and Albanian reses would be similar to last year. There no sign here that study committee or other third proposal will be introduced.

3. Group reviewed soft spots in estimates and divided up task of follow-up approaches with UNDeIs as follows: Costa Rican and Paraguayan Reps will seek confirmation position of Colombia, Bolivia, Guyana and Jamaica; Madagascar to check Libya, Kenya and Nigeria; GRC to check Jordan and Saudi Arabia; Japan with Ghana and Turkey; New Zealand with Maldives; US with Ghana and Iran. Costa Rican Rep (Dobles Sanchez) said Guatemalan Amb told him Guatemala position same as last year. It was decided approaches should not be made here on Chile, Senegal or Belgium pending outcome approaches currently being made in capitals.

4. Group agreed number of friendly speakers should be keyed to number opposing. Following co-sponsors gave firm commitment to speak: Australia, China, Japan, Madagascar, New Zealand, Philippines, and US. It was agreed that order of speakers and additional speakers would be arranged through informal consultation as situation develops.

5. Bautista (Secretariat) confirms Chirep debate will begin in plenary Monday, November 3.

**Yost**

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, UN 6 CHICOM. Limited Official Use. Repeated to Taipei, Santiago, Brussels, and Dakar.

<sup>2</sup> Document 280.

282. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>

New York, November 4, 1969, 0420Z.

3957. Subject: Chirep Debate Opens in Plenary.

1. Chirep debate began late morning Nov 3 (fol expressions condolences on deaths Tanzanian Perm Rep Danieli and Malaysian Perm Rep Ismail) with statements by Cambodia, China, Japan, Afghanistan, New Zealand, and Algeria. Cambodia and Japan, respectively, introduced “Albanian” and Important Question reses.

2. New Zealand (Scott) reiterated PriMin Holyoake general debate statement that ChiComs should be in UN, and that time had come for new approach to find sensible and just solution to problem. However, Albanian res by expelling GRC wld be “clearly unjust” and “totally unacceptable” to GNZ. He urged adoption IQ res since issue was “in every sense” of far-reaching consequences.

3. At beginning GRC statement, usual supporters of Peking walked out. However, junior Amb remained in Sov chair. Moreover, EE diplomat told DelOff Sovs do not plan speak on Chirep. These inactions, including omission of ref to Peking in general debate speech, are first open reflections in UN of Sino-Sov conflict.

4. Debate continues tomorrow (Nov 4) with US statement scheduled late AM.<sup>2</sup>

**Yost**

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, UN 6 CHICOM. Limited Official Use; Priority. Repeated to Taipei, Moscow, Tokyo, Wellington, and Hong Kong. Further reporting on the General Assembly debates on Chinese representation is in the following telegrams from USUN: 3977 (November 5), 4005 (November 6), 4027 (November 7), 4070 (November 8), and 4121 (November 11). (All *ibid.*)

<sup>2</sup> The statement of U.S. Representative J. Irving Whalley is printed in the Department of State *Bulletin*, December 1, 1969, pp. 476–479.

**283. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

New York, November 12, 1969, 0103Z.

4146. Chirep Vote Results.

1. UNGA voted Nov 11 on Chirep reses with following results:

A. Important Question res adopted by vote of 71–48–4, 3 absent (73–47–5 in 1968).

B. Albanian res defeated 48–56–21, 1 absent (44–58–23 in 1968). (This one vote less than margin forecast USUN 3978.)<sup>2</sup>

2. Changes from 1968 were as follows:

A. Important Question: Ecuador–Abstain to yes; Equatorial Guinea–Yes to absent; Kuwait–No to absent; Libya–yes to no; Malaysia–Yes to abstain; Morocco–No to abstain. Favorable margin thus decreased from 26 to 23.

B. Albanian res: No to abstain: Belgium, Chile and Italy; Abstain to yes: Ghana, Libya, Mauritius and Nigeria. Only favorable change was Senegal from abstain to no. Favorable margin thus decreased from 14 to 8.

**Yost**

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, UN 6 CHICOM. Limited Official Use; Priority. Repeated to Taipei and Hong Kong.

<sup>2</sup> Dated Novembr 5. (Ibid.)

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**284. Telegram From the Embassy in the Republic of China to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

Taipei, January 8, 1970, 0918Z.

126. Subject: GRC Plans on 1970 Chirep Tactics.

1. Summary: MOFA International Organizations Director, Che Yin-shou (protect source), gave EmbOff general description Jan. 6 of GRC 1970 Chirep plans, indicating possible GRC reliance on “Colom-

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, UN 6 CHINAT. Confidential; Noforn. Repeated to Bogota, Tokyo, Hong Kong, and USUN.

bian proposal” for UN Charter amendment as new tactic. End summary.

2. Che said that IO had recently completed “timetable” for 1970 Chirep activity. MOFA would complete by February its internal estimate of probable voting course of all UNGA members on Albanian resolution and Important Question. In late February or early March, Amb. Chou Shu-kai will be instructed to approach Dept. on Chirep. MOFA will concurrently begin liaison with US Embassy, Taipei. MOFA hopes to have preliminary consultation with close supporters such as US and Japan finished before ASPAC meeting in Wellington June 17. Final GRC Chirep strategy would be prepared for President Chiang’s approval by ad hoc committee under Presidential office SecGen Chang Chung in July and August.

3. Che commented that although it is too early to predict what circumstances will surround Chirep debate this year, GRC would probably pin hopes for holding line in respect to Albanian resolution on “Colombian proposal” for UN Charter amendment. Che said that this new approach to perennial question would drain off support for Albanian resolution, performing the function supplied in 1966–8 by Italian initiative on study group (a function which, according to Che, GRC has now come to recognize as useful). At same time, this procedure would afford GRC an opportunity as permanent member SC to block any unacceptable Charter amendment by non-ratification if it appeared that measure might otherwise succeed. Before and during 1970 UNGA, the GRC would not actively campaign against Charter amendment proposal, Che said, and would abstain when vote came up there.

4. In conversations with FonMin Wei Dec. 15 and Vice FonMin Yang Hsi-k’un Dec. 24, both mentioned to Ambassador their hope that consultations on Chirep could begin earlier than usual this year. If the GRC does in fact plan to move from its former bitter opposition to any form of third resolution which might carry “two China” implications, we will need to begin thinking soon of how to respond to GRC tactics.

5. Embassy would appreciate any information on Colombian proposal: text if available, US position, extent of potential support in UNGA.

6. Embassy is not certain how far this proposal as described by Che may have been considered outside of MOFA, although it appears that FonMin and Vice FonMin H.K. Yang both have approved active examination of new Chirep departures for 1970. Request that possible interest in “Colombian proposal” not be discussed with GRC officials until we have clearer reading of how “official” this interest is.

**McConaughy**

**285. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

New York, January 10, 1970, 0015Z.

32. Subj: Chirep.

1. Buffum met with Liu (Jan 8) at latter's request for preliminary discussion Chirep in light 24th UNGA and possibility this issue might arise in SC as result addition of Burundi and Syria. Buffum reported to Liu his conversation with Nsanze re possibility challenge to Chirep credentials (reftel USUN 022)<sup>2</sup> and unlikelihood of Syria raising any problems of a procedural character considering her ties with USSR. Liu agreed and also commented that GRC accommodations to Arabs during past year wld be a restraining influence.

2. After a brief discussion of vote changes in past GA (both agreed Belgium and Chile were expected but that Mauritius and Ghana were unpleasant surprises) Liu and Buffum agreed that LA was area for greatest concern. Liu said that state of US relations with LA has impact on Chirep and he asked if US foresees any more changes in future LA positions. Unlike Africa, LA was area where GRC economic assistance could have little effect, Liu believed. Buffum replied that it was still too early to forecast with precision but that we will develop a systematic appraisal of situation.

3. Liu's main concern appeared to be strategy for protecting GRC position in UN. He felt that recent statements by Secy Rogers on US desire for renewed contact with PRC and relaxation of trade and travel restrictions wld have great influence on attitudes of other countries. When US took one step, others want to take three.

4. Buffum assured Liu that flexibility of US toward PRC in no way affected US policy toward GRC representation in UN. US had not yet completed analysis of 24th GA on this issue and its implications for future. Therefore it premature to decide on specific tactics for 25th session. Liu expressed hope that consultations on Chirep tactics for next fall wld begin earlier, and neither Buffum nor Liu alluded to "Colombian proposal" (Taipei 0126)<sup>3</sup> as a possible new tactic.

5. *Comment:* Overall impression was that Chinese, despite acknowledgement of continued US efforts on their behalf, are looking for continued reaffirmation of US support for benefit of others and assur-

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, UN 6 CHICOM. Confidential. Repeated to Taipei and Tokyo.

<sup>2</sup> Dated January 9. (Ibid.)

<sup>3</sup> Document 284.

ances for themselves. VP Agnew's trip to Taiwan was one such reassurance. Liu obviously hoping for major diplomatic assistance with LAs.

**Buffum**

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**286. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Republic of China<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, January 14, 1970, 0008Z.

5611. Subject: GRC 1970 Chirep Tactics. Ref: Taipei 126.<sup>2</sup>

1. Dept has following preliminary comments on GRC Chirep plans outlined reftel which you may pass on to MOFA:

a. Para 2 "timetable" appears generally reasonable, though we doubt that estimate of voting prepared this early can be very meaningful. Factors which cannot be assessed now and which may not be determinable until much closer to opening of 25th GA—such as progress of Canadian and Italian recognition negotiations and clearer indications of policy direction of LA and African countries, will be most important in preparing accurate estimate.

b. Although there appears to have been no reference in Che comments to GRC plans for activities in Africa and Latin America designed to strengthen bilateral ties which influence vote in UN, we assume such plans are being carefully considered.

c. We are prepared and willing, as always, to discuss this subject with GRC reps at any time—the level and timing depending on nature of consultations. If GRC contemplates discussion and/or development of new strategy, we concur that consultations should begin early; consultations to compare vote estimates and to determine where approaches to specific governments might be useful we believe are best left until late summer.

2. We welcome evidence, however tentative, that GRC is considering more flexible tactical approach. Believe best strategy on our part

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, UN 6 CHINAT. Confidential. Drafted by Long; cleared by Richard R. Hart, Paul H. Kreisberg, Frank P. Lockhart, Jr., William H. Gleysteen, and John A. Armitage; and approved by Assistant Secretary De Palma. Repeated to USUN, Bogota, Tokyo, and Hong Kong.

<sup>2</sup> Document 284.

at moment is to give low-key encouragement in that direction, attempt to obtain better picture of types of moves GRC may have in mind, without taking initiative ourselves in suggesting new tactical approaches. In meantime we will continue to weigh various alternatives within Department.

3. We doubt "Colombian proposal" will be useful or desirable as tactical vehicle Che apparently has in mind. For your background information we have pouched text of proposal which called for establishment of special committee by 24th UNGA "to consider suggestions for revising UN Charter". The Sixth (Legal) Committee however and subsequently the Assembly decided instead to put off question until 25th GA where it will be discussed under agenda item entitled "Need to consider suggestions regarding review of UN Charter". While "universality" including Chirep question among reasons Colombians wish Charter revision, debate and suggestions for revisions will undoubtedly deal with other issues as well. We doubt links between debates on Chirep and on Colombian item will be sufficiently close to permit Colombian item perform role of 66-68 Study Committee proposals in "draining off" support for Albanian Res. Moreover, others will be aware that major power opposition to and hence likely veto in ratification process of Charter revision makes this item unproductive route for solution Chirep issue.

4. Nevertheless, we do not wish discourage any budding flexibility on Chirep issue. Therefore at this point without indicating position US likely to take you should express mild interest in any further refinement on use of this tactic that Che can provide. We would of course be interested in knowing level and extent GRC consideration this tactic (para 6 reftel).

5. *For USUN*: Welcome your comments.

**Rogers**

287. Airgram From the Consulate General in Hong Kong to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>

A-24

Hong Kong, January 26, 1970.

SUBJECT

China and the United Nations: Some Thoughts

*Note:* The Department, and especially the Secretary, has encouraged the submission by Foreign Service Officers of ideas and comments with respect to United States foreign policy or operations overseas. This report, prepared by a political reporting officer here, suggests an approach that might be taken toward the Chinese representation issue at the United Nations. It is realized that there may be many complications involved which are not addressed here, such as Charter revision, and the following is intended more as a vehicle for stimulating discussion and consideration of possible alternatives available to the United States than as a specific policy proposal. *End Note.*

The Soviet Union has three votes in the United Nations General Assembly. No amount of legal or political semantics can demonstrate that the Soviet Union had an inalienable right to three votes. It is difficult to conceive of the Ukraine or Byelorussia as being anything but a part of the Soviet Union. However, every member nation of the United Nations accepts the idea of the Soviet Union having three votes, because they realize that this was the price paid in order to gain Soviet participation in the United Nations.

The existence of this anomaly could form the basis for a solution to the problem of United Nations representation for divided countries and, specifically, the China problem. The solution simply stated, would be—"One Nation, Two Votes".

The formula "One Nation, Two Votes", translated into terms of the United Nations Charter would be "One Nation, Two Members". While this sounds like a strange concept, it is exactly the situation that exists as far as the Soviet Union is concerned. "Soviet Union, Three Votes" is translated into terms of the United Nations Charter as "Soviet Union, Three Members". The United Nations, by the very existence of the three members of the United Nations that represent the Soviet Union or parts thereof, has in effect said that a "member" is that entity which the United Nations decides to make a member without regard to tradi-

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, UN 6 CHICOM. Confidential. Drafted by Richard A. Holmes, approved by Richard D. Nethercut, and cleared by Robert W. Drexler. Also sent to USUN.

tional concepts of "sovereignty" or of "a state". The degree of freedom which the United Nations has in this area is underlined even more by the fact that the Ukraine and Byelorussia were Charter Members of the United Nations. If the founding of the United Nations was based on such a practical political compromise, then there should be no reason why one of the United Nations' stickiest problems could not also be resolved by a similar solution.

### *The Case of China*

A formula embodying the principle of "One China, Two Votes" would involve giving Peking one vote and Taipei one vote in the General Assembly. Again, in terms of the United Nations Charter, it would be translated into "One China, Two Members" following the Soviet example. In having two members representing China, the United Nations would not be addressing itself to the sovereignty claims of either Peking or Taipei, just as it has never addressed itself to the question of sovereignty with regard to the Soviet Union, the Ukraine, and Byelorussia. If in the future, Peking and Taipei are able to reach an accommodation between themselves, then a unified China would in reality be represented by two votes—just as in reality the Soviet Union is represented by three votes.

In addition, a General Assembly resolution on Chinese representation might also make the following points: 1) Although China is represented in the United Nations by two members, this fact in no way endorses the concept of Two Chinas. 2) There is only one China; at present China is not unified; however, it is the expectation and hope of the United Nations that China will eventually be unified. 3) The United Nations, in the interest of world peace, calls upon the two divided parts of China to seek reunification through peaceful means.

A "One China, Two Votes" solution tends to avoid problems inherent in a "Two Chinas" policy or a "One China, One Taiwan" policy. Neither Peking nor Taipei want either of these policies to become accepted in the international community. However, third countries, motivated by a desire to find a compromise solution to the impasse on the China problem in the United Nations, may be forced into advocating such policies.

The solution of the China problem in the United Nations is made more complicated by the fact that China is a Permanent Member of the Security Council. A "One China, Two Votes" solution to Peking's admission to the United Nations does not, of course, solve this problem. Neither, however, does any other solution short of excluding Taipei from the United Nations. However, it would seem quite clear that once Peking becomes a member of the United Nations, no matter what formula is finally used, any solution, short of awarding Peking the Security Council seat, is inherently unstable.

Naturally, at the present time, both Peking and Taipei would undoubtedly oppose a “One China, Two Votes” policy in the United Nations, but it is a solution more in keeping with their respective views on the China question than others now being considered and could conceivably represent an acceptable formula to them at some point in time.

*Other Divided Countries*

One possible way of making such a solution palatable to both sides is through example. The concept of “One Nation, Two Votes,” again following the Soviet example, could be extended to three other divided nations that are not now in the United Nations. Germany, Korea and Vietnam are important, albeit divided nations whose absence from the United Nations weakens the organization itself. All three countries have aspirations for eventual unification. Present political conditions prevent these three countries from being members of the United Nations. One major component of these political conditions is the fact that they are divided countries waiting for an eventual solution to the question of unification.

Of the three countries, Germany would seem to be the country most likely to be susceptible to a “One Nation, Two Votes” solution to admission to the United Nations at this juncture in time. Such a procedure again would not address itself to the question of sovereignty—as it has not in the case of the Soviet Union—and it would be based on the assumption of eventual unification as outlined earlier in the case of China.

If a solution for admission of both West and East Germany to the United Nations on the basis of a “One Germany, Two Votes” concept could be worked out, the example and experience gained by such a step would be useful in educating the member nations as well as Peking and Taipei as to the feasibility of such a step with regard to China. The same applies to Korea and Vietnam.

**Martin**

**288. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

New York, March 12, 1970, 2312Z.

408. Subj: Chinese Representation in UN.

1. In view major and politically costly effort required on continuing basis to maintain status quo on Chirep, it seems to us not too early to review whither our longstanding tactics in GA lead and whether modification seems warranted in light our overall China policy. We believe our policy toward China should dictate our tactics on Chirep issue in UN rather than vice-versa.

2. Present tactics. Our current estimate of probable voting situation at upcoming 25th GA is that, barring unforeseen developments and provided we again wage strong campaign especially with LAs, it would be possible again this year to obtain: (A) reaffirmation that change in Chirep requires two-thirds vote (IQ res); (B) rejection by slim margin of Albanian-type res calling for ouster of GRC and seating of PRC (by reason of res's failure secure even simple majority); and (C) subsequent approval of GRC credentials.

3. However, prospects are that in near future [or] thereafter majority will shift in favor of Albanian-type res. This could happen as early as upcoming GA if, for example, current negotiations between Canada and/or Italy and PRC on recognition issue should be successfully concluded within next few months, with result that Canada and Italy, accompanied by like-minded countries, switch from abstentions to positive votes on Albanian res. Colombia, Mexico and some other LAs also may follow Chile's example at 24th GA and abstain on Albanian res.

4. Once simple majority votes in favor Albanian-type res, it likely be mere question of time before Chirep question is posed in terms credentials issue and resolved on simple majority, irrespective of efforts we might make to forestall such development. We foresee specifically that when simple majority tips in favor Albanian res, same majority can be expected, at same or immediately subsequent GA, to insist on separate vote on GRC credentials and reject them, with result that seat of China could temporarily fall vacant with prospect being subsequently filled by PRC reps. At minimum, we would no longer be able to obtain favorable composition of Credentials Comite and our margin on IQ res would begin to decline markedly. Break in dike in GA would lead to crumbling of GRC position throughout UN system, including

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 297, Agency Files, USUN, Vol. II. Secret; Exdis.

SAs which, pursuant GA res 396(V), follow GA lead on issues involving representation of member states.

5. In summary, maintenance of our present tactics seems likely lead to early replacement (1971 or 1972) of GRC by PRC throughout UN system, imminence such development depending in part on behavior PRC in current negotiations with several states and in part on how heavily we are prepared continue lobby with friendly govts in NY and in capitals.

6. Two Chinas. In recent years a UN favored alternative to standing fast on traditional position, with eventual consequences outlined above, has been one or another form of “two Chinas” solution. If this should commend itself to USG, we could either ourselves promote some such initiative or encourage friendly state to do so; in latter case we could at least ostensibly remain on sidelines and either go along or abstain if initiative were successful.

7. Possibilities range from pressing anew for thrice-rejected res to establish study comite (with implication of “two Chinas” solution) to seeking outright GA endorsement of successor-state res which would note that governmental authority in territory under Chinese administration at time China became UN member is now exercised by GRC with its seat in Taipei and by PRC with its seat in Peking; would affirm continuing membership of Republic of China in UN; and express willingness seat PRC as member in addition to GRC, upon notification by former that it accepts UN Charter and membership obligations thereof.

8. However, it seems questionable that necessary two-thirds support for any approach calling for double-representation on separate state basis is likely be forthcoming or that such an approach could provide viable solution for Chirep problem. In view their consistent and vehement opposition to “two Chinas” concept, both GRC and PRC would refuse to participate in GA on such basis and would oppose proposed arrangement so strongly that necessary majority seems unattainable, even if US actively supports. Furthermore, for US to support or even fail actively to oppose any initiative in such direction would not only precipitate familiar crisis in our relations with Taipei but also perhaps be interpreted by Peking as new effort to perpetuate division of China and hence be viewed as hostile act toward PRC. The above estimate of non-success remains valid even if US were to induce third party (e.g., Belgium) to carry “two Chinas” ball in UN.

9. Alternative approach—one-China. Possible new variant on “two Chinas” theme within technical legal framework of “one China” might be approached based on precedent under which USSR has two extra seats in UN for constituent “republics”. Under such approach GA would adopt res which accepts view of both Taipei and Peking that

China is a single state, of which Taiwan is a constituent part, and decides that in view circumstances in this case seats in Assembly should be offered to both pending resolution by peaceful means of issue between them. As part of this, SC seat would go to PRC. Under this procedure we could nevertheless continue to recognize GRC and to protect Formosa pursuant our existing treaty commitments unless and until de facto reunification is decided by parties themselves by peaceful means.

10. However, necessary two-thirds majority for interim solution along these lines also seems unlikely to be forthcoming in absence reasonable prospect parties would refrain from active opposition and would be prepared acquiesce in such decision. We are not sufficiently familiar with Warsaw talks to know whether it would be appropriate and useful to raise this possibility there but would appreciate Dept's thinking on this point. Whether or not PRC is willing acquiesce in such an approach, we would have to be prepared for a major confrontation with GRC which would, at minimum, make decision go along only if it were convinced it has no other alternative. We could in any case, if this alternative commends itself to Dept, consult informally about it with our major Asian supporters on this issue (Japan, Australia, New Zealand) and perhaps with some others (Canada, Italy, Belgium) who have been most interested in finding new course.

11. Basic issue, as we suggested at outset this telegram, is whether our overall policy is designed to move toward accommodation with PRC, without abandoning GRC. If so, our Chirep policy at UN should be geared to this objective. Alternative strategy we suggest may not prove workable, however unpalatable to both Peking and Taipei, but it seems to us nevertheless best possibility for forestalling total exclusion of latter without adopting posture unacceptable in principle to former. It would in any case have advantage of moving away from position which is rapidly becoming untenable, of demonstrating our willingness to see PRC seated in UN under arrangements which are not inconsistent with its claims, and of relieving US from political liability of defending to last ditch cause which seems more and more unrealistic and which indeed is inconsistent with our emerging policy toward China.

12. We would appreciate Dept's comments on foregoing.

**Yost**

**289. Airgram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

A-1069

New York, June 12, 1970.

SUBJECT

Consultations on Chinese Representation Question

Chinese Permanent Representative Liu hosted a working lunch on June 11, 1970 to discuss the Chinese representation question at the 25th General Assembly with Japanese and U.S. Representatives. Ambassador Liu indicated that the Chinese believe the debate of the Important Question and Albanian-type resolutions would at the present reading result in approximately the same outcome as last year. Factors which might influence a change in position of some delegations include the fact that the 25th Anniversary of the organization may be cited by some as grounds for resolving the status quo. On the other hand, if the Lon Nol government holds out, Cambodia can be expected to shift to the abstention column. Ambassador Liu said he was reasonably encouraged by the apparent lack of progress in the Peking negotiations with Canada and Italy. Ambassador Liu sought the U.S.'s assessment of the likely voting position of Latin Americans, notably Colombia, Chile, Ecuador and Peru. We said it would take effort to keep them in the same columns as last year. We suggested that the Chinese Embassy in Mexico could usefully obtain confirmation of the Mexican government's support following the Presidential elections.

In reply to Ambassador Liu's query regarding cosponsors and the introduction of the question in the General Assembly, Japanese Ambassador Tsuruoka said that Japan could cosponsor but would not introduce the resolution.

He said the Japanese press and a number of Diet members including some from the government party were critical of the leading role played by Japan in 1969. With party elections scheduled for this fall and Prime Minister Sato's continuance in office uncertain, Ambassador Tsuruoka expected he would be instructed to adopt a lower profile.

Mr. Newlin averted to the possibility that some compromise formulation might be introduced in place of the defunct study proposal perhaps in the form of a general resolution deploring the continued

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, UN 6 CHICOM. Confidential. Drafted by Frederick H. Sacksteder, Jr., cleared by Kathleen McSweeney, and approved by Michael Newlin. Repeated to Hong Kong, Ottawa, Rome, Taipei, and Tokyo.

absence of mainland China from the United Nations. This kind of general expression of views is likely to be popular with the majority of members, including the Latin Americans, who give varying degrees of support to the universality concept. Chinese Deputy Permanent Representative Chang said everything indicated that Peking would not be interested in such an approach and still held out for the expulsion of the Representatives of the Republic of China.

The participants agreed to maintain close contact through further similar meetings and to the formulation of various contingency plans prior to the 25th General Assembly to cover any likely departures from the established scenario.

Yost

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**290. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, July 11, 1970.

SUBJECT

The Chinese Representation Question

Secretary Rogers has transmitted to you a detailed analysis of the Chinese representation question prepared in State (Tab A).<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 520, Country Files, Far East, China, Vol. IV. Secret; Nodis. Sent for action. The first page of the memorandum is stamped "July 24 1970," and "The President has seen." A July 11 covering memorandum from Holdridge recommends that Kissinger sign the memorandum to Nixon. On this covering memorandum, Kissinger wrote "Note edit," and "What is Albanian resolution?" An earlier draft of the memorandum to Nixon was attached. Kissinger had removed several paragraphs that claimed "this [the ROC in the UN] is a major issue because we have made it a major issue. The most important US interest involved in this decision is 'face.'"

<sup>2</sup> Attached but not printed. On March 20 Under Secretary of State John Irwin requested that Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs Samuel De Palma prepare a memorandum from the Secretary of State to the President concerning both immediate and long-term positions for the United States toward Chinese representation in the United Nations. The final version of this memorandum went to the Under Secretary on May 25, and was submitted by Secretary Rogers to President Nixon on June 19. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, UN 6 CHICOM)

In his covering memorandum, Secretary Rogers does not explicitly recommend a course of action, but he strongly implies that we should continue our present policy even though eventually it will fail, and China will be represented by the People's Republic of China (PRC), or by nobody. He wishes to keep a place for the GRC in the UN, but he does not see any prospect of a solution which would permit the PRC and the Republic of China (ROC) both to be represented, so long as they reject such a solution. And he sees no sign that either will change its mind.

He argues that any change in our UN tactics would require that we consider the effects on the ROC and the PRC, the Japanese and the Soviets, the implications for other divided states, and the consequences of the presence of PRC representatives in the UN and in the U.S. Since most of these points would argue on balance against any change in U.S. position, the strong implication is that we should continue as we are.

Secretary Rogers thinks the status quo can probably be held this year.

The State study describes seven policy options, ranging from a continued strong line to acquiescence in the PRC's taking over the Chinese seat. Most of the options are variants of the "two-China" policy, but some of them contain elements of the more sophisticated earlier proposals for a "successor state" or "contending claimants" policy. These variants were intended to permit us—and other states—to avoid the politically explosive problem of taking a position concerning the present juridical and future actual relationship between Taiwan and the mainland (an area in which one cannot take a position without angering either the PRC, the ROC, Japan or the Taiwanese majority on Taiwan—or all of them).

The study correctly points out that we could move to one of the "two-China" variants either

—as a tactic to disrupt a move toward acceptance of the "Albanian resolution". (This would be particularly effective if the ROC were persuaded to sit tight, recognizing that the PRC would not come in if the ROC stayed, and that this would leave the ROC in possession of the field.)

—*or*, as a means of moving toward a new policy looking toward the entry of Communist China into a more normal role in the family of nations. (For the present, this hangs up on the fact that the PRC would regard it as a sinister move to detach Taiwan from China, and therefore more hostile and dangerous even than our present policy.)

I do not think that a major shift of the US position is justified this year, if the estimate holds up that we can win with the traditional approach.

If we anticipate an eventual defeat, and [I] do not see how we can avoid it, we should minimize that defeat by preparing now to diminish its apparent significance, in so far as we can do so without hastening the event.

There are two policy lines already in existence, which we should underscore and continue:

—We should emphasize that our interest is in protecting a place for the ROC in the General Assembly, rather than in excluding Communist China. This position wins friends in the US and abroad, since there is considerable sympathy for the proposition that Taiwan should not be thrown out to accommodate the Communist demand. If the ROC should voluntarily leave, faced with a hostile or “two-Chinas” vote, we would have demonstrated our loyalty to a friend, and we could convincingly argue that the subsequent entry of the PRC was not a defeat at all.

—The Nixon Doctrine has played down the confrontation mentality, and Administration statements concerning our desire for greater communication with the Chinese Communists have also steered us away from the automatic assumption that any PRC gain in the UN is a US loss. We should continue such statements.

This line should be coupled with strong support for a continuing place for the ROC in the UN.

Taken together, this approach permits us to honor our commitments and protect our important interests, while at the same time it serves gradually to deflate the importance of Chinese representation as a policy issue.

If a “two-Chinas” movement gains momentum in the UN without our encouragement, the posture permits us to examine that movement and see whether we should acquiesce in it. These circumstances—being faced with such a movement but not having encouraged it—would put the strongest possible pressure on the ROC to face the question of its own continued place in the UN on its own merits, without being tempted to take a tough line to force our hand. Under such circumstances, it might decide that it should stay in. This would face the PRC with the choice of coming in on terms acceptable to us, or fighting for ROC exclusion on a very poor wicket. This could stabilize the situation for years. On the other hand, we would have done our best if the ROC decided to withdraw.

*Recommendation:*

That you authorize me to inform Secretary Rogers that you wish—

(a) to continue the US position this year as heretofore on the Important Question and “Albanian” resolutions.

(b) to avoid introducing or encouraging any “two-China” type resolutions at the forthcoming UNGA, unless a later count of prospective votes requires reconsideration of this tactic.

(c) to emphasize that our interest is in protecting a place in the General Assembly for the ROC, rather than in excluding the Chinese Communists. As appropriate, to treat the advantages and disadvantages of a PRC presence in the UN in a generally straightforward manner, along the lines pages 17–19 of the attached paper.

(d) to make clear that we do attach importance to the continued representation of the ROC.

(e) in non-UN contexts, to avoid emphasizing the confrontation aspects of US/PRC relations, and to make clear that we wish to promote greater communication with the Chinese Communists and to see eventual PRC participation in worldwide cooperation on issues such as disarmament, narcotics control, exchange of weather information, outer space, seabeds, etc.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>3</sup> Nixon initialed the approve option.

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## 291. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations<sup>1</sup>

Washington, July 31, 1970, 1707Z.

123390. Subject: Chirep—Meeting with GRC Ambassadors to US and UN.

1. GRC Ambassadors to US (Chow) and UN (Liu) met July 29 with Asst Secretary De Palma (IO) and Deputy Asst Secretary Brown (EA) for annual pre-UNGA Chirep review.

2. Amb. Liu led off with report of July 28 meeting of US, Japanese and GRC Ambassadors to UN which discussed early round up of Important Question cosponsors, and agreed seek about same number and geographic distribution as in 1969.

3. Brief discussion voting positions on Albanian Res indicated outcome likely to be similar to 1969. Favorable shift (in terms our position) likely in case of Cambodia and, possibly Mauritius; unfavorable shift likely by CAR, and, although there no present indications, cannot

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, UN 6 CHICOM. Confidential. Drafted by Long; cleared by Armitage, Winthrop G. Brown, and Linwood R. Starbird; and approved by Assistant Secretary De Palma. Also sent to Taipei and repeated to Tokyo.

rule out small number unpredictable shifts. No shift in Canadian or Italian positions, provided, as is likely, their negotiations with Peking not yet successfully concluded. Amb Liu said recent GRC chiefs of LA missions conference revealed no change in LA positions, including Chile. De Palma suggested and Chinese agreed it desirable compare vote estimates and discuss tactics in greater detail in late August.

4. Ambassador Chow said continuing GRC concern was that recent US moves to reduce tensions (in relations with Peking and others) might be misconstrued as signaling change in US policy on Chirep. Referring to recent reaffirmation of unchanged US position given to Vice Premier (CCK) by President and Secretary, De Palma informed Chinese that annual circular going to field posts within next two weeks would contain explicit reaffirmation that our position has not changed. Ambassador Liu noted with satisfaction that this action coincided with GRC instructions to its missions to make usual annual *démarches*.

5. Most interesting exchange took place on possible new initiatives arising in 25th Anniversary atmosphere. Amb Liu specifically noted reports of possible Zambian initiative to introduce single paragraph res referring to admission of Peking without reference to position of GRC. De Palma said we had no firm indications such proposal would be introduced, but agreed need to be alert and devise tactical handling which would depend upon precise nature and language of proposal. He inquired whether Chinese had any reading on likely Peking reaction to such approach. Ambassador Chow said despite great deal of talk recently about Chicom flexibility, he believed Chicom basic principles and policies remained unchanged. Did not rule out however possible Peking tactical flexibility designed create confusion at UN, "disturb Taipei and Moscow and puzzle Washington." Chow seemed favor attempt amend such resolution, if introduced, to make explicit that it without prejudice to GRC seat in UN; resolution would then be unacceptable to Peking and its supporters. On other hand, Liu feared it would likely pass, even if amended, because it "difficult to prevent many from voting for it." To question by Ambassador Brown whether GRC would withdraw if such proposal adopted, Ambassador Chow said he did not know since decision would have to be made at highest levels. Chinese asked what US position would be on such resolution. De Palma reiterated it not feasible to attempt take position on hypothetical basis, i.e., we would need to have better idea of language of res before we could decide best tactical handling. In any case, we believed insistence on need to preserve place for GRC was best general approach to this and similar initiatives. Matter was left that we would consult closely if issue arose.

6. Meeting went smoothly and we believe was very useful, especially discussion of possible new initiative. In this connection we were

impressed with absence of usual rhetoric that all would be well if US holds line firmly and exerts its influence and with apparent realization that such resolution might be adopted despite our and GRC best efforts.

7. *For Taipei*: In devising contingency tactics for possible new initiative, would be helpful to know whether you think GRC Ambassador's realistic appraisal of situation and possible acceptance of need for flexibility is now shared at higher levels outside MOFA. Request your assessment without approaching host government at this time.<sup>2</sup>

**Johnson**

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<sup>2</sup> The Embassy in Taipei replied on August 5: "Whatever increased tactical flexibility on Chirep may exist within MOFA circles, it is highly unlikely that it reflects any shift in thinking at higher levels on the fundamental issue of Chirep." (Telegram 3344 from Taipei, August 5; *ibid.*)

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## 292. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations<sup>1</sup>

Washington, August 15, 1970, 1544Z.

132973. Ref: USUN 1643, 1644, 1652 (Notal).<sup>2</sup>

1. Belgian Chargé Lion called on Asst. Secy De Palma August 14 to present text of proposed Belgian Chirep res. Presentation followed closely that given USUN 1643, except that Lion explicitly described formula as "One China–Two Govts." He added GOB does not intend formally inscribe until consultation with friendly govts completed; acknowledged domestic political considerations figure in initiative; added Chile to list of those already consulted; and (in informal conversation with Deptoff) stated he knew of no plans float res with Peking.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, UN 6 CHICOM. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Harvey J. Feldman; cleared by Armitage, Thomas E. McNamara, Melvyn Levitsky, and Linwood R. Starbird; and approved by Assistant Secretary De Palma. Also sent to Brussels and Taipei and repeated to London, Ottawa, Rome, Santiago, Tokyo, and Hong Kong.

<sup>2</sup> Telegram 1643, August 12, reported on the meeting with Belgian Representative Longerstaey during which he presented the preliminary draft of the resolution. Telegram 1644, August 12, transmitted the text of the resolution. Telegram 1652, August 13, not printed. (*All ibid.*)

2. In reply, De Palma observed US had seen no real shift on Albanian res and considered vote this year would not differ significantly from last session. While we wished defer definite reply until further study of text, and would give that reply through Ambassador Yost in NY, following were our preliminary observations:

(A) View lack of any real drift toward Albanian res, we did not believe res such as this necessary in order protect GRC UN position as stated in Belgian presentation;

(B) We feared introduction of res at this session might force parties to take hard stand and thereby interrupt evolution toward possible consensus solution to problem.

(C) As practical matter, res did not seem likely to pass (as Belgians themselves recognized), but could have effect of clouding status of GRC and thereby increase chances for expulsion, a result which Belgians note they oppose.

(D) View foregoing, US preliminary view was that res should not be offered, but we would make formal reply at later date and hoped GOB would keep us informed of responses received from others as well as their more specific plans for tabling.

3. GRC Ambassador Chow called on Asst Secy De Palma shortly thereafter stating view that Albanian res likely be defeated by "comfortable margin", but expressing fear Belgian initiative might confuse the issue and lead to situation detrimental GRC interests. His govt wished ask USG try to dissuade Belgians. De Palma noted we had given Belgians only preliminary assessment today, tenor of which was certainly to dissuade them, and would be making more detailed and definitive reply in New York.<sup>3</sup> He asked GRC views on best way deal with problem in event Belgians could not be persuaded withdraw.

**Rogers**

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<sup>3</sup> On August 19 Yost was instructed: "Request you seek early opportunity reply formally to Belgians re proposed Chirep res. Reply should state we note GOB describes initiative as being 'One China-Two Govts' formula, but actual wording of res somewhat different in operative paragraphs. In any event, we believe res unhelpful for reasons given para 2 reftel, and request GOB re-consider decision offer res." (Telegram 134931 to USUN, August 19; *ibid.*) Yost reported on his August 20 meeting with Longerstaey in telegram 1705, August 20. (*Ibid.*)

**293. Telegram From the Embassy in the Republic of China to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

Taipei, August 19, 1970, 0710Z.

3550. Subj: Chirep: Belgian Proposal and Lusaka Conference. Ref: State 132973.<sup>2</sup>

1. During periodic review of Chirep situation MOFA Director IO Affairs Che Yin-shou brought up and discussed with EmbOff proposed Belgian Chirep resolution and possible results regarding Chirep of Lusaka Conference. Che said FonOff regards Belgian proposal as "misguided friendly assistance," and essentially a dangerous variation of "two China" approach. Although FonOff feels resolution could not pass, in part because of its undesirability from Chicom's viewpoint, resolution's introduction would confuse issue and be detrimental generally to GRC position.

2. EmbOff outlined generally observations regarding Belgian proposal as in para 2 and 3 of reftel. Che appeared genuinely relieved and expressed gratitude that US preliminary approach to dealing with Belgian resolution was similar to GRC's.

3. FonOff believes that dissuading Belgians from presenting resolution is best approach. Should this be unsuccessful, FonOff favors direct drive to defeat resolution.

4. Che expressed fear that Lusaka Non-Aligned Conference potentially more dangerous than Belgian or Albanian resolutions in undermining GRC position. Che foresees following possible scenario: Lusaka communiqué could espouse Chicom entry into UN. With this psychological starter, momentum could build in UNGA speeches resulting in "sense of Assembly" vote or expression that Chicoms should be invited into UN. Che claims this whole process could conceivably be accomplished without adoption of any resolution or roll-call vote by UNGA. (We are unaware of such a procedure, particularly in a matter which has been considered an "Important Question.") Although this strategy might not be successful in 25th UNGA session, Che fears great potential for undermining GRC, leading to seating of Chicoms in 26th UNGA session. GRC has also mentioned its concern over Lusaka

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, UN 6 CHICOM. Secret; Limdis. Repeated to Brussels, Hong Kong, London, Lusaka, Ottawa, Rome, Santiago, Tokyo, and USUN.

<sup>2</sup> Document 292.

Conference to Australians. Does Dept have any reading on possible discussion of Chirep at Lusaka?<sup>3</sup>

**Armstrong**

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<sup>3</sup> On August 20 the Department replied: "Che's scenario (para four, reftel) for sense of Assembly vote without roll-call on specific resolution seems rather muddy to us. Certainly procedural objections could be introduced at any point in this unlikely process, such as request for roll-call vote." The Department believed that any resolution about Chinese representation at the Lusaka Conference was unlikely to be binding or to change any later General Assembly votes. (Telegram 135482 to USUN, August 20; National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, UN 6 CHICOM)

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#### 294. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>

New York, September 14, 1970, 2323Z.

1914. Subj: Chirep—Co-sponsorship of IQ Resolution.<sup>2</sup>

1. Chirep co-sponsors meeting held USUN Sept 14 under chairmanship Amb Phillips. Australia, Brazil, GRC, Costa Rica, Gabon, Haiti, Japan, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Nicaragua, New Zealand, Paraguay, Philippines, Spain, Swaziland, Thailand present. (Togo invited but did not attend.)

2. After discussion of handling of IQ res, Phillips asked for comments on which res should be introduced and which countries had agreed to co-sponsor. All present agreed res should be circulated ASAP and Sept 18 was set as target date for submission to Secretariat in order pre-empt voting priority. Following countries agreed co-sponsor: Australia, Costa Rica, Japan, Haiti, Lesotho, New Zealand, Paraguay, Philippines, Swaziland, Thailand, US. (After meeting, Perez-Alonso (Nicaragua) telephoned to say GON prepared co-sponsor.) Waiting for instructions were: Brazil, Gabon, Spain, Madagascar (waiting for formal approval from new government) and Malawi. After meeting, Amb

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, UN 6 CHICOM. Confidential. Repeated to Asuncion, Bangkok, Blantyre, Brasilia, Canberra, Libreville, Lome, Madrid, Managua, Manila, Mbabane, Port-au-Prince, Rio de Janeiro, Rome, San Jose, Taipei, Tananarive, Tokyo, and Wellington.

<sup>2</sup> Telegram 1754 from USUN, August 26, reported on the process of obtaining co-sponsors for the IQ resolution. (Ibid.)

Liu commented to MisOff that GRC Embassies in Gabon, Malawi and Togo reported confirmation of co-sponsorship. Liu plans request GRC Missions these capitals follow-up with view insuring that necessary instructions forthcoming UN dels soonest.

3. Jiminez (Philippines) expressed preference that we should have as many co-sponsors as last year before submission of item to avoid misconception that our strength weakening. All agreed res should be submitted with confirmed co-sponsors by Sept 18th in event other side decides to submit their res. Additional co-sponsors will be added per confirmation by government.

4. Liu expressed preference that Chirep be taken up prior to commemorative session and advocated, in any event, item be taken up early. There was little support for Liu's suggestion and it was pointed out that such course would interfere with proposed political comites' schedules and consideration of certain items prior commemorative session.

5. In reply to Anand's (Thailand) query re Canadian position, Hsueh (just arrived Chinese Amb to Ottawa) reported that Canadians had informed him that, regardless of outcome CPR/Canada negotiations, Canada will continue to vote in favor of IQ res unless Cabinet decides contrary.

6. No objections were raised to Phillips' suggestion that the text of the IQ res should remain the same except for updating to include reference to last year's res.

**Yost**

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**295. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

New York, September 19, 1970, 0025Z.

2007. Subj: Chirep: IQ Res Co-Sponsors.

1. Chirep IQ draft res has been submitted with fourteen of last year's eighteen co-sponsors listed on understanding that others to be added as received. Gabon, Madagascar and Togo Reps still without instructions; Spain (which co-sponsored last year but is not a traditional

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, UN 6 CHICOM. Confidential. Repeated to Canberra, Brasilia, San Jose, Libreville, Port-au-Prince, Tokyo, Maseru, Tananarive, Blantyre, Wellington, Managua, Asuncion, Manila, Madrid, Mbabane, Bangkok, Lome, Taipei, Athens, Abidjan, Kinshasa, and Kigali.

sponsor) has informed us it will support but not co-sponsor this year. Togo expects receive instructions early next week according Ohin. Gabon Perm Rep Davin en route Libreville and planning discuss this among other matters. Rabetafika does not expect instructions until formation new govt in Tananarive.

2. In effort ensure at least same number co-sponsors, US del is contacting additional dels from among past staunch GRC supporters in UN to urge they join co-sponsors list. Dels of Greece and Ivory Coast approached and seeking instructions. We also approaching Kinshasa and Rwanda.

3. In view likelihood Chirep draft reses will circulate soon, US del believes urgent efforts line up additional co-sponsors IQ res highly desirable and recommend Dept consider authorizing Embs Athens, Abidjan, Kinshasa and Kigali make supporting approaches.<sup>2</sup> Text draft res being repeated septel for info latter four posts.

**Yost**

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<sup>2</sup> A follow-up telegram to Athens, Abidjan, Kinshasa, and Kigali reads: "Request action addressees make supporting approaches as suggested refelt [telegram 2007]. You should note USG greatly values past support host government has given to proposition that any attempt to change the representation of China in the UN must be considered Important Question within meaning of Article 18 of Charter, and hopes host government will agree to associate itself as a co-sponsor." (Telegram 155301 to USUN, September 22; *ibid.*)

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## 296. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Belgium<sup>1</sup>

Washington, September 28, 1970, 2255Z.

159694. Subject: Chirep—Conversation with Davignon re Belgian Initiative. Ref: Brussels 4387 (Notal).<sup>2</sup>

1. Summary: In conversation Sept 25, Belgian Fonoff Dirgen Davignon told Acting Asst Sec Herz (IO) Belgian res will not be tabled but consultations to find alternative to Albanian res will continue. Harmel

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, UN 6 CHICOM. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Feldman; cleared by J. Theodore Papendorp, McNutt, Armitage, Shoemsmith, Alfred le S. Jenkins, Herbert S. Okun, and Sean Holly; and approved by Martin F. Herz. Repeated to USUN, Belgrade, Canberra, London, Moscow, Ottawa, Paris, Rome, Taipei, Tokyo, Wellington, Hong Kong, and USNATO.

<sup>2</sup> Dated September 25. (*Ibid.*, POL 16 CHICOM)

will discuss res in General Debate speech, noting Peking should be in UN. Kosygin had earlier told Harmel Chirep was “internal problem between the two states”, but GOB was surprised at vehement Soviet reaction to their res. Yugoslavs had told them Peking would oppose anything short of full Albanian res. GOB will try establish contact with Peking on recognition but expects difficulty since GOB will refuse break with Taiwan. End summary.

2. Following points made by Belgian FonOff Dirgen Davignon during conversation with Act Asst Herz Sept 25. Full memcon by pouch.

3. In proposed res, GOB sought explore solution to Chirep problem not involving ejection of ROC which GOB would find abhorrent. GOB does not consider it has “special vocation” this area, would be glad if others could come up with solution providing for Chinese participation while protecting Taiwan’s UN membership. Fact is, no one is doing this now and GOB still feels beginning must be made.

4. Resolutions which openly endorse “two Chinas” are lame ducks, shot at by all, Davignon said. GOB sought get around problem by devising “one China-two Govts” res, recognizing objections would be raised to wording but knowing objections would be raised to any conceivable wording. Davignon explained that difference between operative paragraphs re treatment of Peking and Taipei had been intentional: GOB felt something more had to be offered to Peking than to Taipei since former could be expected object even more vehemently to dual representation. This explained fact that entire res was described as temporary arrangement (which could in practice become permanent) pending different arrangements between the two govts. It also explained why Belgian draft would have declared PRC to “be” UN member representing territory it controls while ROC would “participate in General Assembly” in similar capacity. Of course, Davignon said, one would have to lean hard on Taipei to get their acceptance, but this inevitable in any case.

5. Result of Belgian soundings had been mixed, Davignon said, and reaction mostly unfavorable though GOB feels if tabled res would have received 25–30 affirmative votes. French opposed tabling on grounds it would draw votes off from Albanian res which should be passed as soon as possible. Bitter opposition of Soviet Union and EE bloc most surprising. Year ago Kosygin told Harmel Chirep issue was “internal problem for both states” and “both states” would have to solve it by themselves. Kosygin had repeated this formulation, so it must have been deliberate. GOB had tried take this into account in “pending other arrangements” clause of res, and had not expected vehement Soviet reaction. Yugoslavs, who also advised against tabling, said Peking explicitly informed Yugo Embassy “moment has not come to change Albanian res” and would oppose one paragraph resolutions.

(Yugoslavs, according to Davignon, had probed Chicoms on acceptability of simple res on PRC admission that would have been silent on ROC expulsion.)

6. View largely negative reaction, GOB will not introduce res at this GA, Davignon said. Res is not dead however and GOB will continue soundings in attempt find some way out of impasse. Harmel in General Debate speech will discuss problem, noting Peking should hold China's UN seat, and will describe GOB's proposed solution.

7. Davignon felt Belgium could not indefinitely maintain its present position of merely abstaining on Albanian res. It is one of small group of remaining EUR countries without relations with Peking. After Canada, Italy will soon establish relations with PRC. Thus Belgium will fairly soon have to try establish contact with Peking to negotiate recognition. Such negotiations will be hard for GOB as GOB will not agree break relations with Taiwan as price for relations with Peking, Davignon said.

8. Since Davignon informed us of cabinet decision not to table, Herz confined his remarks to expression of appreciation and assurance we would expect to work closely with Belgians in reassessment of situation after this year's Chirep vote.

**Irwin**

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## **297. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, September 29, 1970.

### SUBJECT

Chinese Representation at the 25th General Assembly

### PARTICIPANTS

Marshall Green, Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs  
Albert Lakeland, Executive Assistant to Senator Javits of New York  
Alfred le S. Jenkins, Director of the Office of Asian Communist Affairs  
Louise McNutt, UN Advisor, Office of Regional Affairs

Mr. Lakeland, who called at his own request, opened the conversation by noting that Senator Javits would be handling the Chinese

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, UN 6 CHICOM. Secret. Drafted by McNutt.

Representation issue for the United States at this General Assembly. He said that the Senator hoped that this Government could move its position off dead center at this session and he was anxious to use his influence in the direction of some new and constructive solution. Senator Javits as a leading Republican Senator and a member of the Foreign Relations Committee was in an excellent position to make such a contribution. Mr. Lakeland also said that in talks with leading personalities such as Dr. Reischauer it seemed plain that this year might be a particularly opportune time to work toward a new position. While Mr. Lakeland did not advocate any particular new initiative, as the conversation developed he mentioned the possibility of a study committee or some sort of dual representation resolution, or that we could suggest in our speech that we welcome new approaches. Mr. Lakeland argued that staying with the present sterile position could end in disaster. It was no longer tenable to support the idea that the GRC was the Government of all of China or to allow Taipei to lock us into a position on these issues. If we do not move to shape our position to new realities, the situation would be out of our control, with the Chinese Communists seated in the UN on their terms and with consequent severe problems in Congress and with the American people. He acknowledged that we had made a number of recent gestures toward Peking but he felt that the Congress and the people were really ahead of the Department on this issue.

Mr. Green, after noting that he had read with interest Senator Javits' recent statements on China, went on to stress that his further remarks were confidential. He said that we were in agreement that there should be movement on this issue, but added that the core of the question was tactics and timing. He did not believe that this was the year to change; for one thing we were now too close to the time of the vote. The important matter was to create conditions in which Peking and Taipei would be more flexible. We do not know when any changes in their positions might take place—it may be some distance down the pike, but Peking had actually made some movement in this regard. For example it showed more evidence of wanting to join the UN; it was not, apparently, posing as many pre-conditions for its membership; it gave some evidence that it was moving away from extremism; and was becoming generally more active in matters of trade and diplomatic relations.

Taipei is a real problem. Perhaps its rigid view will remain as long as the Gimo lives. But it also seems possible that developments at this Assembly—the possibility of a close vote or perhaps a plurality against us on the Albanian resolution and the possibility—even probability—that the Canadians and the Italians will be successful in reaching agreement with Peking on recognition—may force the GRC to look around for other formulations and to view their position more realistically.

Then we can perhaps try to move to something else. We see a change in the position at the UN as a developing and evolving process. We do not now know what precise shape such change will take but as moves are made it is highly important to maintain the confidence of the GRC and we must do our best to support it. Moreover we want to be able to avoid any dangerous reaction from Taipei. Mr. Green went on to speculate that what evolves may take some special Asian form that we cannot now envision. He recalled that during the Off-Shore Islands crisis no one could have possibly foreseen that it would end in a pattern of propaganda shelling every other day.

As for our bilateral position we have already come a long way. For a number of years now we have acknowledged that the Chinese Communists govern on the mainland and that the GRC governs on Taipei and the Pescadores. Indeed, tacitly, we believe that we should at some time have relations with Peking. Moreover we have given some thought to what we want to see evolve on the mainland. We believe it is in our interest that it be a viable entity, with a material life worth preserving, thereby tending the regime toward prudence rather than desperation.

As far as the situation in the UN is concerned we think it will in time fall into place. But we have to move with care. It is not only a question of Taipei's attitude. The attitude and position of the Japanese must be taken into account; a sudden move could create problems for Tokyo. And there is also the problem of Taipei's other Asian neighbors. In noting the apparent opposition of the Soviets to having the ChiComs in the UN, Mr. Green speculated as to whether there was any way to get them out in front on this.

Toward the end of the conversation Mr. Lakeland said that he did not feel the Senator would be satisfied with these answers; he will want to pursue the idea of reaching some change in our position this year. He again alluded to the attitudes of people generally and in Congress (though he acknowledged there were currents and counter currents on the Hill on this issue). And he spoke of our need to show a general capacity for leadership on this question and not be hobbled by bureaucratic inertia.

Mr. Green, in reply, said that he thought that in our China policy we had achieved a great deal already; that we had moved in concert with the Congress and the press. We have shifted the pace and degree of our actions. But we have to evaluate what the traffic can bear. The central issue is tactics and to bring the GRC along with us. He suggested, however, that Senator Javits might want to talk with the Delegation about his ideas on this question.

**298. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

New York, October 7, 1970, 2037Z.

2302. Subj: Chinese Representation in the UN. Ref: USUN 408, March 12, 1970.<sup>2</sup>

1. In our basic analysis (reftel) we concluded that maintenance of our present tactics seems likely to lead to early replacement (1971 or 1972) of GRC by PRC throughout the UN system. We also noted that successful conclusion of the negotiations between Canada and the PRC on recognition coupled with further defections in Latin America could result in a plurality for the Albanian resolution (to seat PRC, and expel GRC) at the 25th GA. This latter contingency now appears to be a very real possibility due to unfavorable trends in most of the geographic groups and the impact that the establishment of Canadian-PRC ties is likely to have.

2. Our latest voting estimate in which we have assumed the worst in almost all cases of doubt gives the Albanian resolution a slight plurality this year (51–49–27) as contrasted with last year's eight vote margin in our favor (48–56–21). However, we estimate that the worst will not occur in all cases and our current best forecast (subject to revision) is that we can again: (a) obtain adoption of the Important Question (IQ) resolution (estimated vote 66–47–12); (b) narrowly defeat the Albanian resolution with either a tie vote or a one or two votes margin in our favor.

3. Obviously, our projected outcome on the Albanian resolution is much too close for comfort even if we did not have to contend with the built-in variables of a 127-member General Assembly. A few last minute shifts such as those that occurred last year (Mauritius, Ghana) coupled with possible absences of mavericks (both Baroody of Saudi Arabia and El Farra of Jordan are now listed to vote with us against the Albanian resolution) could lead to a 51–47–29 result.

4. Although we would still be protected at this GA by the prior adoption of the IQ resolution, we would have to face the consequences that would flow from the fact that a simple majority opposes our position on Chirep. This could lead to a close floor fight at this session on the Credentials Committee's report. Even more difficult would be a credentials fight at the next session of the Security Council because

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 299, Agency Files, USUN, Vol. V. Secret; Exdis.

<sup>2</sup> Document 288.

a majority of Council members already recognize the GRC. (For example, Zambia might raise credentials in SC using majority vote in GA on AR as springboard.)

5. Likely and possible shifts by regions follow:

A. LA

Chile from abstain to yes  
Bolivia from no to abstain  
Colombia from no to abstain  
Peru from no to abstain

B. WEO

Canada from abstain to yes  
Italy from abstain to yes  
Luxembourg from no to abstain

C. NEA

Kuwait from abstain to yes

D. EA

Cambodia from yes to abstain  
Fiji estimated to abstain

E. Africa

Cameroon from no to abstain  
Central African Republic from no to abstain

6. Analysis by groups:

A. LA

It is only prudent to assume that Chile, under Allende, will move from last year's abstention on the AR to a yes vote. There are firm indications that Bolivia, Colombia and Peru will follow the lead given by Chile last year and will shift from a no vote to abstention. In addition, Peru will vote no on IQ resolution.

B. WEO

We have assumed the successful completion of Canada's negotiation with Peking will be reflected in Canada's vote on Chirep, i.e., Canada recognizes only Peking as the Government of China. In addition, there are firm indications that Italy will swiftly follow in Canada's footsteps and that Italy's negotiation with the PRC will also be completed by the time the vote is reached. Luxembourg has announced that it will follow Belgium's shift of last year and will abstain on the AR.

C. NEA

The strong statement by Kuwait FonMin in the general debate in favor of Peking's admission is generally considered to foreshadow a

shift from an abstention to a yes vote. Note comment in para. 3 above on Baroody and El Farra.

D. EA

The only good news is that we anticipate Cambodia will shift from a yes vote to an abstention. Although we had hoped that ASPAC members would be able to work on Fiji thereby obtaining a much needed no vote, we gather from Australia that Fiji is most likely to abstain. We have heard rumor that Indonesian FonMin Malik, while in NY, told his Mission Indonesia would no longer be absent during Chirep and Korean votes. Moreover, Indonesia would support PRC and NK. We assume ASPAC members will, as before, continue to work on Amb. Abdulgani to be absent.

E. Africa

There has been some uncertainty over the vote of the Central African Republic. While Amb. Liu tells us that the GRC has a firm commitment, all of us recognize that Bokassa is mentally unstable. To be on the safe side, we have carried CAR in the abstention column and we will be checking as we get closer to the vote. We also anticipate that Cameroon will shift from a no to an abstention. Our present expectation is that Equatorial Guinea will again abstain. However, Macias is in about the same mental state as Bokassa and we cannot exclude a last-minute shift to a yes vote.

7. Parsons (UK) told us Oct. 6 that his Mission had just completed Chirep vote estimate and he concluded vote on AR would be a tie. We note this estimate also shared by Embassy's Taipei 4328.<sup>3</sup> Would appreciate Department's latest estimate.

8. For obvious reasons we have not yet shared above with GRC mission.<sup>4</sup>

**Yost**

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<sup>3</sup> Not printed.

<sup>4</sup> On October 10 the Department advised Yost that it generally agreed with his forecast and analysis of the vote, but added that Malaysia, Tunisia, and Sierra Leone were possible swing votes. When discussing the situation with the Republic of China's UN Mission, Yost was advised to say that the United States would concentrate on Tunisia, Malaysia, Luxembourg, Fiji, and Colombia; the GRC should concentrate on Cameroon, the Central African Republic, Sierra Leone, and Guyana. The GRC could ask Japan to approach Kuwait or Peru, and its advice on tactics should be sought. (Telegram 167550 to USUN, October 10; *ibid.*)

**299. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rogers to President Nixon<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, October 13, 1970.

## SUBJECT

Chinese Representation at the 25th General Assembly

The vote on the Albanian Resolution, which seeks to seat Peking in the United Nations and to expel the Republic of China, was defeated last year 48–56–21. The vote this year seems likely to be closer, and a plurality in its favor seems possible. Our estimates, based on the available but incomplete indications of changed position, are roughly as follows: If all the shifts now considered “likely” occur, the resolution would fail 50–52–23. Should roughly half of the now discernible “possible” shifts also take place, the vote would be 51/52–49–24/25 in favor of the Albanian Resolution.

However, the Important Question Resolution (providing that a 2/3 majority of those voting is required to change China’s representation in the UN) should pass easily, though the margin may be reduced somewhat from last year’s 71–48–4. Thus a plurality in favor of the Albanian Resolution would not lead to its adoption. Nevertheless, such a plurality would be a psychological blow to our position and could lead to a marked deterioration in the vote next year. It also could conceivably open up the possibility of new motions unfavorable to our position at the present Assembly.

These estimates are, of course, distinctly subject to change in the period preceding the vote, now expected in mid-November. During that time, we will be consulting closely with the Government of the Republic of China and other governments which share our concern, coordinating tactics in an effort to forestall a plurality for the Albanian Resolution. It will be touch-and-go but I believe we have a reasonable chance of success.

**William P. Rogers**

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, UN 6 CHICOM. Confidential. Drafted by Feldman and Armitage and cleared by Marshall Green and Martin F. Herz. A covering memorandum from Green to Rogers is dated October 12. An enclosure entitled “Chirep Shifts, Likely or Possible” is attached but not printed.

**300. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

New York, October 15, 1970, 0026Z.

2464. Subj: Chirep. Refs: USUN 2302; SecState 167550.<sup>2</sup>

1. MisOffs (Newlin and Romine) went over ground in reftels with Hsueh (GRC) October 14. US and GRC anticipated shifts coincided in cases of Bolivia, Cambodia, Canada, Chile and Malaysia. This resulted in GRC estimated vote on Albanian res of 49–53–24.

2. MisOffs then informed Hsueh of possible trouble in cases of: Colombia, Peru, Italy, Luxembourg, Kuwait, Cameroon, CAR, Sierra Leone and Tunisia.

3. Hsueh took our most pessimistic estimate (USUN 2302) with sang-froid observing that it unlikely that worst would eventuate in all cases. We agreed and said our present forecast was for adoption of IQ res and defeat of Albanian res with much narrower margin than last year.

4. We agreed to following division of labor:

A. GRC to make further efforts both here and in capitals with: Bolivia, where GRC has active Spanish speaking Ambassador; Cameroon; CAR (Hsueh says Bokassa is still in Taipei and that CAR vote is safe); Mauritius; Guyana; Peru; Sierra Leone.

B. US similarly to approach: Colombia, Iceland, Fiji, Luxembourg, Morocco and Tunisia.

5. Hsueh said Indonesian PermRep Abdulgani has told him again that Indonesia will be absent from room at time vote taken.

6. Hsueh agreed that if other side dropped expulsion para from Albanian res or brought about separate vote on operative paras (in expectation admission para would achieve two-thirds majority while expulsion para would receive only simple majority and would be eliminated) would face us with difficult situation. Hsueh agreed that in event Albanian res were to receive simple majority there would be serious difficulty when it came to plenary adoption of report of Credentials Committee. He also agreed GRC would be placed in very precarious position in SC.

7. GRC mission, he said, had been concentrating on lobbying but he promised to reflect on above contingencies and to consult further on best tactics.

**Yost**

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 299, Agency Files, USUN, Vol. V. Secret; Exdis.

<sup>2</sup> See Document 298 and footnote 3 thereto.

**301. Telegram From Secretary of State Rogers to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

New York, October 20, 1970, 2:02 p.m.

Secto 26/2577. Subject: Sec Visit UNGA: Secretary's Conversation with Chinese Foreign Minister Wei.

Following is uncleared memcon for your info only and subject to revision upon review.<sup>2</sup>

Summary: FonMin Wei expressed concern Canadian recognition of PRC (perhaps followed by Italy) and prospective vote shifts by Chile, Bolivia and Colombia, plus certain others, would result in extremely close vote on Albanian resolution (AR). While GRC doing its utmost, US assistance would also be required, particularly in case of Cambodia where GRC considered it vital Cambodia vote No on AR. Help would also be needed with selected other countries.

Secretary said US would continue to do all we could to obtain adoption of Important Question (IQ) resolution and defeat AR. However, after this GA, we would need to discuss with GRC where we go from here. Many UN members were in favor of universality and we faced prospect FRG and GDR and perhaps other divided states would come into UN. In response to question by Amb Chow, Secretary said he did not think President's Oct 23 UNGA speech could be misconstrued re our position on China. End summary.

1. Conversation took place in Room 35A of Waldorf at 3:00 p.m. October 16. US participants were Secretary, Counselor Pedersen and Michael Newlin. Chinese participants were Foreign Minister Wei, Perm Rep Ambassador Liu and Ambassador Chow.

2. Wei thanked Secretary warmly for US support on Chirep and expressed gratification close cooperation between two UN Missions. Secretary said US doing all it could on this problem.

3. Wei said he was concerned over adverse impact Canadian recognition of PRC as well as changes of government in Chile and Bolivia would have on Chirep. Greater US and GRC efforts would be required.

4. In reply to Secretary's question on Cambodia's vote, Wei said matter had been taken up with Lon Nol and Deputy Prime Minister.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Conference Files: Lot 71 D 227, 1970 UNGA, Volume II of VI. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by Michael H. Newlin (POL), cleared by Richard F. Pedersen, and approved by Alden H. Irons (S/S). Repeated to Taipei, Hong Kong, and Phnom Penh.

<sup>2</sup> Clearance was sent on October 21 in telegram 2609 to USUN. (Ibid.)

Wei said vote against AR would be consistent with neutral posture. (In response to repeated urgings, Secretary said we would consider speaking to Cambodians about possibility of a No vote.)

5. Secretary noted increasing difficulties as time goes on. He had urged FonMin Moro AM Oct 16 to delay any GOI move to recognize Peking until after Chirep vote. Moro had cited internal difficulties especially with Senate. Even Conservatives favored Italian recognition of Peking. While we would continue to be in close touch with Italians and we hoped GOI recognition would not take place until after Chirep vote in GA, there was a possibility of a shift in Italian vote in any case.

6. Counselor Pedersen agreed with Amb Liu that vote on AR would be extremely close this year. In his view, we would not know result until vote actually cast. In reply to question as to effect simple majority in favor of AR would have, Pedersen noted this could lead to difficulties when Credentials Committee's report came to plenary. However, if AR received only one or two vote margin, there was still a possibility report of Credentials Committee could be adopted approving GRC credentials.

7. Secretary said he thought we would probably come out all right this year. However, situation concerning Chirep had become more serious and we must look down the road. Many UN members favored universality and we could look for recognition of Peking by Italy, Belgium, certain Latin American countries as well as others. Although we could probably hold the line this year, we needed to engage in active discussions with GRC as to where we go from here.

8. Amb Chow said "universality" was for some a synonym for admission of Peking to UN. He expressed strong hope that President's statement before GA on Oct 23 could not be misconstrued as to US position on China. Secretary replied President would be addressing broader issues and he was confident there would be nothing on China which could be misconstrued.

9. Secretary observed that eventually FRG and GDR would become UN members. Same would probably occur re North and South Korea. As far as Vietnam was concerned, even on US side there was interest in having both North Vietnam and South Vietnam in UN since this would tend to undercut North Vietnam position on Saigon govt. Canada had recognized Peking and Italy would probably soon follow suit. We had to look at facts as they exist and study their implications together. Secretary said he was not saying US position would change next year but that situation needed to be analyzed.

10. Throughout conversation Chinese made numerous requests for US assistance with individual countries. Upshot was as follows: probably nothing could be done re Chile; US undertook to approach Bolivia, Colombia, Cambodia, Iceland, Fiji and Luxembourg with view

to obtaining No vote on AR. US also to approach Belgium to maintain abstention. GRC making effort have Mauritius switch from Yes to No vote and might need supplementary approach from US. GRC to make effort, in first instance, with Kuwait, Ghana, Morocco, Nigeria and Tunisia.

Rogers

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**302. Memorandum From Winston Lord of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, October 27, 1970.

SUBJECT

United Nations Membership

Attached is a memorandum to you from Dick Smyser suggesting that we move toward a Two-China policy with regard to Chinese representation in the United Nations.<sup>2</sup>

*Considerations*

The first point to make about his memo is that it is too late to evolve our position on this question this year—we should hold the line until the voting takes place and then review our policy. The second point is that it is clear from our public statements that we are already moving in the direction that Smyser suggests, i.e., the careful formulation that “we are opposed to Communist China’s entry at the expense of Taiwan.”

With regard to the tactical question in New York, almost every year we are told that we must change our policy because we cannot win the next year. A few years ago there was a tie on the Albanian resolution, and many observers said that the handwriting was clear—yet our margin increased in subsequent years. Admittedly, with the Canadian move, Italy, Belgium and possibly Luxemburg in the wings, probable

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/P Files: Lot 77 D 112, Policy Planning Staff, Director’s Files, Winston Lord Chron, October 11–31, 1970. Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. Sent for action. A handwritten notation on the memorandum reads: “Al, Win informed. Pouch back.”

<sup>2</sup> Memorandum dated October 26, attached but not printed.

dents in the Latin American front (i.e., Chile, Bolivia), and a possible multiplier effect on others, there is more solid reason than before to worry about the future tactical situation. But I don't think the evidence is conclusive, nor do I think this should be the controlling argument.

Smyser lists three advantages in moving toward a Two-China posture at the UN—I think two are without merit:

—*Embarrass the Soviets*—It's hard to see how or why we would embarrass the Soviets. They would probably continue their present policy of supporting the admission of Peking and the expulsion of Taiwan, without overly exerting themselves, no matter what we do. The more relevant point on the Soviets is that we would stir their nervousness about US-Chinese relations, but in a way that they could not complain about.

—*Might improve our relations with Peking* (Smyser does emphasize the "might")—This is highly doubtful given Peking's violent objections to any Two-China formulation. An interesting question here is how we relate this issue to the Warsaw Talks or even whether it should be related at all.

—*Move us to a stronger wicket in the UN*—I would agree with this, but as I have indicated, I do not believe it should be the controlling factor in our decision.

Smyser also suggests that a shift in our policy might make Hanoi nervous and therefore be helpful in the Vietnam context. I find this unconvincing. If anything were to make Hanoi nervous and more amenable to negotiations, it would be our dialogue in Warsaw. Our previous conversations there, our changed rhetoric on China, and our modest unilateral steps on China policy have not made Hanoi nervous so far.

### *Launching Studies*

Having said all this, I still agree with Smyser that we should take a hard look at this question. Before doing so, however, we should decide whether we want to look at it in isolation or as part of an overall review of our policy toward United Nations membership and the universality question. Should we look only at the China angle, or does it make substantive and public relations sense to study at the same time the questions of Germany, Vietnam and Korea?

I believe that the entire universality question should be studied. If, however, you choose only to look at the China aspect, the logical group would be the new China Policy Group which you plan to establish per Dick Moorsteen's suggestion.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>3</sup> Reference is to NSSM 106, November 19; see footnote 1, Document 312.

There should not even be a hint of a study until the voting has taken place in New York, but one should be launched after that. There are two obvious bureaucratic routes: (1) issue a NSSM, and (2) do an NSC internal study.

I think we should do *both*. The former has the advantage of bringing in State with its obvious interest and expertise on these questions—I am still a believer in involving the State Department wherever possible. We can count on immediate leaks that such a study has been launched, but the public impact should be manageable and not necessarily all bad. In any event, we cannot not undertake studies which need to be done just because their existence might become known.

At the same time, I think it makes sense to move ahead within the staff with a parallel internal study to insure a dispassionate look at these issues and to sharpen your own thinking as the bureaucracy's study comes to the Senior Review Group.

Marshall Wright, in both his UN and long-range planning hats, is the logical man to head up an NSC study, working with Holdridge and Sonnenfeldt.

*Recommendations:*

1. That a NSSM be drafted and issued after the UN vote, calling for a study on the entire universality question (action to Wright and Kennedy, with Holdridge/Sonnenfeldt concurrence).

Approve<sup>4</sup>

Disapprove, NSSM on China question only

Disapprove, no NSSM

2. That action on this NSSM be assigned to an ad hoc group, chaired by a representative of the Secretary of State (presumably De Palma), with the study to be submitted to the Senior Review Group.

Approve

Disapprove, assign to new China Policy Group<sup>5</sup>

3. That Wright, with Holdridge/Sonnenfeldt, undertake a parallel in-house study of the UN membership/universality question.

Approve<sup>6</sup>

Disapprove

<sup>4</sup> Kissinger initialed this option and wrote: "Can we phrase it more neutrally?"

<sup>5</sup> Kissinger initialed this option and wrote: "Let's discuss."

<sup>6</sup> Kissinger initialed this option.

**303. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

New York, October 27, 1970, 1744Z.

2749. For the Secretary and Asst. Secys. Green and De Palma. Subj: GRC Interest in Dual Representation Formula.

Summary: At luncheon Oct 26 arranged at initiative of GRC reps, Amb Cheng Pao-nan and Vice Fon Min Yang (protect source), these officials suggested to Amb Phillips that time has come to consider new approach to problem of GRC representation and that it may be necessary to propose a dual representation formula at the 26th GA. End summary.

1. At initiative of Amb Cheng Pao-nan (GRC rep to UN Office in Geneva) Amb Phillips lunched with Vice Fon Min Yang and Cheng Oct 26. Prior to mtg, Cheng "speaking personally" said he did not know if US had begun to look ahead to 26th GA. While GRC hopes Albanian res wld again not receive even simple majority this year, it was unlikely present tactics cld be maintained beyond present GA.

2. Requirement, Cheng said, was for some kind of dual representation resolution, the modalities of which would require not only great deal of work but appropriately high-level political attention (i.e. President Chiang Kai-shek). Cheng hinted that diplomatic personnel in FonOff were prepared to think about future. Problem was that decisions taken by President Chiang and it difficult to get full exposition of options laid out to him.

3. Specifically, Cheng suggested Secretary have short meeting with FonMin Wei before latter leaves for Taipei in late November. He urged Secretary impress on Wei that 25th session was last GA in which Albanian res could be prevented from obtaining simple majority. Therefore, we needed to think of new approach designed to assure continued presence of GRC in UN. Cheng stressed importance of Secretary requesting Wei to report US views carefully to President Chiang.

4. Cheng made it clear he and Yang thinking about a formula analogous to FRG/GDR situation of two governments representing one state. It very important for GRC to be able to claim it is still legitimate Govt of China (of course, PRC would be entitled to do same). This required in order for GRC to be able to keep Formosa Nationalists in check.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 299, Agency Files, USUN, Vol. V. Secret; Nodis.

5. Cheng then urged, after ground had been prepared by Secretary's message to President Chiang via Wei, that US send high level emissary to Taipei in January or February. Yang later mentioned high respect President Chiang has for Vice President Agnew.

6. Phillips agreed on need to consider new tactics as soon as Chirep debate concluded. He then asked Cheng's views on SC seat. Cheng hedged and said this question should be left in abeyance while we proceeded in stages.

7. Substance of foregoing conversations was later repeated during luncheon at which Vice FonMin Yang also present. It essential that both Cheng and Yang be protected.

8. *Comment:* This is first time, in Mission's experience that senior GRC officials have been willing to discuss modalities and timing of possible dual representation formula. They were also candid re GRC need to style itself as the sole Government of China in order to help keep lid on Formosan Nationalists.

Yost

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**304. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Eliot) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, October 28, 1970.

SUBJECT

Chinese Representation at the 25th General Assembly

The following is in response to Mrs. Davis' memorandum of October 26 on the above subject (NSC 22741).<sup>2</sup>

The situation in the General Assembly on Chinese representation remains essentially unchanged from that reported in the Secretary's memorandum of October 13.<sup>3</sup> The vote on the Albanian Resolution,

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, UN 6 CHICOM. Confidential. Drafted October 27 by Robert B. Boettcher (IO) and revised October 28 in S/S-S by Thomas M. Harrington.

<sup>2</sup> In this memorandum to Eliot, NSC Staff Secretary Jeanne W. Davis requested that a brief memorandum be prepared for the President by October 27 as "an up-to-date report on the status of the Chinese representation question." (Ibid.)

<sup>3</sup> Document 299.

which seeks to seat Peking and to expel the Republic of China, will likely fail to obtain a simple majority by a narrow margin, though a majority in its favor or a tie vote are still possible. Our best estimates continue to range between a vote of 51 yes–49 no–24 abstain (possible but not likely) and a vote of 50–52–23 (probable).

There does not appear to be any real threat developing to the adoption of the Important Question Resolution, although as we noted in the previous memorandum, the margin will likely be smaller than last year. However, should the Albanian Resolution obtain a plurality at this session, there may be serious erosion in support for the Important Question in the period before the 1971 session. Moreover, a plurality on the Albanian Resolution at this session would spell serious trouble for us, not only because of its effect on the Important Question Resolution next year, but also because it might encourage other types of initiatives, such as a challenge of Chinese credentials in the Assembly or the Security Council, additional bilateral recognitions, and possible consideration of other Chinese representation formulae.

Statements in general debate and in the commemorative session for the most part followed already-known national positions on the issue of Chinese communist membership, but there was increased attention given to the concept of “universality” of membership. Now that the general statements have concluded, attention is focused on the issues with which the Assembly is immediately concerned, especially the Middle East. We do not expect much change in this atmosphere between now and the opening of debate on Chinese representation, still tentatively scheduled for November 2–6 but likely to be delayed by a week or so as a result of the Middle East debate.

**Theodore L. Eliot, Jr.**

**305. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, October 28, 1970.

## SUBJECT

Part I—Chinese Representation

## PARTICIPANTS

Marshall Green, Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs  
Albert Lakeland, Executive Assistant to Senator Javits of New York  
Alfred le S. Jenkins, Director of the Office of Asian Communist Affairs  
Louise McNutt, UN Advisor, EA, Office of Regional Affairs

Mr. Lakeland, who was again calling at his own request, noted at the outset that he was very pleased to see the recent Ziegler statement on Chirep.<sup>2</sup> He thought this represented a most useful step forward and wondered whether we could not be similarly forthcoming in our statement to the General Assembly.

Mr. Green, who noted in passing that he had drafted the Ziegler statement, said that as far as what we say to the General Assembly is concerned, we have to be very careful to stand by what we have told the GRC and other Governments, especially at this time when the vote is so crucial. We hope to do this without digging ourselves into a hole and by stressing our strong adverse reaction to any proposal to expel the GRC.

What we had tried to do in the Ziegler statement is to set up a formulation to which we can look in the future. He noted that so far we have seen no reaction to the statement from the GRC and that indeed Ambassador Chow, in answer to a question had indicated that there were no problems for him. We feel that many officials in the GRC are well aware of the shadows on the road ahead. The problem, however, is the Gimo's reaction.

Mr. Lakeland argued strongly that we cannot wait too long—to the point of no return—to try to move our position to one of keeping

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, UN 6 CHICOM. Secret. Drafted on October 30 by McNutt.

<sup>2</sup> During the White House news conference held on the afternoon of October 25, Press Secretary Ron Ziegler said: "But it should be stated very clearly, as I have stated it to you today, that the United States continues to oppose the admission of Red China at the expense of the expulsion of the Republic of China, and that the efforts we are making in seeking opportunities to improve our relations with Peking in no way lessens the importance we give to the close association with the Republic of China and the support we give to their constructive role in the international community." (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Central Files, White House Press Conferences, Box 16, White House News Conference No. 789)

the GRC in the UN but not opposing a seat for the Chinese Communists. He said that this year we have to show that we have the strength to beat the Albanian resolution but we should shift while we are still strong. To him this suggested that we should now indicate a new formulation, otherwise we may see the Chinese Communists seated and the GRC expelled.

Stressing that what he was saying was highly confidential, Mr. Green said that we probably would have to make some changes in our position. But we must handle any such move with exquisite diplomacy. On the question of moving from strength, we already have the Ziegler statement on the record and after the vote his (Mr. Green's) statement before the Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs will be published showing clearly it also came before the vote. But any subsequent moves must be in the closest consultation especially with the GRC and Japan. With regard to this year's vote, if the GRC were defeated by a significant majority Peking would certainly be in no frame of mind to do anything but demand a price for its seating. The situation is similar, if reversed, in the case of the GRC. If it feels the hot breath of a losing position, it may be more willing to face reality. Meanwhile, however, we have to stand by Taipei, otherwise our ability to influence it will be weakened.

The difficulty will come after the vote. We will then face such problems as how we take the matter up with the GRC; the need of avoiding precise labels such as two Chinas; one China—one Taiwan, etc. Probably the more nebulous the description of the relationship, the better. In this connection Mr. Green recalled that he had heard that Sato had mentioned something along the lines of one China—two voices.

Mr. Lakeland felt the question was how best to protect the GRC. We cannot do this if we wait too long. With regard to the GRC's reaction, perhaps we should move whether it is ready for us to do so or not. This even at the cost of the GRC's walking out. It could perhaps re-enter later. After all the Indonesians walked out of the UN at one time but subsequently came back without difficulty.

Mr. Green thought the situation in the case of Indonesia was quite different and that GRC withdrawal followed by a later attempted re-entry was likely to be impossible. He went on to stress however, that what we want is the GRC in the UN. We neither want to see it expelled or to have it walk out. We have a stake in this too and it poses us with a very difficult problem.

Continuing, Mr. Green took up an earlier comment of Mr. Lakeland's about the fact that a number of nations seem to be interested in the idea of universality. He noted that the concept had considerable support and it makes a good deal of sense. Mr. Green himself thought there was much to be said for the idea of universality with the added

element of self determination. In this combination we might be able to work out the necessary protection for Taiwan. But there are problems in connection with the concept. In East Asia there is a fundamental one in the attitude of the South Koreans. They would obviously react strongly and adversely, even though there was some element of give in Pak's recent statement with regard to relationships with the North.

In reply to a comment by Mr. Lakeland that we did not seem to show a sense of urgency about moving our policy on ChiRep, Mr. Green denied that this was the case. He said we thought it was a problem of the greatest urgency, but we have to be careful in how we go about it. He recalled President Roosevelt's actions in the early days of World War II. By not moving too fast in the early period of the conflict Roosevelt brought the country with him, so that by the time Pearl Harbor occurred the people were ready for the task ahead. There were similarities in the present situation with regard to China. The attitude of the American people is changing on this issue, but it still has a distance to go. Mr. Green referred to the recent Gallup Poll which found that 35% favored a seat in the UN for the Chinese but 49% opposed. While this showed a movement toward liberalization in the public's mind, it still indicated a considerable body of opposition. Accordingly we must play our cards very carefully.

Mr. Lakeland said he thought that if the question had been posed differently as for example—do you favor the continued opposition of the US to a seat for Peking, the answer might have been reversed. What we must do is free ourselves from the albatross of our present position.

In closing this section of the conversation, Mr. Green said that Senator Javits could be very helpful to us in trying to work out some method of dealing with this difficult problem. Mr. Javits as a leading Senator could help prepare the way in Congress and with the public and we hope that we can stay in close touch with him after the vote this year.

Mr. Lakeland said that the Senator was very appreciative of the role Mr. Green had played in this issue and was well aware of his persuasiveness in getting others to agree with his forward looking concepts.

**306. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

New York, November 2, 1970, 2346Z.

2888. Subject: Chirep at 25th UNGA. Ref: USUN 2860.<sup>2</sup>

1. Dept will note from reftel that in First Committee vote on Korean reses Oct 30, following countries shifted their votes in manner favorable to Soviet position and unfavorable to our own: Bolivia, Chile, Barbados, Congo (K), Mauritius, Morocco, Tunisia, Guyana, Ceylon, Kenya. Following countries shifted in manner favorable to US: Cambodia, Guatemala, Burundi, Saudi Arabia, Upper Volta.<sup>3</sup>

2. Some of these shifts appear to have no particular implications from Chirep standpoint. Absence of Congo (K) during vote was apparently deliberate, but seems based upon personal desire of Ambassador to make small show of independence on issue which he considered relatively minor. Naturally, we are checking further, but assume at this time no Chirep implication exists. View established Moroccan Chirep stand, their defection on Korea was to have been expected. Similarly for Ceylon and Kenya. On the other side of the line, Burundi's abstention is probably in nature of a bow to Ambassador Melady, while Saudi Arabia's "yes" seems attributable to confusion on part of their delegate while Baroodly was out of the room.

3. Following shifts do raise Chirep questions however: Bolivia, Chile, Barbados, Mauritius, Guyana, Tunisia. We have assumed little chance of stopping new Chilean Govt from this year voting against Important Question (IQ) and for Albanian res (AR). This seems confirmed by their vote on Korean invitation reses. Believe we must now assume Mauritius will not adopt voting stance more favorable than last year when they voted "yes" on both IQ and AR, and vote against IQ now becomes distinct possibility. Shift to more unfavorable position also seems indicated for Barbados (1969 vote: abstain on IQ, no on AR);

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 299, Agency Files, USUN, Vol. V. Secret; Exdis.

<sup>2</sup> Dated October 30. (Ibid.)

<sup>3</sup> On October 30 the First Committee of the General Assembly defeated draft resolution A/C.1/L.250, that called for the simultaneous and unconditional admission of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the Republic of Korea to take part, without the right to vote, in future UN discussions relating to Korea. The First Committee approved draft resolution A/C.1/L.251, allowing representatives of both states to participate in discussion of the Korean question provided that they unequivocally accepted the competence and authority of the United Nations to take action on the Korean question within the terms of the Charter. (*Yearbook of the United Nations*, 1970, pp. 209–210)

Bolivia (1969: yes on IQ, no on AR); Tunisia (1969: no on IQ, abstain on AR); and possibly Guyana (1969: yes on IQ, abstain on AR). Finally, though this did not emerge from Korean voting, Chad informed deloff today they were now instructed to vote yes on IQ and abstain on AR. On the positive side, we may perhaps take some comfort from fact Colombia did not shift and continued vote for our Korean res and against Soviet res.

4. Based on foregoing plus other info available to us and Dept, following is our picture of Chirep shifts certain, probable or possible, with approximately 7-10 days to go.

[Omitted here are two tables listing the possible voting shifts on the Albanian Resolution and the Important Question.]

5. Above pattern of expectations indicates following spreads:

A. On AR:

Best—50-55-22 (most unlikely)

Probable—52-50-25 (now most likely)

Worst—54-48-25

B. On IQ:

Best—71-50-6

Probable—68-51-8

Worst—62-54-11

6. Note that we reluctantly conclude a small voting majority in favor of the Albanian resolution now appears probable, unless we can contain and limit the number shifts now foreseeable. Accordingly, in addition to Bridgetown and Rome, we recommend strong démarches in the following capitals: Yaounde, Fort Lamy, La Paz, Bogota, Georgetown and Lima. In addition, we urge strong efforts with Tunisian Foreign Minister Masmoudi while in Washington.

7. Dept repeat to posts as desired.

**Yost**

**307. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Japan<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, November 7, 1970, 2044Z.

183821. Subject: Renewed Japanese Concern over China Problem.

1. At meeting with Assistant Secretary Green following US/Japanese planning talks, Takeshi Suzuki, head of FonOff Policy Planning Bureau, raised China question in terms of urgent need for US/Japanese cooperation in devising means to preserve independence of Taiwan.

2. Suzuki used impending reversion to Japan of Ryukyus as basis for underlining critical importance to Japan of preventing hostile Communist China from occupying Taiwan which is strategic position astride vital shipping lanes on Japan's southern flank. Suzuki also said consensus free Asian nations is that PRC should be admitted to UN but Taiwan should also be recognized as independent political entity. Moreover, at least ten of Taiwan's 13 million population favor independence, even from Chiang.

3. Suzuki then led into proposal he had also raised at policy planning talks. This involved progression of events in which U.S. would first confirm its security commitment to Taiwan; Japan, and U.S. would persuade Chiang Kai-shek to remove GRC forces from Quemoy and Matsu to symbolize abandonment of intention to return to mainland; and UNGA would pass resolution recognizing existence of one Taiwan and one China. This scheme would preserve UNGA seat for Taiwan while Security Council seat would go to PRC. Suzuki admitted Peking and Taipei would both react negatively to idea that both could be seated in UN, but felt that eventually one or both would decide it in their interest to assume seat. In any event, arrangement would preserve independence of Taiwan.

4. Green assured Suzuki that in determining its position, U.S. would consult closely with Japan. Green then said he would give entirely personal, non-official reaction to Suzuki's comments. After agreeing that both Peking and Taipei now show some signs of less diplomatic inflexibility, Green stressed that in past Chinat pride and pretensions have been major obstacles to achievement any tactical goal. Case in point was Gimo's failure to stand fast in Paris in 1964 when French recognized PRC. Danger now is that Chiang will decide to pull out of UN if many more countries recognize Peking or if there is ma-

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, UN 6 CHICOM. Confidential; Exdis. Drafted by Richard A. Ericson, cleared by Robert Emmons, and approved by Assistant Secretary Green. Repeated to Ottawa, Rome, Taipei, Hong Kong, and USUN.

jority for Albanian Resolution. PRC would then be in unchallenged position for a resolution recognizing existence of only one China (including Taiwan) and we would face all the difficulties and embarrassments of trying to support what was regarded as disputed part of a UN member.

5. Suzuki again mentioned advisability of withdrawal from Quemoy and Matsu as means by which Chiang might solidify Taiwanese people behind his leadership. Green responded that in its own peculiar way continued Chinat occupation of Quemoy and Matsu actually seems to have had stabilizing influence on situation. Troop presence symbolizes and confirms view of both governments on identity of China. To remove troops from islands would destroy this symbolism; new situation with clearcut division between two Chinas could precipitate crisis. It would for one thing remove only means by which Chicoms now feel they can reach GRC forces to further their objective of destroying morale and creating opportunities to take over Taiwan from within. Thus, while Suzuki's suggestion makes good sense in U.S. and Japanese eyes, it would not likely pave way for settlement of Taiwan issue. Suzuki accepted role of Quemoy and Matsu as described by Green (who had also described Doane-Wang agreement and its aftermath), indicating he had not previously considered that factor.

6. Subsequent conversation involved need for close consultation between U.S. and Japan on means of ensuring continued independence for Taiwan as soon as this year's results in UN could be assessed. As he did throughout conversation, Green stressed necessity to avoid using two-China or China/Taiwan labels in considering this problem, as PriMin Sato already has recommended. This would preserve maximum flexibility, perhaps even allowing possible future solution based on presence of Taiwan in UN as part of China—a province perhaps—but separate from the whole.

7. When discussion turned to combatting effect of Albanian Resolution, Green and Suzuki agreed that there could be widespread appeal for outcome based on principles of universality and self-determination.

8. Suzuki concluded by mentioning that when he visited Ottawa later in week he would urge Canadians in coming UN debate to make clear, as British had done in past, that their vote for Albanian Resolution did not alter status of Taiwan, which remained unsettled.

**Rogers**

**308. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

New York, November 13, 1970, 0111Z.

3133. Subj: Chirep—First Session.

1. Chirep debate opened in GA plenary morning Nov 12 with Algeria introducing res to “restore lawful rights of PRC” and expel “Chiang Kai-shek clique” from UN. Speech was almost carbon copy of last year, suggesting no flexibility on part of Peking or her supporters. Philippines followed introducing Important Question res. Again speech contained nothing new and was pitched to opposition Peking entry on grounds PRC not peace-loving state as required by Charter. GRC FonMin Wei then delivered lengthy speech built largely on anti-Sov quotes from PRC media (to prove they not peace-loving) and anti-PRC quotes from Sov media (ditto). Wei concluded by stating GRC not opposed to universality but believes it not relevant to Chirep question since GRC represents all of Chinese people, both on Taiwan and on mainland. Pakistan spoke for Albanian res and Costa Rica opposed, both on familiar grounds. Amb Phillips delivered US speech for which session closed.<sup>2</sup>

2. PM session Nov 12 adjourned after other business since no speakers inscribed on Chirep. Canada, Albania, Somalia inscribed for AM Nov 13. PM session will be given over to conclusion of debate and vote on Credentials Comite report, with Chirep resuming Nov 16. Now appears vote will take place Nov 19.

3. Reaction to US speech ran gamut from “nothing new” (Baroody, Saudi Arabia) to “clearly signals change in US policy” (Hearn, Canada). Yazid, who spoke for Algeria to open debate, approached MisOff and called it “most interesting speech—our own was same as last year but you broke new ground.” Petri (Sweden) termed it “excellent speech, striking exactly at our weak point.” Merilles (Australia), in private conversation called it, “thoughtful speech, pointing direction we should all take.” No comment yet from GRC Mission.

4. Press has shown great interest in speech and generally are pressing for elaboration. Among comments so far: Estabrook (*Wash Post*) “looks like a two China policy”; Tanner (*NY Times*): “important departure in US policy”; Yoshida (*Asahi*): “dropping opposition to Peking’s entry is beginning step to two Chinas policy.” Lin of Chinese

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, UN 6 CHICOM. Limited Official Use. Repeated to Taipei and Hong Kong.

<sup>2</sup> Ambassador Phillips’ speech is printed in the Department of State *Bulletin*, December 14, 1970, pp. 733–735.

Central News Agency was among those inquiring whether speech means change in US policy or only change in emphasis. In responding to press inquiries, Mission spokesmen have refused elaborate or comment on speech, saying it speaks for itself and requires no further elucidation.

Yost

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**309. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, November 17, 1970.

SUBJECT

Chinese Representation at the United Nations General Assembly

The annual vote on Chinese Representation at the United Nations General Assembly will come up this week, with last minute changes in delegation positions expected right up to the moment of balloting. Recent recognition of Peking by Canada, Italy and Equatorial Guinea are indicative of declining support for Taipei, and the possibility of a close vote in the United Nations. The procedure of the voting will remain as in previous years, i.e., a vote first on the "Important Question," followed by a vote on the Albanian Resolution (see below). State believes its strenuous efforts of the last ten days on behalf of the Government of the Republic of China have borne fruit and that the close vote may not go against the Government of the Republic of China. A summary of the situation and amplification of the issues follows:

*Important Question Resolution:*

—The United Nations General Assembly may decide by a majority vote that a matter is "substantive" rather than "procedural" and is therefore an "Important Question" requiring for passage affirmative votes of two-thirds of those present and voting.

—As in past years, the United States and other supporters of Taipei have introduced the Important Question Resolution on Chinese Representation, which provides a blocking third against Taipei's expulsion.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 299, Agency Files, USUN, Vol. V. Secret; Exdis. Sent for information. An undated draft of this memorandum, prepared earlier in November, is *ibid*.

—State’s estimate of the probable vote this year for the Important Question is 65 in favor, 53 opposed, with 8 abstentions.

*The Albanian Resolution*

—The Albanian Resolution is introduced by Peking’s supporters. It specifically provides for expelling the “Chiang Kai-shek clique” and “restoring the lawful rights of the People’s Republic of China” by a simple majority vote.

—State’s estimate, subject to revision, of the most likely vote on the Albanian Resolution is 50 in favor, 52 opposed and 24 abstentions.

—Even if the Albanian Resolution should gain majority support, Taipei’s representatives would not be expelled this year because of the two-thirds vote requirement imposed by the Important Question.

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**310. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rogers to  
President Nixon<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, November 18, 1970.

SUBJECT

Contingency Backgrounding Material for Adverse Vote on Chinese  
Representation in the UN

An adverse vote (by a simple majority) on the Albanian Resolution at the present UNGA, which is possible, would of course not result in passage of the resolution because we would still have a majority on the Important Question resolution—but it would probably soon spell the end of the success of our present policy on the Chinese Representation issue. Once the Albanian Resolution obtains a simple majority there is a strong likelihood that our majority on the Important Question will be seriously eroded. It may, in fact, be eroded during the coming year to the point where that majority would be lost at the 26th UNGA, thus opening the way to passage of the Albanian Resolution by a simple majority.

I have approved the use of the following points in backgrounding in the Department and in conversations with key allies in the event the Albanian Resolution obtains a simple majority at this UNGA (the vote is expected the week of November 16):

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, UN 6 CHICOM. Secret.

1. We intend to have a thorough examination of the policy implications of the new situation, in full consultation with our friends and allies.

2. We recognize there is much sentiment in the UN in favor of the admission of Communist China. We do not believe, however, that a majority favors expulsion of the Republic of China. Certainly, the United States does not.

3. We note a glaring inconsistency in the position of some countries which favor United Nations "universality" in their speeches, yet vote for the Albanian Resolution which would expel the Republic of China from the organization.

4. We have long felt that a major problem is the fact that the Chinese Representation issue at the United Nations is posed in terms of expelling the Republic of China and seating the People's Republic of China in its place. While the United States is prepared to examine all the implications of the situation, it is not prepared to drop its firm opposition to attempts to deprive the Republic of China of its membership in the United Nations.

A copy of contingency guidance we plan to use for public statements is enclosed.<sup>2</sup>

**William P. Rogers**

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<sup>2</sup> Attached but not printed. The guidance was transmitted to all posts in telegram 190133, November 20.

**311. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rogers to  
President Nixon<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, November 18, 1970.

SUBJECT

Next Steps in Our China Policy

The adverse voting trend in the UN General Assembly on the Chinese representation issue and the likelihood that in the months ahead several more countries will follow the lead of Canada and Italy in recognizing Peking require that we take a thorough look at our China policy to see where we go from here. There is also always the possibility that Peking may on short notice propose a resumption of the Warsaw talks.

I plan to meet with Foreign Minister Wei Tao-ming in early December, before his return to Taipei, to urge that he impress upon President Chiang the seriousness of the situation confronting his government in the UN and in its bilateral relations and the need for the GRC to consider carefully how best to meet it.

Meanwhile, I have asked my staff to initiate a thorough study and review of the situation and possibilities open to us and will make recommendations to you as soon as possible.

**William P. Rogers**

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, UN 6 CHICOM. Secret; Exdis. Drafted November 17 by U. Alexis Johnson and Shoesmith and cleared by Winthrop G. Brown, De Palma, Ronald I. Spiers, and William I. Cargo. An attached memorandum from Rogers to Assistant Secretaries Green and De Palma, and to the Directors of the Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs and the Policy Planning Staff, dated November 18, authorized the Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs to coordinate the policy review. Another attached memorandum from Deputy Assistant Secretary Winthrop G. Brown to Rogers, dated November 17, recommended the initiation of a Departmental review of U.S. China policy.

312. National Security Study Memorandum 107<sup>1</sup>

Washington, November 19, 1970.

TO

The Secretary of State  
The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT

Study of Entire UN Membership Question: U.S.-China Policy

The President has directed that a study be prepared of the membership question at the United Nations.

The study should incorporate alternative views and interpretations of the issues involved.

The study should include but need not be limited to the following:

1. The implications of new approaches, e.g. "universality," on the membership question for the United Nations itself and on our ability to pursue U.S. interests within the U.N. organization.
2. In addition to dealing with Korea, Vietnam, Germany, and China, the study should treat with any other aspects of U.N. membership likely to be affected by the adoption of a new approach to the membership question.
3. The effect on our bilateral relations with other countries which would be caused by adoption of a new approach to U.N. membership.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 365, Subject Files, NSSMs. Secret; Sensitive. Copies were sent to Laird, Moorer, Stans, and Kennedy. In a November 10 memorandum to Wright, Holdridge, Sonnenfeldt, and Kennedy, Lord noted that Kissinger wanted "both an inter-agency effort and an in-house NSC study" of this issue. (Ibid., RG 59, S/P Files: Lot 77 D 112, Policy Planning Staff, Director's Files, Winston Lord Chron, November 1970) Nixon was initially unaware of NSSM 107. On November 22 he wrote a short note to Kissinger: "On a very confidential basis, I would like for you to have prepared in your staff—without any notice to people who might leak—a study of where we are to go with regard to the admission of Red China to the UN. It seems to me that the time is approaching sooner than we might think when we will not have the votes to block admission. The question we really need an answer to is how we can develop a position in which we can keep our commitments to Taiwan and yet will not be rolled by those who favor admission of Red China." (Ibid.) Kissinger responded with a short note on November 27 explaining to Nixon that the studies were already underway. (Ibid.)

Also on November 19 NSSM 106 called upon the Interdepartmental Group for East Asia and Pacific Affairs, together with representatives of the Treasury and Commerce Departments, to study long- and short-range U.S. policy goals toward China, U.S. policy toward Taiwan, tactics to be pursued to implement these policies, coordination of policies with other countries having particular interests in China, and the effects of U.S.-China policy on relations with the Soviet Union and on U.S. interests in Southeast Asia. (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 365, Subject Files, NSSMs) NSSM 106 is printed in *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, volume XVII, China, 1969–1972.

4. The inter-action between U.S. policy toward Chinese membership in the United Nations and our bilateral relations with Peking.

Responsibility for this study is assigned to an ad hoc group chaired by the Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs and including representatives from CIA and the NSC Staff. The study should be submitted to the Senior Review Group by January 15, 1971.

Henry A. Kissinger

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**313. Telegram From the Consulate General in Hong Kong to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

Hong Kong, November 23, 1970, 0430Z.

4725. Summary.

A. Strategy on Chirep in wake of last week's UN vote<sup>2</sup> must presumably be based on particularly close consultation with the GRC, but ought also to be consistent with by-now well-established U.S. posture of not opposing PRC participation per se. Necessity of concerting with GRC (together with other factors) appears to exclude U.S.–GRC common support of any formula which explicitly or implicitly suggests permanent political separation of Taiwan from the mainland, such as "one-China, one-Taiwan" approach. However, GRC might at least tacitly acquiesce in strategy aimed at marshalling support for "one-China, two delegations" formula, i.e., providing dual representation for China without prejudice to the claims of either Peking or Taipei with respect to sovereignty or territorial integrity.

B. We are not overly sanguine about prospects for adoption by UN of such dual representation formula even with GRC acquiescence, and we realize that complex Charter problems might block immediate

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, UN 6 CHICOM. Secret; Priority; Exdis. This telegram was forwarded to USUN on November 23 as telegram 191736 and to Taipei on December 1 as telegram 195256. (Ibid.)

<sup>2</sup> Telegram 3295 from USUN, November 20, reported on the results of the vote on November 20 in the General Assembly. The Important Question resolution was adopted by a vote of 66 to 52 with 7 abstentions, with Maldives absent and Indonesia not participating. The vote on the Albanian resolution was 51 to 49 with 25 abstentions, again with Maldives and Indonesia not participating. Since two-thirds majority of those present and voting was required because of passage of the Important Question resolution, the Albanian resolution failed to receive enough votes for passage. (Ibid.)

implementation of formula even if adopted. Also, as a matter of tactics, we might find it desirable to continue join with GRC in opposing Albanian resolution (or its successor) and supporting Important Question, while encouraging initiatives by others along "one-China, two-delegations" lines. Nevertheless, U.S. identification with "one-China, two-delegations" position would have implications for our long-run relations with Peking, for rationale of our relationship with GRC, and for peace of Pacific, whose benefits would out-weigh short-term tactical considerations, and which would in any case be better than implications of alternative strategies. End summary.

1. Just-concluded Chirep season appears to us to have publicly committed U.S. to position of not opposing seating of PRC in UN per se. In wake of favorable vote on AR, pressures for definition of rationale of this position seem to us likely to become irresistible before next year's Chirep vote. That is, U.S. may be forced to declare whether it favors seating both Peking and Taipei in UN as two separate countries ("one-China, one-Taiwan") or as two separate groups representing a single country ("one-China, two delegations").

2. At same time, as practical matter, historical role of U.S. as ally and supporter of GRC has also just been reaffirmed, with result that it would be difficult, and perhaps harmful to U.S. honor and prestige, for us to take formal position on Chirep in sharp divergence from that of GRC. Also, if our aim is ultimately to have both Peking and Taipei in UN, Peking's reactions must be taken into account. Peking would certainly strongly prefer to see Chirep continue to be fought out on all-or-nothing, "one-China, one delegation" basis. Peking, which more intent on winning seat than in past, wants her entry to come if possible as humiliating defeat for U.S., not as result of compromise. Despite majority vote for AR, Taipei may prefer defeat to compromise and also may want to gamble that IQ will pass at least once more. Nevertheless, based more on subjective estimate than on evidence, we believe that Taipei, and perhaps Peking too, if they had to choose between "one-China, one-Taiwan" formula and "one-China, two-delegations" formula, would choose latter. We believe in particular that KMT/GRC sensitivity to Taiwanese Independence Movement and suspicions re TIM's U.S. connections virtually rule out possibility of developing a Chirep strategy for next year based on "one-China, one-Taiwan" formula. In any case, "one-China, one-Taiwan" formula would have implications for territorial integrity of China that would be vehemently denounced by both Peking and Taipei.

3. We accordingly recommend that U.S. seek to develop with GRC common strategy which would, with minimal revision of our past position, nevertheless move toward support of a dual representation formula without prejudice to integrity of China—a "one-China, two-delegations" position. U.S. and GRC would not rule out tactics of con-

tinuing to oppose Albanian resolution and support Important Question rule, but would, as matter of longer term strategy, (a) encourage and support introduction of resolution calling on UN (in words of Lusaka) “to examine modalities of enabling all countries which are divided to participate in the activities of organization and its agencies”, and, (b) support introduction of “improved Belgian resolution” which would retain seat in UN for GRC “without prejudice to integrity of China or to competing claims of two governments”.

4. In keeping with this strategy, U.S. should endeavor, in direct contacts with Chinese Communists at Warsaw and in public statements, to demonstrate active interest in PRC participation in UN and even in its seating in Security Council. This, we believe, is essential if strategy is not to appear to Peking and majority of membership as simply another device to delay or prevent PRC seating. In addition, it would be desirable for U.S. to seek at Warsaw understanding with Peking on status and future of Taiwan consistent both with renunciation of force concept and with above Chirep position.

5. GRC would probably regard above strategy as much less than ideal; PRC would certainly denounce strategy as “two-Chinas” plot, and vigorously oppose it. However, if strategy gains support and if we present it properly at Warsaw, in broader context of Taiwan problem, it seems at least conceivable that Peking as well as GRC might come to see strategy as part of sequence of events most realistically calculated to prevent permanent political separation of Taiwan from Mainland. (Same, incidentally, cannot be said of any strategy of “one-China, one-Taiwan” variety. Adoption by U.S. of “one-China, one-Taiwan” strategy would in our view materially reduce prospect for improvement in Sino-U.S. relations.)

6. If, despite our persuasion, Taipei insists on sticking to all or nothing, “one-China, one-delegation” position, and refuses to join us in promotion of “one-China, two-delegations” solution, we recommend that U.S. agree to support GRC in defense its seat on terms acceptable to it. However, in such case we should in our talks with GRC let them know that we intend to lend informal encouragement to initiatives by third parties designed to enable both the GRC and the PRC to participate in the UN as dual representatives of one China. We are not sanguine about prospects for adoption by the UN of a dual representation formula, but U.S. identification with this position would have implications for our long-run relations with China whose benefits would outweigh immediate tactical considerations.

7. Department please pass Taipei.

**Osborn**

**314. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

New York, November 25, 1970, 2300Z.

3383. Subj: Chirep—Further Considerations on This Year's Vote.  
Ref: USUN 3295.<sup>2</sup>

1. Reftel reported our immediate and largely statistical analysis of the two Chirep votes at 25th UNGA. Over following weeks we will report on conversations with other missions on this question, a process already begun, and hope to develop and comment on alternatives for coming year. We strongly recommend, and are sure Dept will wish to undertake, a most rigorous analysis of where we stand and where we want to go. Naturally, Mission would like to participate in this. For moment, we would make following observations:

A. In years past, for passage of IQ and defeat of Albanian res (AR), we have depended upon coalition of Western Europeans, Latin Americans, black Africa, and non-Communist Asia. Though we suffered some defections on IQ, this coalition held together this year, leading to our 66-52-7 victory. On AR, however, we lost Western Europe, the Andean LAs, and significant support among black Africans.

B. It seems unmistakably clear that without high level messages, démarches in numerous capitals and strenuous lobbying here on part GRC, US and Japan, AR vote would have been even more adverse. Before the round of approaches in capitals and letters was undertaken, it was not only possible but likely that AR would obtain plurality of six instead of plurality of two. In a sense, however, this result carries with it certain contradictory elements. In corridors word is spreading quickly that in representations, US asked for support this year on understanding we would have a new policy next year, and AR cosponsors have been quick to point out that despite a major effort both in NY and in capitals US could no longer command a simple majority against AR.

C. It seems to us that coalition which held together on IQ is far from stable. Peking will exert very strong pressure on the five states which recognize PRC but which nevertheless voted for IQ this year, and AR cosponsors will lobby very hard on this issue. With 66-52 vote, shift of seven votes from "yes" to "no" would produce tie, as would fourteen yeses shifting to abstention. While far too early to predict next

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 299, Agency Files, USUN, Vol. V. Secret; Exdis.

<sup>2</sup> See footnote 2, Document 313.

year's voting behavior, it seems to us we can no longer count on "yes" votes from many WEOs and must also expect defections from some Africans as well.

D. With exception of Bolivia, we can probably hold LA support we now have both on IQ and AR. We have already lost Eur support on AR and (as noted above) must realistically expect to do so on IQ as well. We should be able to hold island states of Asia, though Japan and New Zealand will come under great public pressure. (We have impression Tsuruoka of Japan lobbied much harder than FonOff wished.) NEA countries, where we already have little support, will probably continue to vote much as they did this year (though further shifts by Cyprus, Lebanon and Kuwait are distinct possibility). The swing continent seems to be Africa.

E. African vote on AR this year split 18–18–5. Yet this split masks an underlying unity. Three AF states which voted for AR made statements in favor of dual representation (Ghana, Morocco and Nigeria). Ethiopia (which did not speak at all during Chirep debate) reportedly favors two-Chinas solution, and Tunisia's statements have already been reported. In their debate speech, Zambia, an AR cosponsor, never once called for ROC expulsion. Similarly many Africans who voted against AR privately or publicly advocate seating PRC. It seems to us there is unmistakable African consensus that Peking should be seated but Taiwan should not be expelled. We believe it is only realistic to take as our frame of reference that consensus.

2. We have read with much interest Hong Kong 4725.<sup>3</sup> "One-China-two-delegations" proposal, one of several possible variants of two-para res (along with two-Chinas, one-China-one-Taiwan, one-China-two-governments), merits study along with other possibilities such as universality res, one-para res, etc. In this connection, Japanese Minister Yoshida today suggested to us one-para res which would make no mention of PRC but would express Assembly view ROC should not be expelled. Such a res might obviate necessity for IQ, would take advantage of African consensus mentioned above, and might place AR cosponsors in a most difficult position. Finally, we should also take into account alternative of continuing on our present course in knowledge that though defeat likely, other alternatives could be still less attractive.

3. In reviewing all policy options, Mission believes Dept should take into account:

A. Damage we would suffer if PRC entry were seen as resounding defeat for us. Such damage would be not only to our prestige and

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<sup>3</sup> Document 313.

hence our ability to influence events in UN, but to our ability to deal with Peking, in or out of UN, as well.

B. Effect on public and Congressional opinion if PRC were voted in over our strong opposition.

C. Fact that delegates, and thus presumably member states, worldwide want to see this problem solved next year and that if US is seen as blocking "equitable and realistic" solution we would be swimming against entirely adverse tide.

D. Fact there is strong UNGA consensus which believes PRC should be in, but views with impatience and frustration limitation to "either-or" choice.

**Yost**

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### **315. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Mexico<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, December 2, 1970, 1945Z.

196208. Subj: Memorandum of Conversation with GRC Foreign Minister Mexico City for Freeman Matthews from Peter Johnson.<sup>2</sup> Please deliver following to Mr. P. H. Huane, Secretary to the Foreign Minister. Understand Foreign Minister will be in Mexico City until December 4.

1. The Secretary met with Foreign Minister Wei at Ambassador McBride's residence for twenty minutes at 9:15 a.m. on December 1.<sup>3</sup>

2. The Secretary opened the conversation and said that we made strenuous efforts this year on both the Important Question and the Albanian Resolution and that he personally had made numerous approaches both while in New York at the beginning of the General Assembly and then later with Austria, Chad, Iceland, Ireland and

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, UN 6 CHICOM. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Repeated to Taipei. Drafted by Peter Johnson, cleared by Eliot, and approved by Rogers. The telegram was passed to the President by Kissinger in the daily briefing memorandum for December 8. (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 14, President's Daily Briefing)

<sup>2</sup> H. Freeman Matthews, Director of the Vietnam Working Group beginning in August 1969; Peter B. Johnson, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State.

<sup>3</sup> Robert H. McBride, Ambassador to Mexico. Both Rogers and Wei were in Mexico for the inauguration of President Luis Echeverria.

Malaysia. The results of these efforts were not as good as we could have wished.

3. The Secretary said that for the first time since 1961, when the Chinese representation question took its current form, a simple majority voted to expel the GRC in order to seat Peking. It is unlikely that we can reverse this trend. The Secretary pointed out that the Albanian Resolution did not carry because the Important Question resolution imposed the requirement of a two-thirds majority. The Important Question passed by only 14 votes, down 9 from last year.

4. The Secretary added that we believe there will be further difficulties with the Important Question resolution next year. A number of governments (including Canada, Italy, Austria) which voted for the Important Question have indicated that they have reservations about continuing to support that resolution in future years.

5. The Secretary said the United States remains firmly opposed to the expulsion of the Republic of China from the United Nations.

6. Under the present circumstances, however, we believe we both must examine the new situation carefully with a view to determining what courses of action may be open to us in preventing the expulsion of the Republic of China from the United Nations.

7. The Secretary said he hoped that when the Foreign Minister returned to Taipei he would inform President Chiang in detail of the seriousness of the problem and the Secretary's personal concern about it, and that the Foreign Minister would emphasize to President Chiang the importance of examining carefully all available courses of action for meeting the problem.

8. The Secretary asked the Foreign Minister to convey to President Chiang the United States desire to consult fully on this matter as soon as possible.

9. Minister Wei said in response that in the Security Council in January, Somalia may take some action with regard to GRC credentials and that possibility there would be one more vote against the GRC beyond the present five. His government, he added, has been in touch with ours with regard to tactics. Minister Wei went on to say that the recent General Assembly results were disappointing but there is still some cause for hope. He said he expects the Albanian Resolution will be resubmitted next year and hopefully will be dealt with again as an Important Question.

10. Secretary Rogers pointed out that the process of erosion that is taking place probably will continue to present a dangerous situation to the GRC. Minister Wei then said his government foresaw problems within Mainland China which, although not as serious as during the Cultural Revolution, still could cause a change favorable to the GRC between now and next year's General Assembly session. Minister Wei

considered this year's vote was caused by a combination of negative factors including the Lusaka Conference and the Italian recognition. He expressed hope that the situation might be brighter next year.

Irwin

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### 316. Telegram From the Consulate General in Hong Kong to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>

Hong Kong, December 4, 1970, 0800Z.

4967. Subj: Chirep—Tactics. Refs: A. USUN 3383; B. Hong Kong 4725.<sup>2</sup>

1. Particularly grateful to Dept and USUN for giving us chance to comment on reftel A. Chirep question appears to us to have reached stage at which definition of US position has policy implications more critical than any near-term tactical or political considerations. If US Chirep position is defined in manner which logically implies that Taiwan and mainland China are separate nations, we believe long-run effect could be to make conflict between PRC and ourselves (and others, like Japan, who might go along with US) more probable than if we keep our Chirep position consistent with concept that Taiwan and mainland China are parts of single nation. Short-run effect would be virtually to rule out significant détente between US and Peking, and to enlarge differences between US and GRC. In line with last sentence para 2 reftel A, we accordingly recommend avoidance of Chirep positions implying that Taiwan and China are separate nations, even if alternatives might appear to lead to tactical defeat, or seem harder to "sell" in the GA.

2. Our intent in reftel B was thus not merely to extol merits of one particular variant of "two-para res," but to call attention to importance of avoiding implications, via our Chirep position, that US has committed itself to perpetual political separation of Taiwan from China, thereby tending narrow options leading to accommodation with Peking. We believe that all Chirep proposals should be reviewed from standpoint of these consistent with concept that Taiwan is legally part

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, UN 6 CHICOM. Secret; Exdis.

<sup>2</sup> Documents 314 and 313, respectively.

of China, and that those which are not consistent should either be eliminated from consideration, or, if feasible, revised to make them consistent with such a “one-China” position. For example, it appears to us that “universality res” could, depending on its definition and context, be either consistent or inconsistent with one-China position. As commonly used, “universality” seems to us to mean that every nation should be represented; if there is only one China, then Albanian res is not in conflict with principle of universality. Accordingly, if “universality” is to be used as basis for opposing expulsion of GRC, there should be a gloss on the term to effect that in favoring “universality” US intended, not just that every nation should have delegation in UN, but that every established regime in firm control of definite territory and population should have right to representation. We have thought of this as “popular universality” (as opposed to “national universality”) and have been attracted to it in part because it might accommodate cases of other divided nations.

3. Similarly, one-para res suggested by Yoshida might, in our view, be made acceptable if amplified to make clear that it was without prejudice to territorial integrity of China. Otherwise, given the prevalent assumption that only sovereign nations are entitled to have delegations in UN, Peking might fairly conclude that PRC was being asked to sacrifice territorial integrity as price for seat. Peking and probably many UN members would regard Yoshida res, if not amplified as suggested above, as merely another device to prolong exclusion of PRC. In this connection, it is noted that the amplification we have suggested would be quite in line with “one-China” position that Japanese Govt spokesmen have consistently taken in public statements and in Diet for at least past year.

4. I wish to make clear we are not urging that US operate on assumption that GRC and PRC will necessarily be able eventually to agree on peaceful reunification. Nor would US adoption at this time of Chirep position consistent with Taiwan status as province of China necessarily foreclose option of eventual recognition of independent Taiwan or its admission as such to UN, should this be course of history. We are concerned, rather with serious effects that would stem from our identification at this time with view that Taiwan is not part of China.

5. Dept please repeat USUN, Taipei, Tokyo.

**Osborn**

**317. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

New York, December 19, 1970, 0133Z.

3752. Subj: Chirep in SC.

1. With the accession of five new SC members on Jan 1, we must anticipate that GRC credentials will be raised at first meeting in 1971. This, of course, is an annual contingency (which has not materialized since 1968) but it appears likelier to arise this year in light of vote on Albanian res and election of Somalia. We have already heard reports Yazid (Algeria) is agitating that UN take cognizance of this year's Chirep vote by rejecting GRC credentials in SC.

2. On this question, the changed composition works in our favor: Argentina vice Colombia, Belgium vice Finland, Italy vice Spain, Japan vice Nepal, Somalia vice Zambia. We have a solid base in SC of six members which support our position on Chirep: US, China, Argentina, Japan, Nicaragua, Sierra Leone. If we can persuade UK, Italy and Belgium (all of which support IQ) to join us in procedural moves to defeat any effort to bring matter up, we will have procedural majority of nine votes.

3. Obviously, such procedural tactics must not prejudice position of anyone on substance.

4. We currently approaching UK, Italy and Belgium on above. President of SC for Jan, Sir Colin Crowe, has referred previous contingency plans worked out between USUN and UKUN to London for approval which he expects will be forthcoming.

5. On Dec 18, Amb Phillips approached Italian Acting PermRep Migliuolo. Latter had done considerable research in depth and said Vinci currently in Rome and would bring back instructions around Jan 1. Main contingencies discussed with Migliuolo were: (A) If Somalia and/or Syria request change in long-established practice of approving only credentials of five new non-perms, objection would be made with object of forcing member seeking change to submit formal proposal. Hopefully any such proposal would get only six votes: Burundi, France, Poland, Somalia, Syria, USSR. (B) If challenge is submitted to Chinese credentials or a vote on them is requested, President should rule consideration would require agenda item. President would submit challenge to the vote and hopefully it would receive only above six votes. (C) Somalia and Syria might request SC meeting for purpose of ap-

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, UN 6 CHICOM. Confidential. Repeated to Brussels, London, Rome, and Taipei.

proving credentials and submit agenda item to this effect. In this case, we should agree to meeting but seek to defeat adoption of agenda item (nine votes needed for inscription). (D) In event item nevertheless inscribed, we should seek nine votes for following res:

“The Security Council,

“Noting with approval the report by the Secretary General on ‘practice of the Security Council regarding the credentials of its members’ of 26 January 1968 (S/8365),

“Decides to take no further action at this time to consider the credentials of any of its members.”

6. While there are other contingencies, we stressed to Migliuolo that main thing we were seeking was commitment to cooperate in tactics which would keep SC from becoming embroiled in major controversy over matter which should be decided in GA where all members present. Migliuolo seemed personally sympathetic and said he had pointed out prior to Chirep debate in GA that a no vote on IQ would restrict Italy’s freedom to prevent SC from getting involved in Chirep. Since Italy voted for IQ, Migliuolo seemed to think there was good chance that GOI would agree to cooperate with US in elaborating contingency plans. However, he stressed this view was entirely personal and that decision was up to Rome. He promised to report above approach fully.

7. Yost and Phillips will see Belgian PermRep Dec 21.

Yost

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**318. Telegram From the Embassy in Italy to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

Rome, December 22, 1970, 1750Z.

7341. Subject: Chirep in SC. Ref: USUN 3752.<sup>2</sup>

1. USUN’s flagging of potential GRC credentials problem in SC coincided with first intimations here that issue could become troublesome.

2. In recent talk with Ambassador, FonOff SYG Gaja hoped we intended to thoroughly review Chirep problem since it quite likely with-

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, UN 6 CHICOM. Confidential. Repeated to Brussels, London, Taipei, and USUN.

<sup>2</sup> Document 317.

out new approach we could be exposed to defeat next year. Reflecting Moro's belief that Secretary in New York had indicated awareness new Chirep policy essential, Gaja intimated that unless US produced one that Italians could support, internal pressures might cause increasing divergences between US and Italy on this subject.

3. A further indication of this possibility came December 21, when Foreign Ministry's UN Director told EmbOff that question of GRC credentials in SC would have to be decided at "high political level." He added, however, that UK and Belgium positions might conceivably affect Italian decision.

4. Transmission of SC credentials matter to higher Italian political level could be very troublesome, if it should involve political parties, as did earlier Chirec and Chirep decisions. At such level Italian Socialists assume a purposeful intransigence that is worrisome to government in best of circumstances, frightening in periods of uncertainty like that likely to prevail early in new year. Near crisis occurred last November when, as Gaja told Ambassador, Vice Premier De Martino and Socialist Party Secretary walked out of party "summit" when decision was taken to vote for IQ. Moro was not certain PSI might not leave government on this issue but, in view of clear US views presented Ortona by Under Secretary Johnson, remained adamant that GOI would vote for IQ.

5. We should assume same intense pressure will be applied again in hope of imposing PSI views on government, for in such way does PSI build up a power it hopes will give it a veto over Italian foreign policy.

6. Would therefore appreciate early and full status report in hope that by our acting early enough and forcefully enough here we may not only keep Italian position of SC credentials under control but at same time buck up the government in its resistance to PSI's search for foreign policy veto.

**Martin**

**319. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

New York, January 13, 1971, 2314Z.

87. Subj: Chirep—Phillips/Liu Meeting Jan 12.

1. Amb Phillips met with Liu at latter's request Jan 12 to compare notes in light of US policy review and Liu's recent consultations in Taipei. Phillips said US review in full swing and that we intended to consult GRC just as soon as it is completed. Liu said Taipei "very disappointed" that he, Liu, was not able to indicate preliminary US thinking about future strategy and tactics. In response to Phillips' probing, Liu admitted that various alternatives had been discussed (e.g., Belgian resolution—USUN 3750 with generally negative reactions).<sup>2</sup>

2. In course of long, rambling and disjointed discussion, Liu revealed that important preoccupation was SC seat. Liu said substitution of PRC for GRC in SC would destroy GRC's *raison d'être* (i.e., claim to be legitimate representative of Chinese people) and therefore was no better than "the worst" (adoption of AR resolution). Under these circumstances, best course might be to maintain present tactics and seek to shore up support for IQ. Liu several times stressed that this was not question of "ideological purity" but involved GRC's *raison d'être*.

3. Phillips asked if Liu thought IQ could be adopted again. Liu said GRC believed IQ would carry in 1971 provided US and Japan work for its adoption. Liu said Chiang Ching had met with former Japanese PM Kishi in Taiwan and GRC was pleased GOJ would follow its present course on Chirep. (*Comment*: This is not our impression from Tokyo 265 and informal discussions with Japanese Mission here.)<sup>3</sup>

4. Liu said GOJ had instructed its Embassies to submit appraisals on Chirep and he understood Japanese had requested early consultations with USG on this subject. Liu gave impression of alarm that US might have bilaterals with Japan on Chirep before consulting GRC. He mentioned DFM Hogen scheduled to have talks in Washington on Chirep next month. Phillips assured Liu that we had no intention of

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 300, USUN, January–May 1971, Vol. VI. Secret; Exdis.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed.

<sup>3</sup> Telegram 265 from Tokyo, January 11, reported that Japanese Foreign Ministry officials had said that their government was under increasing pressure to find an alternative to continuing the "Important Question" versus the "Albanian resolution" strategy. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, UN 6 CHICOM)

initiating talks with other governments on this subject prior to consultations with GRC. Liu expressed appreciation.<sup>4</sup>

5. Liu next raised US commitment to exercise veto in SC "should this be necessary and effective". Liu recalled this commitment given by President Kennedy and later former Secretary Rusk confirmed Johnson administration maintained commitment. He wished to know if commitment still valid. Phillips said he unable to reply because this was first time he had heard of such commitment. Speaking personally, Phillips said we would not wish to take position credentials were substantive matter thereby having our own subject to Soviet veto. However, should challenge to GRC in SC be presented as expulsion this would be vetoable. Phillips promised to look into question.

6. In further inconclusive discussion of what Liu called "third resolution" (i.e. dual representation formulas) he admitted such alternatives had been discussed in Taipei and expressed some interest in the possibility that such a resolution would reduce support for the AR and, if adopted, the PRC would refuse to come to the UN. GRC could not support such a res but it would buy time. Liu repeated his earlier comments to the effect that it would be desirable to maintain IQ since this resolution has been standard for a number of years.

7. Liu asked if US would be consulting Soviets on Chirep. He recalled comment that Chirep would not be settled until US, USSR and PRC reached agreement. Phillips said US review still in progress and no decisions taken. We did intend to discuss results of our review with our friends, beginning with GRC, and he had no idea if US would eventually discuss matter with Soviets. Tripartite agreement, Phillips indicated, was farfetched.

8. In summing up, Liu said GRC's chief concern was not to become isolated or absorbed into Communist domination. He asked if US position on Chirep remained the same. Phillips said we shared similar goal and we were opposed to expulsion of GRC from UN.

9. *Comment:* Liu's trip to Taipei has only served to aggravate his case of jitters. Main reason for his call was to continue his fishing expeditions. Principal substantive clue was implication that, if GRC could be assured seat on SC (presumably along with PRC), GRC might decide to live with dual representation decision rather than continue to fight rear guard action against "worst case".

**Yost**

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<sup>4</sup> Telegram 166 from USUN, January 20, stated that Ambassador Phillips wanted to change the next-to-last sentence of paragraph 4 to read: "Phillips assured Liu that just as soon as US Chirep review concluded, we planned to consult GRC and other friendly countries intimately concerned." (Ibid.)

### 320. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>

Washington, January 14, 1971.

#### SUBJECT

Chinese Representation in the United Nations

#### PARTICIPANTS

His Excellency Frank Corner, Ambassador E. and P., Embassy of New Zealand  
Mr. Marshall Green, Assistant Secretary—EA  
Mr. Martin F. Herz, Acting Assistant Secretary—IO  
Mr. Alfred le S. Jenkins, Director, ACA

1. Ambassador Corner opened by observing that we are all faced with quandaries concerning China just now, and that it is important to keep in consultation. He said this was one of the few issues having important public opinion significance in New Zealand. Opinion is divided, but a fair number say that it is ridiculous to have China not represented in the UN. However, GRC representatives have done their work well in New Zealand and the China problem has the makings of quite an issue. There is no great division between the Labor and Nationalist parties. Labor dropped the issue from its formal agenda. The China question is, however, bound up with New Zealand-US relations because the US is regarded as the chief supporter of the GRC. If the GRC is forced out of the UN there would be an inclination in New Zealand to conclude that Peking should be recognized. The voice of the UN would have spoken, and the two issues of UN representation and diplomatic recognition are closely interrelated in the average New Zealander's view. The Ambassador said what is really wanted is a two Chinas solution, and in the last two years the Government has appeared to favor two Chinas.

2. Mr. Green asked whether the New Zealand public appreciated the fact that both Chinas are opposed to a two Chinas solution. The Ambassador replied that newspapers periodically reminded the public of this fact but there was not general awareness, even so, that we cannot have both in the UN. Holyoake had said that he believed that Chiang might stay in the UN even if Peking were in the Security Council and the GRC seat there was lost, but the Ambassador did not think so. The Ambassador further thought that whenever the issue of having one or the other China in the UN arose starkly the sentiment would overwhelmingly be to "let the GRC go." It seemed clear to the Am-

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, UN 6 CHICOM. Secret. Drafted by Jenkins.

bassador that we would end with Peking in and Taipei out. In response to a question from Mr. Herz he said he thought this would happen soon.

3. Mr. Herz said we have been trying to think through various alternative courses of action, without coming to any conclusion. We did believe that a two China resolution might draw votes from the Albanian Resolution. In answer to probing by Ambassador Corner about the legal aspects of such a resolution, Mr. Herz said that a number of dual representation formulas could be envisaged which would be difficult to attack on legal grounds. At any rate, legal obstacles could be overcome if there were sufficient political will behind a movement for such a solution.

4. The Ambassador thought that legal arguments augmented the position of those already disposed toward the question but did little else. He thought the "Important Question game was probably up." He thought it possible to contrive it so that for a time we would have neither China in the UN. In domestic terms the New Zealand Government wanted to find something which would enable it to say that it was willing to have Peking in the UN but unwilling to throw the GRC out but it must find a way for the formula not to be denounced as a gimmick. For instance, New Zealand had formerly put forward at US behest the idea of a study group. The New Zealand public saw through that as the gimmick that it was. This left a bad taste.

5. The Ambassador said that in more general terms his Government was worried about what would happen if the GRC were out. If this should encourage Taiwan to make a deal with the mainland, his Government thinks this would be bad. Or would this hasten the time when we would get an independent Formosa? If so, this would be in our interest. (1) New Zealand is interested in the effect on the strategic situation in the area, (2) the public reaction and (3) the linkage of the problem with New Zealand's relations with the US. If we use a gimmick and that gimmick is associated with the US it will harm our relations, since the public will feel that New Zealand followed slavishly US desires. Mr. Green observed that we had a similar problem in being accused of being subservient to Chang Kai-shek.

6. The Ambassador observed that if the Soviets should back a two Chinas resolution this would greatly enhance the prospects for its passage. Mr. Green thought it would be hard for the Soviets to change their position even though they do not want to see Peking in the UN. They want others to do battle on keeping them out. Mr. Herz agreed.

7. Mr. Green emphasized the importance of Japan's views on this whole question. He said we believe that the Japanese have not decided their policy in this regard as yet. In any event we certainly want to know more about other countries' views before we make definitive

decisions. The Ambassador asked whether Japan wanted a separate Formosa. Mr. Green said he thought they did. They used to talk openly of a one China, one Taiwan solution. In public, however, they have shifted to a one China theme. Nevertheless, it seems fairly certain that the Japanese actually want an independent Taiwan. The strategic considerations are perhaps more fundamental to Japan than to any one else, and her economic interests in Taiwan are also great. Japan would want to keep Taiwan out of Communist hands. Japan would not be as worried as some of us if the GRC simply quit the UN. Some Japanese are even willing to encourage the GRC to do so, but this would not solve the matter for Japan. There would still be the question of recognition on the agenda. Sato probably has reservations about any change in the current Japanese stand, but he does not want to be charged with inflexibility. Japan also has a strong sentimental attachment for China, and it is salivating over prospects for increased trade with the mainland. The Japanese people tend to think there is more potentiality for better relations than does the Government. The PRC in the UN is not a very attractive prospect for any of us. Nevertheless, it does represent a quarter of humanity; there are practical problems which cannot be solved without China's cooperation; and with increased international intercourse we can hope for a better attitude toward the world on Peking's part.

8. Mr. Herz said that if we believe that in a comparatively short time we will in any event have the PRC in the UN and the GRC out, one could argue that we might well let the Albanian Resolution pass and get the agony over with.

9. Mr. Green observed that because of domestic opinion it is very difficult to stick with a formula which faces defeat and which would appear to make us lacking in flexibility and realism.

10. The Ambassador said that if we mounted a great effort to pass a two Chinas resolution we might get it through and the result might be an empty China seat because both sides refused dual representation. Mr. Green said there could be a formula where the GRC would not walk out and we would still not have the PRC in. Mr. Herz added that if the GRC did walk out, Peking might very well come in since it could consider itself vindicated. Mr. Herz mentioned that there are some who believe that through great effort we might be able to pass a two Chinas resolution by a two-thirds majority (employing the IQ device), in which case it would then take a two-thirds majority to overturn it. In response to a question from Mr. Green, Mr. Jenkins said that he thought in all likelihood if a seat were offered to Peking and denied to the GRC that Peking would accept and enter the UN promptly. However, we should not rule out the possibility that Peking would play a bit hard to get, attempting in effect to exact an apology from the UN for its having spurned the PRC for so long.

11. Mr. Green said before we moved much further he would want to know whether the present formula might hold for another year, and what were possible voting patterns on variants of dual representation formulas. Mr. Green thought that if we did not try a two Chinas solution the American people would not be satisfied that such was in fact impossible. The Ambassador said that the minute we put forward a two Chinas formula we are undermining the GRC's *raison d'être*. He thought we had both already partly given that away. Mr. Green responded that the US has not really given that position away. We still maintain that the status of Formosa is undetermined.

12. Mr. Green thought that for the present we should do the necessary nose counting on possible Chirep formulas but not talk much about it. Mr. Green said he would certainly welcome the New Zealand Government's views at any stage, as well as those of the Ambassador, whose UN experience was extensive.

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### 321. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>

Washington, January 16, 1971.

#### SUBJECT

Chinese Representation in the United Nations

#### PARTICIPANTS

His Excellency Sir James Plimsoll, C.B.E., Ambassador E. and P.,  
Embassy of Australia

Mr. Marshall Green, Assistant Secretary, East Asian and Pacific Affairs

Mr. John A. Armitage, Director, IO/UNP

Mr. Alfred le S. Jenkins, Director, EA/ACA

Ambassador Plimsoll opened by asking whether things were moving with respect to China. Mr. Green said that we were in the process of preparing a basic issues paper on China policy and that IO was preparing a paper on tactics relating to Chirep. There were a number of possible alternative approaches. We would have to undertake more "nose counts" in the near future and we were now starting preliminary talks with our friends. We certainly wanted to keep in close touch

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, UN 6 CHICOM. Secret. Drafted by Jenkins.

with Australia. If we hold to our present line on the Albanian Resolution and the Important Question we could well have an increase in votes on the former and a decrease in the latter which could create a situation in which the GRC might walk out. On the other hand it is possible that a dual representation formula could at least buy time. The Ambassador thought there was no doubt that a majority of the membership would look favorably on the concept as such. Mr. Green said it would indicate that we recognized the realities in the situation and were trying to move toward what people wanted. We would also not look as though we were a prisoner of President Chiang. Over the last two years we have developed basic support among the American people for what we have been doing with respect to overall China policy.

The Ambassador expressed doubt that present Chirep policy could hold for long. Mr. Green thought that Peking would hold out for the time when it could get into the UN on its own terms. He was not sure that any of us had thought enough about what it would mean if the GRC were out of the UN. The Ambassador said he personally thought that things would not “go on pretty much as usual” if the GRC were out. Mr. Green said our consistency in supporting our pledges is a considerable asset to the US. If the GRC should walk out because it anticipates a defeat people might well ask: why should we be left holding the bag?—in other words why should we continue to support the GRC?

The Ambassador said as long as the GRC is in the UN any attack on it by Peking is difficult. Mr. Green agreed that there would be less credibility under that circumstance concerning Peking’s claim of our interference in internal Chinese affairs. Mr. Armitage thought most people were not aware that a two-China formula was anathema to both Chinas. Mr. Green said if we continued on our present line it would make it easier with respect to our relations to both Peking and Taipei but that we could be in difficulty because of domestic reaction in case of defeat. It could of course lead to a total resolution of the problem, with Peking in and Taipei out, although this would be far from an acceptable solution. One of the worst results would be for us to support dual representation, and then back down in the face of Chiang’s strong objections. We will have to go through with it if we start down the path of dual representation.

Mr. Armitage asked whether pro-Peking countries would not vote against dual representation. The Ambassador thought this would depend largely on Peking’s stand. He said the Yugoslav Ambassador thought it would be best to seat both, but he was not sure how significant this observation was. Mr. Green said if Taipei acquiesced in dual representation and Peking should not come in, the GRC could simply sit still for a while. Some key figures in the Government in Taipei give some signs of flexibility as have a couple of recent Taipei editorials.

The GRC line has been that the US has never let it down in the past, and it trusts we will not do so in the [future.]<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>2</sup> The source text ends at this point.

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## 322. Memonradum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>

Washington, January 20, 1971.

### SUBJECT

Chirep

### PARTICIPANTS

M. Pierre Harmel, FonMin of Belgium  
Vicomte Etienne Davignon, DirGen for PolAffairs, Belgian FonMin  
Ambassador Walter Loridan, Belgian Ambassador to US  
M. Paul Noterdaeme, Chef de Cabinet, Belgian FonMin  
M. Roland d'Anethan, Director of Western European and North American  
Affairs, Belgian FonMin  
M. Rene Lion, Deputy Chief of Mission, Belgian Embassy  
M. Hugo Paemen, Press Officer, Belgian FonMin  
  
Marshall Green, AsstSec for East Asian & Pacific Affairs  
Samuel De Palma, AsstSec for International Organization Affairs  
Thomas P. Shoesmith, Country Director for Republic of China Affairs  
J. Theodore Papendorp, EUR/FBX  
Harvey Feldman, IO/UNP  
Alec Toumayan, OPR/LS

After welcoming Foreign Minister Harmel and his suite, Mr. Green noted that the US was concentrating very hard on the Chirep problem and although we had not yet reached any decisions, we were actively considering alternatives. We would be very pleased to hear the Foreign Minister's views.

Mr. Harmel began by mentioning that Belgium's views on the matter were not determined by domestic political difficulties or a need to deal with parliamentary pressures. Rather Belgium feels that the Albanian resolution is a bad presentation of the Chirep issue, and yet if

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, UN 6 CHICOM. Secret; Noforn; Exdis. Drafted January 26 by Feldman; cleared by Armitage, De Palma, Green, Shoesmith, and J. Theodore Papendorp; and approved in S/S-S on February 1.

matters take their present course before long the Albanian resolution will pass, Peking will be seated in the Security Council and Taiwan will be expelled from the UN entirely. If, after that, the PRC should attempt to use force to seize Taiwan, and if the U.S. and Japan or others went to Taiwan's assistance, they would find themselves opposed by the UN.

Mr. Harmel then took up the matter of the Important Question procedure, saying that there is no longer any certainty that the IQ will again receive majority support in the Assembly. The vote in favor of the IQ is narrowing steadily, and Belgium believes that Canada, Italy, Austria and others will not maintain their present position of supporting it. A shift of even a few votes would put the IQ in jeopardy, and it would be an act of carelessness not to have other alternatives available to meet the situation.

There are points that must be avoided in any new approach to the Chirep problem, Mr. Harmel continued. What must be avoided are: accepting Peking by expelling Taiwan; calling for PRC admission as a new member (since it will refuse to do this); calling for Taiwan to apply as a new member (since its application would be vetoed). The crux of the matter, however, is Taiwan's insistence that it is the only legitimate government of China and its refusal to give up its Security Council seat. Obviously Taiwan is a state, but equally obviously it is not a great power and thus is not entitled to a Security Council seat. Taiwan's insistence that it is such a state only gives weapons to the supporters of the Albanian resolution. Sooner or later diplomatic action must be taken to make the GRC understand that it is in its interest to remain in the UN, but to acquiesce in a dual representation formula under which the Security Council seat would go to the PRC.

Mr. Harmel noted that the legal basis for a dual representation resolution could be, briefly: (1) the PRC is one of the five major states described in Article 23 of the Charter; (2) the GRC, though changed in size and scope, remains a state with all the attributes of sovereignty and therefore should remain a member of the UN.

As far as Belgium is concerned, Mr. Harmel continued, it has no great desire to be in the forefront on this issue. If the US, Japan, Australia and the other countries more immediately concerned say that something can be done along these lines, Belgium is willing to play its part fully; it does not insist on the exact wording suggested, or even this specific approach. Belgium would like to find a way out of the impasse. If the GRC continues to claim to be the sole legitimate government of China, and digs its own grave, "we will attend the funeral and shed some—but not all the tears." It is not too soon to look for a way out. If support for the Important Question drops, and particularly if Canada, Austria and Italy change their position (as is likely), there will be great pressure on the Benelux countries to do the same.

Mr. Green thanked Minister Harmel for his thoughtful and well-stated views. He noted that if dual representation were tried, there would be difficulties with the PRC as well as the GRC. The old line GRC leaders will be thoroughly opposed. Although there is some recognition of a need for a change lower down the line, even those leaders would find it difficult to go along. Mr. Green asked Mr. Shoemsmith's views on the question, and Mr. Shoemsmith rated the chance of GRC acceptance at about 5%. Continuing, Mr. Green pointed out that even if one could get GRC acquiescence in dual representation, the PRC would continue to refuse to join the UN as long as Taiwan remained in the organization. He asked how Minister Harmel would view this development.

Mr. Harmel observed that the Belgian Government would shed no tears if the PRC refused to take an offered seat. What mattered most of all was that the seat not be vacated through GRC expulsion, and that both Chinese parties understood that despite their claims and counter-claims, the issues would have to be resolved peacefully, under the control and protection of the UN. He noted that changes do occur over time; once the West Germans emphasized the Hallstein doctrine with no flexibility at all, and now they themselves say they do not oppose separate UN membership for the two Germanies. If the Albanian resolution passes, there are no options for the future; if some other solution is put forward, the options remain open.

Mr. De Palma mentioned the difficulty of keeping the General Assembly from bowing to PRC pressures. Dual representation or some other formula short of the Albanian resolution might well become interim stages on the way to ultimate passage of the Albanian resolution by the Assembly. This raises the question of whether it is better at all to put forward short-term formulas since they would not be a final solution. Mr. De Palma also noted that the Belgian draft does not mention the principle of universality at all, and asked Minister Harmel whether he thought universality might be a first step toward dual representation.

Mr. Harmel thought not; universality would create problems for the West Germans and others. Combining Chirep and universality might complicate matters and yet not prevent the Albanian resolution from making progress. It would be best to keep the two problems separate. Vicomte Davignon observed that if one put forward the principle of universality, one would still have to contend with the view that the GRC is not China.

Mr. Green expressed concern that if we just stick with our present policy, the PRC will get in on its own terms. The US Government would come in for a great deal of domestic criticism. Most people in the US would prefer to see a dual representation solution and there would be support for the Belgian position. But the GRC is bound to be opposed.

It is hard enough for them to move over time to accept dual representation; all the harder for them to accede to the PRC taking the Security Council seat and to make so great a shift in policy in the course of one year. If the US and others attempted to persuade them to do so, and if they refused, this would impair the US–GRC relationship. At any rate, Mr. Green continued, the results of the voting on the Albanian resolution at the last Assembly have persuaded the Nationalists to begin thinking the unthinkable.

Mr. Harmel observed that unfortunately, we do not have several years available to educate the GRC. He expressed grave doubts that they can be persuaded of anything, and noted that they still talked of re-capturing the mainland by military means—an attitude which he called an “abyss of unreality”. If the GRC is willing to exist outside of the UN, well and good; that is what would happen if they continued on their present course.

Mr. Green noted that no one on Taiwan realistically expects to recapture the mainland militarily any more, and added that some are even coming around to viewing with relative understanding the US position on seeking better relations with Peking. But, he added, the present situation demands a great leap in their thinking all at once, and this is most difficult for them.

Mr. Harmel said that Belgium is prepared to continue sharing views with the US on this matter. If studies are to be made, Belgium will be happy to cooperate. But, he observed, it is now January and if nothing has been decided by July, it will then be too late—the situation will pass from our control. Belgium would like to participate in working out a solution—and does not believe that half-way measures like the Study Committee are of use any longer. However, Belgium will not take any separate initiatives and will act only as a member of a group. He noted that last year, when they floated their draft resolution, they encountered more opposition from the East Europeans, and particularly the Soviet Union, than from their Western allies.

Mr. De Palma asked if Belgium had continued to discuss dual representation formulas with other countries in the period since the General Assembly, and Mr. Harmel replied they had not.

Mr. Green again expressed great thanks to Minister Harmel and his party.

(In a subsequent luncheon conversation with Minister Harmel, Mr. Green requested that the Belgians convey to us the reactions of other countries to the Harmel proposal. Minister Harmel said his government would do so.)

### 323. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>

Washington, January 20, 1971.

SUBJECT

Chirep

PARTICIPANTS

Samuel De Palma, Assistant Secretary for International Organization Affairs  
Winthrop Brown, Deputy Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs  
Harvey Feldman, IO/UNP

Guy E. Millard, Minister, British Embassy  
John Boyd, British Embassy

Mr. Millard began by noting that he was calling pursuant to instructions. Some months earlier, Mr. John Morgan of FCO had inquired what the US attitude might be if the UK stopped supporting the US position on the Important Question. He now wished to ask the same question, but more formally.

Mr. Millard went on to note that Britain has supported the US on the IQ for the past ten years, largely because of the close relations between our two countries and not really because of British agreement with the principle involved. The entire matter of China policy is under active study in London at the moment. The UK now has better relations with the PRC than they have had for some time. The Chinese have recently released the last of their British prisoners. It appears there is now an opportunity for the UK to improve relations further with the PRC, and put them on a long-term basis. At the same time, the UK might be able to assist in bringing the PRC more fully into the international community. In addition to these considerations, as far as the IQ itself is concerned, it appears to be a rapidly sinking ship. Speaking quite frankly, said Mr. Millard, the UK would not want to be one of the bitter-enders, particularly since this would incur Peking's wrath in behalf of a cause which appears lost in any event.

For these reasons, Mr. Millard said, the UK has come to consider that it can no longer support the US on the Important Question but has not decided whether it would vote against or abstain on IQ. In addition, again under instructions, he wished to make two further points:

(1) The UK could not support any new Chirep tactic which seemed to be a procedural device for further delay;

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, UN 6 CHICOM. Secret. Drafted on January 22 by Feldman and cleared by De Palma, Brown, and Armitage.

(2) The UK could not support any “Two Chinas” tactic, since this seemed quite unrealistic.

Mr. Millard noted that these were preliminary views. No final decisions had yet been made, but the British Government would appreciate receiving a considered American response.

In reply, Mr. De Palma noted that the US also has not yet reached the point of taking decisions on the Chirep problem, but is attempting to study the entire question as thoroughly as possible. However, in the course of this study, we definitely have not come to the view that the Important Question is no longer valid or no longer important to us. We therefore hope that the British Government will be willing to itself hold off a final decision on this matter, at least until the situation at the next General Assembly can be more clearly foreseen. That situation might well be quite different from what it has been in the past.

Regarding the question of “new tactics”, Mr. De Palma expressed the view that here too one would have to look carefully into the situation. In our study of the problem, we have not been able to identify any new approach that clearly would move the matter to a final solution once and for all time. But this did not necessarily mean that any new initiative taken to deal with the problem was merely a delaying tactic. If a reasonable suggestion is put forward, and if the two parties denounce it, this does not mean the suggestion was put forward as a delaying tactic.

Similarly with regard to the “Two Chinas” matter, Mr. De Palma continued, many different types of proposal could be, and would be labelled a “Two Chinas” tactic by the PRC or the GRC. But this did not mean that the proposal ipso facto should be discarded. The intent of the proposal and the manner of its application should also be taken very much into account—one should not be boxed in by labels.

Ambassador Brown expressed the hope the British Government would understand that the US was really taking a completely fresh look at the situation; it was not just a matter of refurbishing old tactics to make them appear better, or stand a better chance of success. The US is studying what is possible, what might be desirable, and what might be least undesirable. Before taking any decisions, we would like to consult closely with the UK and with other key governments, in order to benefit by their views. We hope that U.K. thinking will not be put into final form until we have had these consultations, and that the UK will not at the moment adopt final positions on the Important Question, dual representation, or anything else. At the end of the process we may come out with different conclusions, Ambassador Brown noted, but we should discuss these questions fully before reaching decisions.

Mr. Millard asked when it might be reasonable to expect to hold these consultations, and Ambassador Brown and Mr. De Palma agreed

that it should be possible in about five or six weeks. Ambassador Brown noted that it was not the US intention to stall on the issue, but rather that we hoped to go into this thoroughly within a reasonable period of time and therefore would like to ask that the British Government not take a firm decision at this point. Mr. De Palma expressed the hope that the British would not in any case make their views on the IQ generally known at this point.

Mr. Millard observed that it will not be possible to hold London off for long on this matter, since it is a matter of ministerial interest, and expressed the hope that discussions could begin soon.

As the meeting was breaking up, Mr. Boyd observed to Mr. Feldman that in their reference to not supporting any "Two Chinas" move, the UK meant it to be understood that they had in mind any "Two Chinas" strategy, no matter how it was technically described.

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#### **324. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

New York, January 20, 1971, 2130Z.

168. Subj: Conversation With SYG on Chirep.

During a call on the SYG yesterday morning on another subject, I mentioned his statement, which he had made previously and reiterated in his January 18 press conference, that he did not expect Communist China to obtain representation in the UN before 1972 but that they might do so that year.<sup>2</sup> I inquired how he saw this coming about and particularly whether he thought any sort of dual representation for both PRC and GRC would be feasible.

He replied that he is inclined to think that while the Albanian resolution will obtain a larger number of affirmative votes this year, the Important Question resolution will still be adopted and hence there will be no change in China's representation this year. On the other hand he would think that by 1972 opinion would have evolved sufficiently so that the Albanian resolution would be adopted. He did not think that dual representation would be possible since he believes that Peking

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, UN 6 CHICOM. Confidential. Repeated to Tokyo, Hong Kong, and Taipei.

<sup>2</sup> Yost reported on the Secretary-General's press conference in telegram 138 from USUN, January 18. (Ibid.)

is and will remain adamantly opposed to it. He said that during the last Assembly he had asked the Romanians to inquire of Peking whether it would consider any form of dual representation and it had replied firmly in the negative. I pointed out that, while this might be their present position, they might not necessarily stick firmly to it under all circumstances. Thant said that one could not be certain but he thought that they would.

Yost

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### 325. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>

Washington, January 25, 1971.

#### SUBJECT

Chinese Representation Question

#### PARTICIPANTS

Chow Shu-kai, Chinese Ambassador  
Liu Chieh, Chinese Ambassador to the UN  
Marshall Green, Assistant Secretary of State, EA  
Samuel De Palma, Assistant Secretary of State, IO  
Winthrop G. Brown, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, EA  
Thomas P. Shoesmith, Country Director, EA/ROC  
Harvey J. Feldman, IO/UNP

Mr. De Palma said that thus far in our approach to the Chinese representation problem we have been concentrating on an assessment of the situation and the prospects. He emphasized that we have not yet reached any decisions. A number of countries have expressed an interest in discussing this matter with us, however, and we wish to learn what we can from them, although we are not in a position to exchange views on policy questions. Mr. De Palma added that we would not wish to get into policy discussions until we have had an opportunity to consult with the GRC and some other key governments.

Thus far, all indications point not only to a great interest in this problem on the part of many governments, but also to a steady erosion of support for the position we and the GRC have maintained. This

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, UN 6 CHICOM. Secret; Exdis. Drafted on February 2 by Shoesmith and cleared in draft by Deputy Assistant Secretary Winthrop G. Brown and Assistant Secretary De Palma.

erosion is evident both in the shift of votes in the UN General Assembly and in the manner in which governments are addressing this problem.

Mr. De Palma stated that there is good evidence that this year the vote on the Important Question resolution (IQ) will be quite close. Our preliminary estimates show some 54 votes already lined up against it. This number probably will increase. The disturbing fact is that the trend is away from support for our position. Equally significant, however, is the fact that many governments are tending to adopt positions on this issue which are not subject to outside influence. More and more, governments appear to be structuring their positions in terms of their view of the over-all situation in East Asia and their policy toward the area, with consideration for their relations with the US becoming a less important factor. Mr. De Palma pointed out that other governments now are not in the least apologetic in telling us how they view this issue and, for our part, it is difficult to see what pressure or arguments we can bring to bear to influence their positions. In short, the trend away from our position is proceeding at a faster rate than we had anticipated and the attitudes of other governments are not nearly so susceptible to US influence as in the past.

At the same time, Mr. De Palma noted, a number of countries which share our concern to prevent the expulsion of the GRC are coming to believe that this can only be done if there is some new approach, although no one has yet been able to devise such an approach which seems certain to achieve that objective.

Mr. De Palma emphasized that in approaching this problem, it is important to view the situation as it is and not as we would like it to be. He had therefore given Ambassadors Chow and Liu this summary of our assessment to date, without preliminaries, and he suggested that they might like to comment on how they view the problem.

Ambassador Brown added that one government recently told us bluntly that, "We have supported the IQ for 10 years because of our friendship for you. Now we have to think of our own interest." Ambassador Liu asked whether countries taking this attitude already have recognized Peking. Ambassador Brown replied that in the case cited, the government was one which recognizes Peking. Mr. De Palma added that similar reactions have been encountered with countries not recognizing Peking, as well as with those which do.

Ambassador Liu then remarked that while he had been in Taipei during December of last year, he had discussed the Chinese representation problem with all government agencies concerned. In those discussions he had not failed to impress on them the erosion of the GRC position on the IQ and Albanian Resolution (AR). However, in the absence of any idea of an alternative, the consensus was that the GRC

should continue to rely on the IQ. Ambassador Liu noted that he had emphasized this point when he met with Ambassador Phillips following his return from Taipei. He had pointed out at that time that since, when the IQ tactic was adopted in 1961, it was with a view to preventing adoption of the AR should it obtain a majority, if the IQ were to be abandoned the first time that contingency arose, it would make meaningless our efforts over all these years to retain support for it. Mr. Feldman observed that the IQ had already played that role once; in the session just past it had prevented adoption of the AR by a majority.

Mr. Green commented that we also have anticipated that once the AR obtained a plurality or simple majority, our position on the IQ could erode rapidly. He recounted that prior to the vote at the last session of the General Assembly, we were told by a number of governments that they would stand by us on the IQ one more year, but that after that they would have to reconsider their position. The fact that the AR obtained a majority probably has reinforced that view.

Mr. Green observed that, looking over the alternatives, one might conclude that the easiest course would be to fight the battle on the same line as we have in the past, but would this be the wisest course? Our common interest is that the GRC remain in the United Nations, but this will not be possible if the AR is adopted because of our inability to hold the line on the IQ. It is this which concerns even the GRC's closest friends, who now feel that we must develop some new approach.

Ambassador Liu said that he appreciated this assessment of the situation, which he also had outlined during his consultations in Taipei. What he had attempted to explain to Mr. Green and Mr. De Palma, however, was how his government feels about the problem. It continues to feel that logic alone requires that the line on the IQ be maintained as the best safeguard against the situation we face and that sufficiently compelling arguments remain to persuade the General Assembly to reaffirm this resolution. This, said Ambassador Liu, was the consensus at all levels of government at the time he departed Taipei, and he believed that this remains the position of his government. Aside from questions of logic, Ambassador Liu continued, his government regards its fight in the UN as part of its political struggle against the Chinese Communists. From its point of view—and the GRC hopes that this is also the view of the United States—the main purpose must be to keep the Chinese Communists out of the UN and to prevent the United Nations from recognizing them as the sole legitimate government of all of China. That, he emphasized, must be prevented at all costs.

Ambassador Brown commented that this position appears to be based on the assumption that support can be retained for the IQ, but if not, then what? Ambassador Liu replied that his government can see no alternative. Further, it feels that if the US, Japan and other key coun-

tries pursue the IQ as they have in the past, then that line can be held. Ambassador Brown asked whether he shared that assessment. Ambassador Liu conceded that he was not quite so optimistic, but stressed that he believes there is a distinct possibility that the IQ can be carried again. He added that while he was in Taipei, several Japanese "political figures" discussed this problem with "our high level people." The Japanese "seemed to have the encouraging impression that Japan should go along with the Important Question."

Ambassador Chow said that he looks at this question from the point of view of psychological warfare. He recalled that in 1965, when there was a tie vote on the AR, the atmosphere was similar to that which followed the vote this year. Today, the mainland regime has had some success in its psychological warfare campaign, giving the impression that it is returning to the international community. Under these circumstances, there is the danger of a growing mood that the Chinese Communists are irresistible. As for the strength of US influence, Ambassador Chow acknowledged that we must take into account the changed membership of the UN and some reduction of effective US influence, but he believed that "in their innermost thoughts" many UN members continue to be guided by what they believe the US will do. He implied that whether a bandwagon mood in favor of PRC admission develops depends in large measure upon the US attitude and that if such a mood now exists, it should not be considered irreversible.

Ambassador Chow recalled that in a recent *Business Week* interview, Prime Minister Sato had been asked for his reaction to criticism that his government might miss the bus on the Chirep issue. Sato had replied that whether one gets on a bus depends on where it is going. Before getting on any bus, Sato said, Japan will wait and see its direction and whether the US also is getting on board.

Ambassador Chow then asked what is this "new approach" that other governments are advocating, what alternatives are being offered by those countries which say they wish to prevent the expulsion of the GRC?

Mr. De Palma stated that he did not think that other countries are being influenced simply by a bandwagon mood. Rather, as the vote on the IQ narrows, those holding the deciding 2 or 3 votes will become very anxious about being placed in the position of the last to cross the line. He felt that this factor already is operating and that we must, therefore, anticipate that the next vote on the IQ will be very close.

As to alternatives which have been proposed, Mr. De Palma said that no government has come to us with any solution. It appears, however, that they are groping toward some kind of dual representation formula. Their thinking is based on the assumption that the present tactics will fail and that the only certain outcome of our present tactics

is that the PRC will enter the UN on its own terms. Since countries friendly to the GRC wish to avoid this, they are searching for some other course of action.

Ambassador Liu said that “our people” do not underestimate the possibility that other countries may change their position, but they also do not underestimate the influence of the US and Japan on other countries. Therefore, they continue to feel that the best safeguard of GRC interests is to continue to hold to the IQ. It follows from this, Ambassador Liu continued, that whatever alternatives others may propose, the IQ must not be abandoned, having been reaffirmed by the General Assembly on so many sessions. Further, if an alternative is proposed, his government feels that for “political, psychological and other reasons, the US should not be a party to it.”

Ambassador Liu then said that he understood the Belgian Foreign Minister recently had visited Washington. He presumed that the Foreign Minister had discussed alternatives with us and he asked whether the GOB intends to reintroduce its resolution as originally proposed or in some modified form.

Mr. Green replied that at the moment, the GOB is making no moves and that Foreign Minister Harmel has not yet made up his mind as to the best course of action. Harmel’s interest, however, is to find a formula which best will insure the GRC’s place in the UN. Mr. Green added that in our discussions with the Foreign Minister we had been able to say only that we are considering all alternatives. As in our discussions with other governments, we were careful not to give the impression that we necessarily will change our policy.

Mr. Green emphasized the importance of frankness in our conversations. The relevant fact which we and the GRC face is that if we stick to our past tactics we may not succeed in preventing the expulsion of the GRC; the evidence we have to date certainly points in that direction. Assuming that to be the case, has the GRC given any thought to alternative courses of action? We feel that we must do so and do not consider that by thinking of alternatives we are prejudicing a decision to remain on our present course. Perhaps the GRC feels that if it considers alternatives, its position will be weakened. For our part, we believe that our policy position and the position of the GRC in the UN could be weakened if we do not give careful consideration to possible alternatives. For this reason, Mr. Green expressed the hope that the GRC would not take rigid positions in our consultations, insisting that the US must do this and must not do that.

Ambassador Liu said that he appreciated the point which Mr. Green had made and agreed that frank discussion is most necessary. The GRC’s basic assumption is that the US is anxious to enable it to remain in the UN and that, “up to now, your policy has been to keep

the Communists out." "Thus," Ambassador Liu said, "we have a common problem and common objectives." In discussions within the GRC, the "worst situation" has been explored. However, Ambassador Liu emphasized, "You can understand that we have to consider the political consequences. We have our *raison d'être* to maintain. This makes it difficult to come up with any alternative. As for any alternative which seems to do damage to our position in the UN, our people may not be able to swallow it."

Ambassador Liu said that he personally had not been able to think of any acceptable alternative. He wished to have our assessment of the situation, but he hoped that we could understand why the GRC could not come up with any alternative. Summing up his previous remarks, Ambassador Liu repeated that the consensus within his government is that no matter what alternative is proposed, the IQ must be held.

On substance Ambassador Liu stressed that the basic GRC objective is to prevent the UN from recognizing the Chinese Communists as the sole legitimate government of all of China. The US should also realize that any alternative, such as the Belgian proposal of last year, which envisages ousting the GRC from the Security Council "would be very difficult for our people to swallow." Ambassador Liu explained that the GRC feels that it earned its position on the Security Council by its role in World War II and has to make no apologies for occupying it. The GRC holds that seat "as a matter of historical consequences" and considers that it is more able than many countries to fulfill the functions of that position.

Ambassador Brown asked what the GRC reaction would be to a formula providing for the admission of the PRC without recognizing it as the sole legitimate government of all of China. Ambassador Liu replied that he had not discussed this during his consultations in Taipei, which had centered on proposals, such as that advanced by Belgium, which have come up in the General Assembly's consideration of the question.

Mr. Green reiterated that the basic problem is whether to consider alternatives if it is clear that the old tactics will no longer work. Ambassador Liu had said that the GRC sees no alternative, that there is nothing which the GRC can propose or support. It may be, Mr. Green continued, that a consensus will emerge within the international community in favor of some form of dual representation. Although the GRC might be opposed to such an approach, it might be sophisticated enough to reckon on the fact that such an approach might also be opposed by Peking.

There are in this situation, Mr. Green suggested, several tactical possibilities and many ways of handling the problem. We should not be satisfied with saying that we can see no alternative, that nothing

can be done, since if we neglect other possibilities and stick with the old tactics, the GRC may lose with no chance of recovering its position in the UN. We must face the fact that if we stick to our present position, the AR will pass and the IQ may not. Mr. Green suggested that perhaps the GRC will feel that it cannot participate in the exploration of such alternative possibilities. He hoped, however, that it will understand why the US might have to do so, without prejudice to a decision to stay where we are.

Mr. De Palma reiterated that those countries which are looking for a formula which will prevent ROC expulsion do so because they are friends of the ROC and have its interests in mind. None pretend that they have a formula which will insure representation in the UN for both Peking and Taipei, but they do wish to find a solution that will help the ROC preserve its place in the UN.

Ambassador Liu stated that the GRC wishes to know the views of its friends and what the US believes is "the best way to achieve our objective—to keep the Chinese Communists out." His government feels that we can hold the line on the IQ. On that basis, he could see some possibilities in a situation where a "third resolution" would be introduced and, although it did not pass, it would draw votes away from the Albanian Resolution. "This would work out fine," he said. "The other side would vote solidly against the third resolution. We also may vote against it and have a few friends do so also; it would be all right if the US should vote for it, so long as the US does not co-sponsor it."

Ambassador Chow commented that the IQ originally was introduced not only as a tactic to block passage of the AR, but because the issue was considered on its merits to be an important question. Whether or not a new approach is adopted, therefore, we should continue to insist on the IQ. He thought, however, that if another resolution is introduced, those who have voted for the AR because they saw no alternative, might switch their vote.

Mr. De Palma pointed out that it will be important for us to have thought out well in advance what we should do if, as we get closer to the next session of the General Assembly and debate on this issue, it becomes apparent that the IQ will not carry.

Ambassador Liu suggested a situation in which there are three resolutions—the Important Question, the Albanian resolution and the Belgian proposal. Should worse come to worst and the IQ fail but the Belgian proposal carries, did we think that the Chinese Communists would enter the UN on that basis? Mr. De Palma replied that we do not think Peking would enter under those circumstances. Ambassador Liu indicated that his government has considered this possibility and the merits of remaining in the UN despite passage of a dual representation resolution, so long as the PRC refuses to enter on that basis. He

suggested that perhaps there could be a "simple resolution" inviting the Chinese Communists to enter the UN but affirming that the GRC should remain. "If this keeps the Chinese Communists out, we will have accomplished our objectives." "But," Ambassador Liu added, "if we were out of the Security Council before the Chinese Communists came in, our people could not swallow that."

Mr. De Palma remarked that it is difficult to look ahead that far, but that we should also think of a situation in which the question of the Security Council seat might have to be settled after the PRC entered the UN. Ambassador Liu observed that countries should not propose resolutions which could have a bearing on this question if they are uncertain as to the outcome.

Ambassador Chow referred to a recent article in the *Los Angeles Times* reporting speculation, attributed to the American Embassy in Tokyo, that Peking is interested in UN membership and going so far as to state that Peking also is receptive to a "two Chinas" approach. The Ambassador wondered whether this might be part of a buildup to force the GRC to change its position. Mr. Green explained that no one in the American Embassy had made such a statement and that guidance has been sent to our Embassy for responding to further queries prompted by this report. He added that there has been no change in our support for the GRC's continued membership in the UN, although we continue our efforts to improve relations with mainland China.

Mr. Green then remarked that, as he had stated in his testimony before the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee, the economic planners of the Republic of China are as good as any in all of East Asia. He thought a similar statement could be made about the GRC's diplomats. He suggested they might usefully be given a degree of flexibility in meeting the Chinese representation problem in a way that would be best for their country.

Ambassador Liu observed that when one is negotiating from strength, flexibility is more possible than when negotiating from weakness. He recalled that at the end of World War II, President Chiang had been generous in his treatment of Japan. However, "When you are on top it is easy to be generous, to forgive, to concede. But when any little flexibility means defeat, it is not easy."

Expressing his appreciation for this opportunity to discuss this matter at such length, Ambassador Liu said that before leaving he wished to confirm that "your position is still with us and that, if possible, you will keep the Chinese Communists out." Mr. Green replied that he would prefer to define our position in terms of our continuing support for the GRC. While he would prefer not to define our position as Ambassador Liu had, he realized that the end result might be the same.

Ambassador Liu also emphasized that “time is running short” and that within the next several months other governments will be firming up their positions. His government, therefore, is anxious to be informed frankly of the US views and conclusions and to consult with us. At this meeting, he had attempted to put before us his government’s point of view. President Chiang, he noted, has taken a direct personal interest in this problem and will not leave it to others. “The President is a man of high principle, and it is not easy for him to consider anything which might damage the Republic of China’s *raison d’être*.”

In conclusion, Ambassador Liu expressed his appreciation for the assurance that the US has not said anything to other governments which would give the impression that we consider the GRC’s case hopeless. He said that he would report to his government that we believe that the chances for holding the line on the Important Question are only 50–50 and that the US is continuing its examination of how best to assure the GRC’s place in the United Nations.

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### 326. Response to National Security Study Memorandum 107<sup>1</sup>

Washington, undated.

#### *I. Conclusions and Options for Decision*

1. The major problems facing us are Chinese Representation (Chirep) and UN membership for the divided states. We are likely to suffer a major foreign policy defeat this year on the Chirep issue if we persist in our present policy. Neither the Charter nor legal analysis furnishes real guidance for formulating a US policy. The issues are and always have been political, not legal. The choices before us are:

A. *Maintain our present policy*—continue to treat Chirep as a separate problem and deal with admission of the divided states on a case-by-case basis.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 80 D 212, National Security Files, NSSM 107. Secret. NSSM 107 is Document 312. According to a covering memorandum from De Palma, Chairman of the Ad Hoc Working Group, he submitted this report to Kissinger on January 25. It was then forwarded to Irwin, Packard, Moorer, and Helms by Jeanne Davis on January 27. She noted that the report would be discussed at the February 26 Senior Review Group meeting, but the meeting was not held until March 9. For the minutes of this meeting, see Document 335. Davis also distributed an Issues Paper prepared in the Department of State to Irwin, Packard, Moorer, Helms, Anthony Jurich (Treasury), and Robert McLellan (Commerce Department) on February 9. (National Archives, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 80 D 212, National Security Files, NSSM 107)

B. *Adopt "Universality"*—attempt to deal with the problems facing us within a single framework by urging General Assembly adoption of a doctrine of universality. Since there are important practical obstacles to the immediate admission of all divided states, we would not necessarily make specific proposals but might state willingness to see them admitted when conditions are appropriate. We would oppose expulsion of the Republic of China (ROC) as contrary to universality, and not oppose—perhaps even advocate—Communist Chinese (PRC) entry.

C. *Adopt "Universality" plus a Dual Representation resolution on China*—follow a universality resolution of the above type with a resolution calling for seating of both Peking and Taipei as a solution to the pressing Chinese representation issue within the universality context.

D. *Adopt Dual Representation Alone*—propose a dual representation resolution on China without the universality framework. A number of variations are available, some more desirable and/or more saleable than others.

2. *Maintain our present policy*: The ROC will strongly urge that we take this course and will resist any other choice. But doing so is likely to lead to early passage (this year or 1972) of the Albanian Resolution seating Peking and expelling Taiwan. It therefore involves the greatest potential loss of prestige for the US. (Curiously, this option least jeopardizes improvement in relations with the PRC—who also see it as leading to their early victory.)

3. *Adopt "Universality"*: The concept of universality has much to recommend it: it is supported by the great majority of UN members, would appeal to domestic and international public opinion, and might help stem the tide in favor of the Albanian Resolution. But espousing universality would cause us difficulties in our bilateral relations with the ROC, the ROK, and the FRG (in addition to the PRC). It would not by itself settle the China issue. Even if it were specifically invited to come in, Peking would almost certainly refuse to do so while Taiwan remained. It is more likely that the UN would eventually yield and eject the ROC, than that the PRC would yield and accept seating alongside the ROC.

4. *A Combination of "Universality" plus a Dual Representation Resolution on China*: This is the formula most likely to head off defeat on the Chirep issue, in the short term at least. Placing the dual representation resolution within the philosophic basis of universality improves its chances for passage by making it more difficult to attack. Should the PRC refuse to enter on this basis, even though it would have been specifically invited, the onus would be on them, and the ROC would remain a member (unless it decided to withdraw—see paragraph 7 below). In the long run, however, the same considerations about a contest of wills noted in paragraph 3 above would apply.

5. *Dual Representation Alone*: The Chirep problem could be dealt with independently by offering a dual representation resolution without universality as a philosophic cloak. This course would have less appeal in the General Assembly, but would avoid the problems with the Koreans and probably the Germans which universality would raise. Such a resolution would stand a good chance of commanding majority support in the General Assembly and blocking the Albanian Resolution and would be seen as a realistic and forward-looking policy. However, it also would have the problem of durability mentioned in paragraphs 3 and 4 above. Taiwan doubtless would argue that it would prefer to withdraw from the UN rather than agree to dual representation (see paragraph 7).

6. *If we go the dual representation route*, we must decide whether to press the Important Question again. By dropping the Important Question, we probably could easily pass a dual representation resolution by a simple majority—but it could later be overturned by a simple majority. If we go for the Important Question and the Important Question passes, we would have to get a two-thirds majority for dual representation, which seems rather doubtful. On the other hand, if we were able to get a two-thirds majority, dual representation would be established on a reasonably durable basis. Our decision on tactics should be made after an assessment of the situation later in the year, and in consultation with our allies.

A dual representation resolution probably would have to express the view that the Security Council seat should go to the PRC since this is in keeping with Assembly sentiment on the issue. However, we could and should attempt to explore other possibilities of keeping that aspect open. The Security Council, regardless of any specific Assembly recommendation, would probably decide to award the China seat to the PRC following Assembly action to seat Peking.

7. *If the ROC remains adamantly opposed to dual representation* and consequently withdraws from the UN before or after adoption of a dual representation proposal, our objective of preserving a place for it in the UN obviously would have failed. A carefully organized effort would be required to persuade the ROC that withdrawal would be against its interest, and there is no assurance that this effort would succeed. At the same time, we should recognize that the security of Taiwan depends primarily on the US defense commitment, which would not be affected, and not on UN membership. Taiwan's economy would not be directly affected by loss of UN membership.

8. It has been occasionally suggested that the US also has the option of opposing the Albanian resolution, but in a relatively pro forma manner—assuming that since we are bound to fail, we should cut our losses and involve our prestige as little as possible. We believe that the

ROC would view such a stance as conspiring in its ejection from the UN and thus as a breach of good faith and that passage of the Albanian resolution, over even passive US opposition, would still be seen as a serious American defeat. Accordingly, it appears that this option would be less attractive than it initially might seem to be.

9. PRC membership would be troublesome to us and to the UN. However, the PRC probably would not try to wreck the organization and could not even if it tried.

10. Microstates, insurrectionary regimes, irredentist organizations, etc., do not pose unmanageable problems to universality. Southern Rhodesia might be a theoretical problem, but in practice the UN would find ways of excluding it as long as its present racial policies continue. No state currently recognizes its sovereignty.

11. Whether or not we strike out on a new path, close consultation with a number of countries is required. After the ROC itself, Japan most urgently requires consultation on Chirep.

a. If we go the universality route, we must also consult closely with our German, Korean, and Vietnamese allies. ROK interests probably cannot be entirely reconciled with our own, but compromises satisfying some of their most urgent requirements are possible. In the case of the FRG, difficulties need not arise provided the US maintains the position agreed by the Foreign Ministers of the US, UK, France and the FRG on December 2, 1970 (see Section V).

b. If we opt for dual representation, we must expect a period of major difficulties with the ROC, and it is possible that they would be of such a magnitude as to cause us to reconsider the choice of that policy option.

## *II. Introduction to the Problem*

We have been asked to study the question of UN membership in its totality. There is only one urgent problem, that of Communist China, but another is not far behind—East Germany which is already being pushed forward by the USSR. (The other divided countries, Korea and Vietnam, are not pressing matters.) If we adopted universality as a broad, philosophical approach to membership questions generally, this would give us a tactical advantage; but it would entail some cost in our relations with individual countries, particularly our Korean allies. No problem need arise with the FRG if we maintain the position agreed by the four Foreign Ministers (see Section V). If we depart from this position, we would have to expect a sharp FRG reaction.

On the Chinese Representation (Chirep) issue in the UN, the trend is clearly against us. Although we obtained a majority on the Important Question (IQ) resolution at the 25th General Assembly, support for the IQ will be subject to accelerating erosion. If we continue on our

present course, the Albanian resolution will pass before long. There is little doubt that a strategy looking to UN acceptance of the principles of universality and dual representation for China would be better calculated to prevent or delay the expulsion of the ROC than our present policy. However, there are risks and pitfalls to every policy option. These are analyzed in this paper.

Curiously, if our overriding interest is in laying the Chirep issue to rest, to improve the prospect for relations with the PRC, and yet to remain faithful to our ally on Taiwan, it might be best to continue with our present policy and see the PRC admitted to the UN over our opposition and even at the expense of expulsion of the ROC. However, this would involve a major American defeat on an issue of world importance.

If we chose to go down to defeat on the Albanian resolution, the US Government would be widely regarded as wrong-headed, static, inflexible, and unrealistic—even though it might be pursuing a carefully calculated policy of the lowest aggregate of liabilities abroad. There would also be a political price to pay for the fact that the US Government was suffering a major defeat at the hands of the Communists. It is clear, therefore, that a rational calculation of international advantages and disadvantages is not sufficient for the choice among policy options. Domestic political considerations must play an important part in the decision.

[Omitted here are Sections III–IX.]

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### 327. Telegram From the Embassy in the Republic of China to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>

Taipei, February 1, 1971, 0854Z.

436. Subject: Chirep. Ref: State 13771.<sup>2</sup>

1. During courtesy call by PolCouns and William J. Cunningham of Embassy Tokyo, Vice Foreign Minister Yang Hsi-k'un took opportunity to raise Chirep. He emphasized that he had not discussed his

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, UN 6 CHICOM. Secret; Nodis.

<sup>2</sup> Telegram 13771, January 27, transmitted an account of Ambassadors Chow and Liu's January 25 meeting with Assistant Secretaries Green and De Palma. (Ibid.) See Document 325.

views even with his colleagues, and that he was speaking personally and most confidentially. Yang prefaced his statement by remarking that there was little imagination "at higher levels" of GRC on Chirep.

2. Yang said that he views the Chirep situation this year as critical. He said that this year, as after the tie vote of 1966, his government, like that of U.S. is re-examining Chinese representation problem.

3. Yang referred to "exploratory" conversation Jan 25 between Ambassadors Liu and Chow and Assistant Secretaries Green and De Palma on which he had just received a report. Yang said he believes that some new formula, such as a "third resolution" is necessary to "preserve the Important Question." (Yang did not elaborate on this point.) He suggested a two-paragraph resolution: one paragraph would seat the People's Republic of China in the UN; a second paragraph would note that the seating of the PRC would be without prejudice to the rights of ROC in the United Nations and its specialized agencies, with the understanding that the differences between the two contending governments would always be subject to peaceful resolution by the parties concerned. After the adoption of such a resolution, the burden would then be on the ChiComs to show whether they would be prepared to accept this kind of a formula. Yang said it was essential that the Republic of China be called "the Republic of China" in such a resolution, even though it was understood that the ROC was government of "only Taiwan and a few small islands." (Yang did not mention the Security Council.)

4. Yang said it was most desirable that "third resolution" get a two-thirds majority. When asked if he thought this was essential, he replied that the vote should be as close to two-thirds as possible. In order to obtain a high vote for third resolution, Yang said it was necessary that the United States, Japan, and other close friends of the ROC be free to lobby as strongly as possible. He thought it also desirable to have as many co-sponsors of the third resolution as possible, including Japan, the U.S., and if possible past supporters of the Albanian Resolution. Yang said that if the 45 votes for the Albanian Resolution which represent hard-core ChiCom support could be reduced to 35 opposing the third resolution, he believed that at least 70 votes could be obtained for the resolution. There would, of course, have to be a tacit understanding that the GRC would oppose such a resolution, but it would not object to its friends voting for it.

5. Yang said that within the GRC bureaucracy it is extremely difficult to present a proposal of this sort to President Chiang, since the motives behind such a proposal could easily be misunderstood. He thought the best way would be a presentation by the United States, which would inform GRC that after thorough study, U.S. had come to the view that a third resolution was necessary to protect the interests

of both the GRC and itself. Yang said that President Nixon would be the ideal person to present such a proposal to President Chiang, but supposed this was impractical. He believed, however, that if President Nixon were to send Vice President Agnew, for whom President Chiang has highest respect and trust, there would be good chance of getting a sympathetic hearing. Yang emphasized that President Chiang could not publicly agree to a third resolution, but Yang believed he might “acquiesce” in one.

6. Yang reverted to the 1968 vote on the Italian study committee resolution which had been considered a GRC victory in Taipei. He said he had pointed out that of the 67 votes against the study committee, only six (Thailand, Philippines, Australia, Jordan, Paraguay, and Honduras) were really firm supporters of the GRC. After the 1970 Chirep vote, he had reminded a meeting of the GRC’s National Security Council of this vote in his report, and said he thought the situation more serious this year. President Chiang, who was chairman, asked for Yang’s views on Chirep this year. Yang said he demurred, saying the decision was purely political and should be made by the President himself. When Chiang insisted on hearing Yang’s views, Yang said that [for] the GRC to withdraw in any way or to be expelled from the United Nations would lead to international isolation, and for the GRC isolation is suicide. (Yang said that he had never discussed this statement with anyone outside the NSC.) Yang added that if the GRC were expelled, the Chinese Communists would enter the United Nations, and immediately lodge a formal charge against the United States of aggression against Taiwan. Yang said the United States, to protect its own interests, would then be forced to modify its policies in all East Asia.

7. *Comment:* Yang’s views are obviously not current GRC policy, and Department will recognize necessity of protecting him. For this reason, these views should not be discussed with Chinese or other foreign nationals. Yang had carefully thought out what he said, and we believe he would give full support within GRC to U.S. proposal for “third resolution.”

8. Department may wish to pass this on eyes only basis to Hong Kong, Tokyo, and USUN.

McConaughy

**328. Letter From the Representative to the United Nations (Yost) to Secretary of State Rogers<sup>1</sup>**

New York, February 8, 1971.

Dear Mr. Secretary:

As I terminate my mission at the UN and as a contribution to the review of US policy toward Chinese representation now under way, I should like to submit the following personal views on this subject.

The US would appear to have three options: (1) to continue to seek both to maintain the GRC presence and to exclude the PRC, either by holding to the "important question" tactic or by resorting to a new one; (2) to work out or encourage others to work out some form of dual representation which would have a reasonable chance of being approved by the General Assembly; (3) to cease to organize active opposition to PRC representation, even if it means GRC withdrawal or ouster.

I have for many years been an advocate of the second policy as the best means by which a GRC presence might be maintained after the time arrives when the demand for a PRC presence becomes irresistible. There is naturally a strong temptation to opt for this alternative in 1971 when it is becoming increasingly doubtful whether option one will any longer be viable, or in any case be viable for more than one more year. Yet before choosing the second option and putting our prestige behind it, we should consider carefully how realistic it actually is, whether it is any longer viable itself or whether, in attempting to make it so, we might not seriously and uselessly jeopardize our relations with *both* Chinas.

Indications from Taipei so far are that the Generalissimo is not prepared to abandon his long-standing policy of exclusive representation. Some of his advisers are beginning to think the unthinkable but it is clear they have no confidence in their ability to change the Generalissimo's mind and would expect that, if it is to be changed, the US would have to bring it about. We would have to convince him, not only that continuing the present course would lead to expulsion, but also (1) that a dual representation formula offers a good prospect of preventing expulsion and (2) that we will mount the same sort of worldwide campaign in support of such a formula as we have for the previous strategy.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, UN 6 CHICOM. Secret. Secretary Rogers acknowledged Yost's letter on February 23, and invited him to attend the meeting of the Senior Review Group of the NSC when it discussed NSSM 107. (Ibid.) See Document 335.

As to the attitude of the PRC, several diplomats at the last GA who have recent first-hand experience with the Chicoms, including Algard who is present Norwegian Ambassador to Peking, Petri longtime Swedish Ambassador there and Shahi Pakistani Permanent Representative, have expressed to us their firm conviction that the PRC will not come into the UN at this late date while the GRC is represented here in any form. The Secretary General has recently expressed to me the same opinion and this would also appear to be the British view. Given long-standing PRC policy, their relative indifference to UN representation and their probable belief that they will be invited in a year or two on their own terms, this judgment seems a plausible one.

As to evolving UN attitudes, it is probably true that a majority of member governments would at this time prefer to see both Chinas represented. If there were a reasonable chance both would accept, a majority, possibly even two-thirds, would we believe vote for dual representation. Many will wish, in light of the 1970 vote, seriously to explore this possibility.

If it should become clear, however, that, even if the GRC would tacitly acquiesce, the PRC would adamantly oppose such an arrangement, it would also soon become clear that the arrangement falls under option one rather than option two, that is, that it amounts to a new device for maintaining the GRC presence and excluding the PRC rather than a realistic means of securing the presence of both. As soon as this became clear, I believe a large number of those who favor real dual representation would fall away, a minority reverting to the present strategy but a majority swinging over to something like the Albanian resolution.

The growing purpose among UN members to involve the PRC in world problems through their presence in the UN is almost certainly an irreversible trend unless the Chicoms themselves should reverse it. There is a strong feeling that neither disarmament nor the problems of East Asia can be effectively dealt with in or out of the UN without Chicom participation. This feeling is likely before long to outweigh with many governments any regard for the status of the GRC. The US would therefore be unwise to count on a dual representation proposal as more than a temporary and inconclusive expedient.

If the above analysis is correct, we should weigh carefully whether, for a short-term advantage, it would be worthwhile (1) to exert the pressure and undertake the commitments necessary to bring the GRC around to dual representation and (2) to impede any possible rapprochement, however limited, with the PRC by mounting a worldwide campaign which, in their eyes and the eyes of many others, would be again designed to exclude them from the UN. It would seem that our policy toward the second Communist great power, and the role it might

play in balancing the first, should be determined by more fundamental considerations than whether one or both Chinas is represented in the UN. Hence the second option is probably not a real one and our actual choice may lie between continuing to pursue option one through a dual representation tactic or reconciling ourselves to option three, however we might choose to handle it tactically.

There is, however, one more important aspect to be considered—the effect on domestic and international opinion of whatever posture we may adopt. To continue to maintain our present policy seems to most foreign and an increasing proportion of domestic opinion to be both wrongheaded and unrealistic. On the other hand, to shift out of hand to option three would seem to many a cynical abandonment of the GRC, even if we maintained our security and political commitments to it outside the UN. From this angle dual representation seems the respectable and logical way out. Yet to go all out in support of it, as we could easily drift into doing, as we might have to do to persuade the GRC to acquiesce in it, would entail the disadvantages described above and would risk aggravating rather than mitigating the domestic sense of defeat when the effort eventually fails, as it almost certainly would.

Under these circumstances the lesser of evils, in extricating ourselves from this messy and anachronistic situation, seems to me to be to assume the lowest possible posture and not to promise or even to appear responsible for an outcome which we can no longer control. In my view we should say that we ourselves favor a dual representation solution, will ourselves vote for it and hope both Chinese governments will see the advantages of accepting it. On the other hand, we would not undertake a campaign in support of it, *vis-à-vis* either one or both Chinese governments or anyone else. We would tell the GRC that this seems to us the best solution but that we certainly could not assure its success and they would have to decide themselves whether it is in their interest either to support or to acquiesce in it. We would inform our other friends of our support of this solution but we would make clear that the responsibility for putting it forward and putting it over must rest with others than ourselves.

If it should unexpectedly prove that, despite the opposition of the PRC, the General Assembly adopts a dual representation formula, we would urge the GRC to keep its seat and the status quo would be preserved for another year or two. On the other hand, if support for dual representation evaporated in face of adamant PRC opposition, we would not have committed our prestige and our public opinion to another lost cause and would be no worse off than we are now.

The essential fact, in my judgment, is that, unless Communist China again dissolves into turmoil, a substantial majority of UN

members will, within another two years, vote to seat the PRC, even if it means the withdrawal or expulsion of the GRC. This is an evolution of opinion which the US, by very active support of dual representation, might delay for a year or so, but could not stop. The real problem is how to adapt to this evolution in the most graceful, dignified and politically acceptable fashion.

The above analysis relates of course only to representation of the GRC in the UN. It need not affect our defense commitments or economic and political association with the GRC nor need it weaken the ability of that Government to maintain for many years its sovereignty over Taiwan. Representation in the UN is by no means indispensable to national survival.

On the other hand, we would under those circumstances want to consider most seriously whether or not it was any longer to our advantage to hold that Taiwan is a part of China rather than a separate entity. Presumably the decision would be based primarily on our judgment whether the need for our maintaining a defense perimeter through Taiwan over the long term outweighed the disadvantages of continuing indefinitely a serious and irreconcilable territorial dispute with mainland China.

Sincerely yours,

Charles W. Yost

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**329. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

New York, February 10, 1971, 0020Z.

390. Subj: Chirep in SC.

1. As expected, Amb Farah (Somalia) raised Chirep on point of order at beginning of first SC meeting of 1971. His speech was carefully reasoned but pro-forma attack on right of GRC to represent China in SC. Reps of Syria, USSR, France, Poland and Italy spoke in support of Farah and Burundi would have but did not since Amb Terence away from NY. GRC and US spoke in rebuttal.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, UN 6 CHICOM. Limited Official Use. Repeated to Taipei, Hong Kong, Bujumbura, Mogadiscio, Tokyo, London, Paris, and Rome.

2. Farah's statement expressed his del's "strong objections" to acceptance of credentials of Amb Liu (GRC) and recalled Algerian move to have SC consider credentials of all SC members in 1968. However, he made no procedural moves, simply expressing desire to return to the matter "at a future date, after consulting like-minded delegations".

3. Remainder of Farah speech was routine re-hashing of arguments that GRC has no right to sit in UN and attempt to refute arguments that PRC did not want or was not fit for UN membership. Farah spoke confidently of growing awareness of injustice being done to PRC, which applied to take China seat as early as 1949. He referred to passage of IQ as dishonest procedural device to thwart will of GA majority and quoted statement by Senator McGovern as evidence of growing public demand for new approach to Chirep problem.

4. Speaking as President of Council, Yost "took note" of Farah's statement and said his gov't's position would be reflected in SC records. Reverting to role as US Rep, Yost totally rejected as unfounded Farah's allegations concerning so-called US aggression in Indochina.

5. Tomeh (Syria) said he was in full agreement with Farah's remarks and agreed that GRC Rep's credentials subject to objection under SC rules of procedure.

6. Malik (USSR) made brief, pro-forma statement along lines of his last-minute intervention on Chirep at 25th GA. He said Sov position on Chirep "well-known and unchanged" and called for GRC expulsion from all UN organs.

7. Kosciusko-Morizet (France) briefly said he fully shared views of Farah and had no doubt Chinese seat belonged to PRC.

8. Kulaga (Poland) chimed in with statement which appeared more enthusiastic than Malik's.

9. Vinci (Italy) simply noted that "GOI shares views of previous speakers on Chirep in UN".

10. Liu (China) made relatively mild statement arguing that SC not place for Chirep debate and affirming that GRC is authentic voice of people of China.

11. Speaking as Representative of US, Yost gave statement prepared by Dept stating that Liu's credentials approved in 1962 and not objected to since, and recalling GA Res 396 (V) pointing out that GA was proper place to discuss Chirep.

12. *Comment:* As Farah is aware that he does not have the votes to carry procedural motion on Chirep in present SC, we expect we have heard last of this question for a time.

**Yost**

### 330. Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Posts<sup>1</sup>

Washington, February 17, 1971, 2157Z.

26614. Subject: Chirep: Consultations in NY with Australian, New Zealand and Japan UN Missions.

1. Deptoffs Jenkins (EA/ACA), Shoemsmith (EA/ROC) and Feldman (IO/UNP) held consultations in NY Feb 10 with officers of Australian, New Zealand, and Japanese UN Missions.<sup>2</sup> USUN personnel accompanied. Following is summary these meetings. Septel reports meeting with Ambassador Liu, ROC Permanent Representative.<sup>3</sup>

2. Deptoffs met with Charles Mott, Australia UN Feb 10. Mott began by noting GOA in process of reviewing Chirep and he therefore under instructions listen but unable outline GOA views. Deptoffs stressed USG has not reached firm decisions on Chirep policy but wished hold full and frank consultations with key allies (particularly Japan, Australia and New Zealand, in addition ROC) for mutual exploration of situation and discussion of possible alternatives. Hopefully, consultation process would establish parameters and lead to consensus on best course of action. Also noted USG did not see this as necessarily remaining a bilateral consultation process with US consulting separately with GOA, GNZ, GOJ, etc. and then reporting views to GRC; we assumed individual countries would wish to consult with each other and with GRC.

3. Jenkins began substantive discussion by describing our view of Peking's attitude. Noted our belief PRC definitely wishes join UN, but for foreseeable future will insist upon prior ROC expulsion. PRC doubtless optimistic this will happen 1971 or 1972, wishes no change in manner in which issue presented to UNGA (IQ and Albanian Res), and will exert great pressure, particularly on countries with whom it has relations, to vote against IQ and for AR. Over next several months, countries negotiating PRC recognition may find this part of price. Peking probably fears US and allies will attempt new tactics to deprive it of victory almost in its grasp, probably expects this will be dual repre-

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, UN 6 CHICOM. Secret. Drafted by Feldman; cleared by Armitage, John A. Froebe, Jr., and Shoemsmith; and approved by Deputy Assistant Secretary Herz. Sent to Canberra, Tokyo, and Wellington and repeated to USUN, Taipei, and Hong Kong.

<sup>2</sup> Telegram 18209 to USUN, February 3, informed the Mission that Jenkins, Shoemsmith, and Feldman would be in New York for a continuation of exploratory discussions. (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 300, USUN, January–May 1971, Vol. VI)

<sup>3</sup> The meeting with Ambassador Liu was reported in telegram 27069, February 18. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, UN 6 CHICOM)

sentation formula, and will make every effort prevent this tactic from succeeding.

4. Shoemith discussed GRC attitudes noting that realistically we see only slim chance of its acquiescing in any substantial change from present Chirep policy and tactics. However, we believe possibility of such change is more than just theoretical. GRC has not yet made final decision or attempted to define limits beyond which it will not accept compromise. In addition, discussion of various alternatives to present policy is taking place within govt and KMT. We consider these circumstances moderately encouraging, and are holding frank talks with GRC to encourage further process of objective and careful examination of all facets of situation. We have given GRC our estimates of adverse IQ situation, will discuss specific alternatives and have stressed importance of not underestimating impact loss of UN membership (whether through expulsion or withdrawal) not only on GRC interests but on policy concerns of friendly governments wishing maintain close relations with and support for GRC. GRC has told us they believe IQ should be vigorously pressed at next UNGA and that they regard Security Council seat as matter of prime importance.

5. Feldman noted IQ situation adverse and that tide running against us. If policy unchanged, many countries which voted for IQ in 1970 likely to abstain in 1971 and IQ opponents probably already number 54, increase of 2 over last vote. Vote probably will be very close. Hard to predict outcome at this point, but most likely only three or four votes will separate winners and losers. Noting list certainly not exhaustive, Feldman summarized theoretical alternative dual representation and universality resolutions including general advantages and disadvantages of each. Noted that any alternative formula put forward must be seen by UNGA as reasonable and equitable attempt at solution of Chirep problem and not as gimmick to block PRC entry. If decision ultimately made to follow one of these alternatives, language should be worked out through consultation process to find most saleable and durable formula as far as Assembly concerned, and one which protects strategic concerns in area. In addition, would have to find answers to following questions: How deal with Security Council seat? Maintain present IQ and attempt get two-thirds vote for new Chirep formula or drop IQ and seek passage by simple majority? Put forward new IQ formula stating that resolution to expel ROC requires two-thirds vote instead of present formula that any proposal change China's UN representation requires two-thirds vote?

6. Mott expressed appreciation for full presentation, expressed particular gratification for observation that final policy decisions should be based upon consensus view major concerned allies. Mott, who had taken full notes, said his mission would be reporting to Canberra in detail.

7. Deptoffs lunched with Minister Yoshida and Kagami of Japan UN mission Feb 10, explaining purpose of their visit to NY for discussions with Australia, NZ and ROC Missions and noting Herz visit to Tokyo preceding week. In general luncheon discussion, Yoshida expressed personal view that separate universality resolution might prove troublesome but suggested that philosophic basis could be established simply by having dual rep res pay homage to universality principle in preamble. Yoshida principally concerned, however, to emphasize importance he personally attaches to retaining IQ formula at least for one more year, either in present or amended form as suggested para 5 above, as essential safeguard against passage of AR. He also alluded to "serious problems which Chirep poses for GOJ" and, although he not specific, seemed to have in mind conflicting forces within Japanese government and LDP. In connection with handling of SC seat, Yoshida said these problems so difficult that he thought GOJ might have to abstain on new resolution. Yoshida also seemed to feel that for similar reasons it might be difficult for GOJ to take lead in developing support for some new approach to Chirep problem.

8. Deptoffs met with Ambassador Scott, Small and Williams of NZ Mission and Hensley of NZ Embassy Washington Feb 10 pm, making presentation essentially similar that given Australia. In following discussion, New Zealanders noted their assessment IQ situation closely parallels our own. Hensley indicated that GNZ primary concern is to avoid expulsion or withdrawal of GRC since this likely generate strong public pressures in NZ to recognize PRC and cease support for GRC. Over time, Hensley suggested, such development could threaten bring Taiwan under PRC control, thus weakening security situation in East Asia. GNZ, therefore, would not wish to see GRC position lost because no new approach made to protect it. Fact that PRC would not agree to some new approach, Hensley stated, would not be "fatal disadvantage" if such approach would buy time to deal with problem of public opinion. New Zealanders saw problems with universality res but also (though independently since we had not mentioned Yoshida's remarks) thought preambular language of dual rep res might bow in universality direction. GNZ had not thought of quite as many variant dual rep reses as the six listed by Deptoffs, but since meeting between Hensley and Deptoffs (reported State 19896),<sup>4</sup> has been giving consideration to rather different style scenario under which two separate reses would be introduced in tandem, one seating PRC and one maintaining place for ROC. Idea was that countries would have complete and free choice: they could vote for both reses, or only for "country of their choice."

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<sup>4</sup> Dated February 5. (Ibid.)

NZ offs did not know whether Wellington intended that both reses be introduced by same set of co-sponsors and agreed with Deptoffs that this approach would not preclude Albanian res being introduced in its traditional form. Parliamentary handling of two parallel reses, therefore, would be quite tricky and perhaps ultimately uncontrollable. This led to general discussion of whether US and allies would have to get out in front in handling dual rep res or whether it might be preferable let others carry the ball. General view was that if dual rep was to succeed, US and allies would have to make major effort in its behalf. Scott stated his view that even those countries which strongly favored dual rep solution are "waiting for Godot" and would take no action until US intentions became clear.

9. Scott noted he returning to Wellington Feb. 13 for consultations and would discuss matter with Ministry. Both sides expressed desire hold further meetings in near future.

**Rogers**

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**331. Memorandum From the Country Director for the Republic of China (Shoesmith) to the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs (Green)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, February 26, 1971.

SUBJECT

Consequences of GRC Expulsion or Withdrawal from the UN—Weekend Reading

Outlined below is our assessment of the consequences of the loss of GRC representation in the United Nations on the political and economic stability of Taiwan, GRC relations with the United States, US policy toward the GRC and Taiwan, and GRC relations with third countries. We also have considered the impact on US-PRC relations.

We have tried to foresee the consequences under two different circumstances: (a) Although the GRC is willing to acquiesce in some compromise of its position as the sole representative of China in the UN

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, UN 6 CHINAT. Secret. Drafted by Charles T. Sylvester and Shoesmith and cleared by William T. Breer and William A. Brown.

and not to work against some form of alternate approach which might preserve a place for it in the UN, it is voted out through passage of an Albanian-type resolution or, (b) the GRC is unwilling to accept any compromise of its present position and either withdraws from the UN in the face of a proposed dual representation resolution or is voted out after actively working against passage of such a compromise resolution. In the case of withdrawal, we assume that the GRC's action is clearly final and from the entire UN system. We also assume that under either circumstance, the GRC's departure from the UN is followed closely by Peking's entry. If this did not occur, we believe that some of the more adverse consequences might be softened or postponed.

*Our conclusion* is that the most significant consequences of GRC expulsion or withdrawal from the UN are likely to be in the areas of US–GRC relations, the viability of our own policy toward the GRC and Taiwan and the GRC's bilateral relations with third states. The impact on internal political stability and on Taiwan's economy seems likely to be less direct and more dependent on how the GRC responds to this situation. We also believe that these consequences are likely to be more serious in the event of a GRC refusal to acquiesce in some compromise and withdrawal from the UN than if it should be expelled despite a willingness to compromise.

*I. Although willing to compromise, the GRC is expelled from the UN:*

*A. Internal political stability would probably not be greatly affected under these circumstances.*

(1) Expulsion would be a blow to the GRC's claim to legitimacy as the government of all of China in temporary exile on Taiwan. Such action by the UN could be interpreted as having stripped the GRC not only of any claim to be the government of China but also of any standing as a separate international entity. However, the present government's effective rule over the island is not dependent primarily on its status as the caretaker of the 1947 Constitution. Its control is based on the monopoly of force and a well-organized internal security system together with a record of material progress, limited democracy, social order and reasonably efficient government administration. There is no organized opposition to the government on the island of Taiwan and little likelihood that one could develop quickly.

(2) The GRC probably would seek to cushion the domestic impact of expulsion and would develop some form of self-justifying rationale for internal consumption.

(3) Mainlander members of the government, military and party structure on Taiwan seem generally to have been pessimistic about the future of GRC representation in the UN. For them, expulsion from the

UN would be more a confirmation of long-held fears than a cause for basic recalculation of national or personal goals.

(4) Politically aware Taiwanese probably would welcome any discrediting of the present government while tending to be anxious about the possibility of internal repression if the GRC were no longer worried about its international image. A few Taiwanese leaders may be concerned for the possibility that expulsion of the GRC might prejudice the possibility of obtaining international recognition of Taiwan as an independent entity.

(5) A significant minority of both mainlanders and Taiwanese probably would welcome the end of the annual struggle for the UN seat. Some mainlanders find this yearly test of the GRC's credentials to be an undignified process for the GRC to suffer through. Some Taiwanese resent the expenses involved in UN dues, contributions to specialized agencies and the costs of GRC diplomatic efforts which are devoted mainly to Chirep.

(6) In the final analysis, the domestic political consequences of expulsion will depend importantly on the government's response. If, out of fear that this development might increase disaffection with or provoke an overt challenge to mainlander rule, the government tightens internal security and gives way to repressive measures, tensions might build to the flash point. This situation probably could be avoided, however, if the government avoided such a response and particularly if, after a face-saving interval, it gave some signs of willingness to accommodate Taiwanese desires for greater participation in the central government. We are uncertain how the GRC will respond, but are inclined to believe that it probably will avoid over-reaction.

*B. The effect of expulsion on the economy of Taiwan would probably be transitory, if the GRC is able to manage the internal political consequences without too much strain.*

(1) Although the investment climate is partially formed by subjective factors such as international political respectability, investors should over the long run continue to be attracted to Taiwan by low wages, official interest in attracting foreign capital and growing domestic technical and managerial experience. The immediate result of expulsion probably would be some slowdown in new investment to allow for assessment of the situation—including such elements as the degree of investment risk associated with any changes in US or Japanese policies toward the GRC or the effect of investment in Taiwan on future opportunities for trade with mainland China. The duration and severity of the slowdown would depend also on how well the GRC handles the internal political consequences of expulsion.

(2) The Taiwan economy is heavily export-oriented. Since new investment (particularly American) is concentrated in production for

export, the economy as a whole would probably feel the effects markedly of a slowdown in the input of foreign capital if it were severe and extended. Loss of UN representation per se, however, should not adversely affect Taiwan's foreign trade patterns any more than in the case of the GRC's loss of bilateral diplomatic relations where there has been no noticeable fall-off in trade with the individual countries involved.

(3) Discontinuation of grant assistance from the UN Special Fund and technical assistance from UNDP would have minor drawbacks for the GRC, as would possible loss of membership in ECAFE. The relationship of the IMF and the IBRD to the UN is more indirect and their voting arrangements more favorable to the GRC. No Communist countries belong to either organization and there has been no pressure for PRC entry. On the other hand, ROK and the GVN are members of both IMF and the IBRD without being UN members.

C. *GRC relations with the United States might suffer new strains, the severity of which would depend upon the nature and extent of our efforts to prevent the GRC's expulsion and our policy subsequent to GRC departure from the UN.*

(1) If, after having agreed in consultation with us to acquiesce in a compromise, the GRC should feel that we had not made a determined effort to win support for it within the UN and to block passage of an Albanian-type resolution by all means available, it probably would conclude that we had not dealt with the GRC in good faith and that our purpose had been to mask our willingness to have the PRC admitted at the price of GRC expulsion. This would place a severe strain on US–GRC relations. If, on the other hand, we had demonstrated clearly our determination to preserve a place for the GRC in the UN, such strain is likely to be minimal even if our efforts fail.

(2) The GRC would probably press us after expulsion for renewed assurances of support, including reaffirmation of our defense commitment and provision of items of military equipment (submarines, F-4's, tanks) as evidence of our continued close cooperation and support.

(3) The Taiwanese Independence Movement in the United States probably would interpret expulsion from the UN as the beginning of the end for the GRC and might intensify efforts to unite Taiwanese overseas and publicize their cause. Our tolerance of their activities in the US would lead to increased tension in our relations with the GRC.

(4) The GRC would be even more sensitive to our policies toward the PRC, and is likely to urge strongly that we take no further steps toward improving relations on the grounds that this would further undermine the GRC position internationally.

D. *US policy toward the GRC and Taiwan would face new challenges if the GRC were expelled from the UN.*

(1) Without the imprimatur of UN membership it would be more difficult for us to shore up the international position of the GRC since the PRC and other governments unfriendly to the GRC undoubtedly would insist that the UN action had stripped the GRC of any international standing. Even governments friendly to the GRC probably would confront rising pressures from public opinion no longer to cooperate with the US in seeking to support the GRC internationally.

(2) The PRC also would argue that the denial of UN representation for the GRC in effect acknowledged that Taiwan is part of China and thus confirmed its claim to sovereignty over it. Within the UN, it probably would introduce resolutions condemning US interference in an internal matter and declaring our Mutual Defense Treaty to be an infringement on China's territorial integrity and sovereignty. Even if we succeed in defeating such resolutions, the debate will focus critical attention not only on our treaty commitment but on our continued support for the GRC, and even close allies might find it politically difficult to come to our support. Within the US, the effect of such controversy may be to increase pressures for a change in our basic policies toward the GRC and Taiwan.

(3) On the other hand, within the US GRC expulsion from the UN despite its willingness to acquiesce in a compromise solution might evoke some short-term sympathy for the GRC and opposition to PRC entry. This reaction probably would be strengthened if Peking were to trumpet the GRC's expulsion as a victory over the US and to seek immediately to exploit the UN as a forum for attacks on our policies.

(4) Over the longer term, however, the trend of international and US public opinion following the expulsion of the GRC probably will be in the direction of declining support for our present policies toward the GRC and Taiwan and increasing sentiment in favor of greater accommodation to PRC demands on this issue. This trend conceivably could lead to pressures for some change in our defense commitment and policy of continuing relations with and support for the GRC.

*E. GRC relations with third countries can be expected to erode further following expulsion.*

(1) The expulsion of the GRC from the UN probably would accelerate the erosion of its bilateral relations. Even governments such as Belgium, Australia and New Zealand which either are not now actively interested in establishing diplomatic relations with Peking or are unwilling to break with Taipei in order to do so would be under increasing internal pressures to recognize the PRC on its terms. Within several years following its expulsion, the GRC might be reduced to a position where it is recognized only by a handful of strongly anti-Communist countries (such as the Republic of Korea and South Vietnam) and, in

addition to the US and Japan, a scattering of other countries in Africa and Latin America.

(2) Having been willing to accept compromise in the UN, the GRC might succeed in slowing this trend if it made clear its willingness and desire to maintain diplomatic relations on the basis of its *de facto* position even with governments prepared to recognize Peking. Its ability to hold the line on this basis probably would be greater if the GRC also made clear its willingness to continue programs of technical assistance to and to participate in regional organizations even with countries recognizing Peking. It is possible, however, that having been expelled from the UN, the GRC might elect to contract its diplomatic efforts, turning inward to rely on the support of firm anti-Communist allies in East Asia, together with that of the US and Japan.

(3) The position of Japan would be vitally important for the GRC. Japan's major concern—that Taiwan not come under Chinese Communist control—would curtail its room for maneuver in changing its China policy even though domestic pressure probably would build for some new stance. The GOJ, however, would probably not move from its present position on the recognition of Communist China as long as there were no changes in the top LDP leadership, President Chiang were still alive and American policy on recognition did not change.

F. *US-PRC relations.* The PRC can be expected to oppose strongly any compromise solution of the Chirep problem. It will be harshly critical of US support for such a solution and probably will interpret it as a plot to insure the permanent separation of Taiwan from the mainland, charging that the US intends to maintain Taiwan as a permanent military base. Since defeat of a compromise solution and expulsion of the GRC would be a major victory for Peking, it probably would be less willing to agree to any compromise on the Taiwan issue which we might advance in our efforts to clear the way for some improvement in US-PRC relations. Peking also would attempt to exploit this circumstance in an effort to increase domestic and international pressures for a major change in US policy toward Taiwan and the GRC by refusing to resume the Warsaw talks and rejecting all unilateral initiatives, thus heightening the appearance that the US is isolated on the question of relations with mainland China.

## *II. The GRC refuses to compromise and either withdraws or is voted out of the UN.*

A. *The internal political consequences under this circumstance* probably would not be much different from those in the case of expulsion as outlined above.

(1) The fact that the GRC could insist that it had rejected any compromise of its claim to be the government of all of China and that the

UN's action was without legal effect in the absence of its agreement might have some stabilizing effect internally.

(2) However, a sizeable minority of influential mainlanders and of the Taiwanese elite would feel that President Chiang and the more reactionary elements in the KMT and the government had deprived Taiwan unnecessarily of hard earned international recognition.

(3) Supporters, on Taiwan and overseas, of Taiwanese separatism may see withdrawal under these conditions as a blow to their own hopes for the island, since the GRC will have thereby rejected a course that might have helped preserve Taiwan as an independent entity.

(4) Refusal to compromise in the UN probably would signify the predominance of hard-line conservatives in GRC policy councils. A likely concomitant, therefore, would be a tightening of internal security controls. In combination with reduced confidence in the viability of the government following the loss of UN membership, this could increase domestic political tensions.

B. *The immediate economic consequences* of GRC refusal to compromise and withdrawal from the UN might be somewhat greater than indicated in I/B above.

(1) Foreign investors might assume that GRC refusal to compromise not only makes Taiwan's future viability more uncertain but may make the climate on Taiwan less hospitable to the foreign investor. This assumption would be strengthened if, in the immediate aftermath of the GRC's withdrawal, there were anti-American or anti-foreign demonstrations.

(2) Taiwan's trade relations might be damaged if, in an effort to discourage further erosion of its bilateral relations, the GRC were to threaten pressures, either in the form of boycotts or suspension of trade, with countries which may seriously consider recognition of Peking in the aftermath of GRC withdrawal from the UN.

C. *US-GRC relations would be strained* if the GRC had urged strongly that we at least not support any compromise proposal but we had felt that it was in our best interests to do so. This would make more difficult continued cooperation subsequent to the GRC withdrawal.

(1) It is possible that under these circumstances there would be violent anti-American demonstrations on Taiwan, condoned if not encouraged by the GRC, protesting the US "betrayal." It would be in the GRC interest, however, to keep such demonstrations in check given its continued reliance on our defense commitment and political support.

(2) Other consequences for US-GRC relations indicated in I/C(3) and (4) above probably would be aggravated in the event of GRC refusal to compromise and its withdrawal from the UN.

D. *US policy toward the GRC and Taiwan* probably would be under greater pressure for change under these circumstances.

(1) GRC refusal to compromise probably would evoke little sympathy in the US and considerable resentment and impatience with its position. Both in the press and Congress, there probably would be strong sentiment that Chiang had refused to be helped, that we had discharged our responsibilities to the GRC and that we now should be guided solely by our national interests in seeking an accommodation with the PRC.

(2) The foregoing reaction would make our policy more vulnerable to such pressures as indicated in I/D(2) and (4) arising from PRC efforts to take advantage of the GRC withdrawal and the longer term trend of domestic and international opinion.

E. *GRC bilateral relations could be expected to erode even more rapidly* in this circumstance than if it were expelled despite a willingness to compromise.

(1) In this circumstance, it is unlikely that the GRC would become more flexible in defending its bilateral relations than its position in the UN. It is more likely that the GRC position would become more rigid, accompanied by less imaginative and more doctrinaire diplomatic efforts.

(2) Public opinion in other countries probably would swing against the GRC even more rapidly than in the US thereby placing the governments, even in Japan, under strong pressures to recognize Peking even at the expense of breaking with Taipei.

(3) If we had tried and failed to persuade the GRC to acquiesce in a compromise, our leverage in encouraging other governments to resist such pressures probably would be next to nothing.

F. *US-PRC relations*. Peking's initial reaction under this circumstance is not likely to be much different from that described in I/F above, particularly if it is clear that the US had sought to persuade the GRC to acquiesce in some dual representation compromise. Peking's subsequent reaction would depend partly on our own. The PRC might, for instance, seek to exploit the strains in US-GRC relations and lowered sympathy for the GRC in the US and other countries by holding out to Taipei some offer of a "Chinese settlement" of the Taiwan problem. It is also possible that the PRC, despite its limited capabilities, might attempt to mount a clandestine campaign on Taiwan to stir up anti-US, anti-foreign sentiment, at the same time sapping confidence in the Chiang government.